IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM [1]

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IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST
STAGE OF CAPITALISM [1]
A Popular Outline
PREFACE
¶1 The pamphlet here presented to the reader was written in the spring of 1916, in Zurich. In the conditions in which I
was obliged to work there I naturally suffered somewhat from a shortage of French and English literature and from a
serious dearth of Russian literature. However, I made use of the principal English work on imperialism, the book by J. A.
Hobson, with all the care that, in my opinion, that work deserves.
¶2 This pamphlet was written with an eye to the tsarist censorship. Hence, I was not only forced to confine myself
strictly to an exclusively theoretical, particularly economic analysis of facts, but to formulate the few necessary
observations on politics with extreme caution, by hints, in an allegorical language–in that accursed Aesopian
language–to which tsarism compelled all revolutionaries to have recourse whenever they took up their pens to write a
“legal” work.
¶3 It is painful, in these days of liberty, to reread these passages of the pamphlet, which have been distorted,
cramped, compressed in an iron vise on account of the censor. About the fact that imperialism is the eve of the socialist
revolution; that social-chauvinism (Socialism in words, chauvinism in deeds) is the utter betrayal of Socialism, complete
desertion to the side of the bourgeoisie, that this split in the working-class movement is bound up with the objective
conditions of imperialism, etc., I had to speak in a “slavish” tongue, and I must refer the reader who is interested in the
subject to the articles I wrote abroad in 1914-17, a new edition of which is soon to appear. Special attention should be
drawn to a passage on pages 119-20.[2] In order to show the reader, in a guise acceptable to the censors, how
shamelessly the capitalists and the social-chauvinists who have deserted to their side (and whom Kautsky opposes with
so much inconsistency) lie on the question of annexations, in order to show how shamelessly they screen the annexations
of their capitalists, I was forced to quote as an example–Japan! The careful reader will easily substitute Russia for Japan,
and Finland, Poland, Courland, the Ukraine, Khiva, Bokhara, Estonia or other regions peopled by non-Great Russians,
for Korea.
¶4 I trust that this pamphlet will help the reader to understand the fundamental economic question, viz., the
question of the economic essence of imperialism, for unless this is studied, it will be impossible to understand and
appraise modern war and modern politics.
Author
Petrograd
April 26, 1917
PREFACE TO THE FRENCH AND GERMAN EDITIONS [3]
I
¶1 As was indicated in the preface to the Russian edition, this pamphlet was written in 1916, with an eye to the tsarist
censorship. I am unable to revise the whole text at the present time, nor, perhaps, would this be advisable, since the main
purpose of the book was and remains: to present, on the basis of the summarized returns of irrefutable bourgeois
statistics, and the admissions of bourgeois scholars of all countries, a composite picture of the world capitalist system in
its international relationships at the beginning of the twentieth century–on the eve of the first world imperialist war.
¶2 To a certain extent it will even be useful for many Communists in advanced capitalist countries to convince
themselves by the example of this pamphlet, legal from the standpoint of the tsarist censor, of the possibility–and
necessity–of making use of even the slight remnants of legality which still remain at the disposal of the Communists,
say, in contemporary America or France, after the recent almost wholesale arrests of Communists, in order to explain the
utter falsity of social-pacifist views and hopes for “world democracy.” The most essential of what should be added to this
censored pamphlet I shall try to present in this preface.
II
¶1 It is proved in the pamphlet that the war of 1914-18 was imperialistic (that is, an annexationist, predatory, plunderous
war) on the part of both sides; it was a war for the division of the world, for the partition and repartition of colonies,
“spheres of influence” of finance capital, etc. Proof of what was the true social, or rather, the true class character of the
war is naturally to be found, not in the diplomatic history of the war, but in an analysis of the objective position of the
ruling classes in all the belligerent countries. In order to depict this objective position one must not take examples or
1
isolated data (in view of the extreme complexity of the phenomena of social life it is always possible to select any
number of examples or separate data to prove any proposition), but the whole of the data concerning the basis of
economic life in all the belligerent countries and the whole world.
¶2 It is precisely irrefutable summarized data of this kind that I quoted in describing the partition of the world in
1876 and 1914 (in Chapter VI) and the distribution of the railways all over the world in 1890 and 1913 (in Chapter VII).
Railways are a summation of the basic capitalist industries: coal, iron and steel; a summation and the most striking
indices of the development of world trade and bourgeois-democratic civilization. How the railways are linked up with
large-scale industry, with monopolies, syndicates, cartels, trusts, banks and the financial oligarchy is shown in the
preceding chapters of the book. The uneven distribution of the railways, their uneven development–sums up, as it were,
modern monopolist capitalism on a world-wide scale. And this summary proves that imperialist wars are absolutely
inevitable under such an economic system, as long as private property in the means of production exists.
¶3 The building of railways seems to be a simple, natural, democratic, cultural and civilizing enterprise; that is
what it is in the opinion of bourgeois professors, who are paid to depict capitalist slavery in bright colors, and in the
opinion of petty-bourgeois Philistines. But as a matter of fact the capitalist threads, which in thousands of different
intercrossings bind these enterprises with private property in means of production in general, have converted this railway
construction into an instrument for oppressing a thousand million people (in the colonies and semicolonies), that is, more
than half the population of the globe inhabiting the dependent countries, as well as the wage slaves of capital in the
“civilized” countries.
¶4 Private property based on the labor of the small proprietor, free competition, democracy, all the catchwords
with which the capitalists and their press deceive the workers and the peasants–are things of the distant past. Capitalism
has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and of the financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of
the population of the world by a handful of “advanced” countries. And this “booty” is shared between two or three
powerful world marauders armed to the teeth (America, Great Britain, Japan), who involve the whole world in their war
over the sharing of their booty.
III
¶1 The Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty dictated by monarchist Germany, and the subsequent much more brutal and
despicable Versailles Treaty dictated by the “democratic” republics of America and France and also by “free” England,
have rendered a most useful service to humanity by exposing both the hired coolies of the pen of imperialism and the
petty-bourgeois reactionaries, although they call themselves pacifists and Socialists, who sang praises to “Wilsonism,”
and who insisted that peace and reforms were possible under imperialism.
¶2 The tens of millions of dead and maimed left by the war–a war to decide whether the British or German group
of financial marauders is to receive the most booty–and those two “peace treaties,” are with unprecedented rapidity
opening the eyes of the millions and tens of millions of people who are downtrodden, oppressed, deceived and duped by
the bourgeoisie. Thus, out of the universal ruin caused by the war a world-wide revolutionary crisis is arising which,
however prolonged and arduous its stages may be, cannot end otherwise than in a proletarian revolution and in its
victory.
¶3 The Basle Manifesto of the Second International, which in 1912 gave an appraisal of the very war that broke out
in 1914 and not of war in general (there are different kinds of wars, including revolutionary wars), this Manifesto is now
a monument exposing the utter shameful bankruptcy and treachery of the heroes of the Second International.
¶4 That is why I reproduce this Manifesto as a supplement to the present edition,[4] and again and again I urge the
reader to note that the heroes of the Second International are as assiduously avoiding the passages of this Manifesto
which speak precisely, clearly and definitely of the connection between that impending war and the proletarian
revolution, as a thief avoids the place where he has committed a theft.
IV
¶1 Special attention has been devoted in this pamphlet to a criticism of “Kautskyism,” the international ideological trend
represented in all countries of the world by the “most prominent theoreticians” and leaders of the Second International
(Otto Bauer and Co. in Austria, Ramsay MacDonald and others in England, Albert Thomas in France, etc., etc.) and a
multitude of Socialists, reformists, pacifists, bourgeois-democrats and parsons.
¶2 This ideological trend is, on the one hand, a product of the disintegration and decay of the Second International,
and, on the other hand, the inevitable fruit of the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie, who, by the whole of their conditions
of life, are held captive to bourgeois and democratic prejudices.
2
¶3 The views held by Kautsky and his like are a complete renunciation of the very revolutionary principles of
Marxism which that writer has championed for decades, especially, by the way, in his struggle against socialist
opportunism (of Bernstein, Millerand, Hyndman, Gompers, etc.). It is not a mere accident, therefore, that the
“Kautskyans” all over the world have now united in practical politics with the extreme opportunists (through the Second,
or the Yellow International) and with the bourgeois governments (through bourgeois coalition governments in which
Socialists take part).
¶4 The growing world proletarian revolutionary movement in general, and the Communist movement in particular,
cannot dispense with an analysis and exposure of the theoretical errors of “Kautskyism.” The more so since pacifism and
“democracy” in general, which lay no claim to Marxism whatever, but which, like Kautsky and Co., are obscuring the
profundity of the contradictions of imperialism and the inevitable revolutionary crisis to which it gives rise, are still very
widespread all over the world. To combat these tendencies is the bounden duty of the Party of the proletariat, which must
win away from the bourgeoisie the small proprietors who are duped by them, and the millions of toilers who have been
placed under more or less petty-bourgeois conditions of life.
V
¶1 A few words must be said about Chapter VIII entitled: “The Parasitism and Decay of Capitalism.” As already
pointed out in the text, Hilferding, ex-“Marxist,” and now a comrade-in-arms of Kautsky and one of the chief exponents
of bourgeois, reformist policy in the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany,[5] has taken a step backward on
this question compared with the frankly pacifist and reformist Englishman, Hobson. The international split of the whole
working- class movement is now quite evident (the Second and the Third Internationals). The fact that armed struggle
and civil war is now raging between the two trends is also evident: the support given to Kolchak and Denikin in Russia
by the Mensheviks and “Socialist-Revolutionaries” against the Bolsheviks; the fight the Scheidemanns, Noskes and Co.
have conducted in conjunction with the bourgeoisie against the Spartacists [6] in Germany; the same thing in Finland,
Poland, Hungary, etc. What is the economic basis of this world-historic phenomenon?
¶2 Precisely the parasitism and decay of capitalism which are characteristic of its highest historical stage of
development, i.e., imperialism. As is proved in this pamphlet, capitalism has now singled out a handful (less than
one-tenth of the inhabitants of the globe; less than one-fifth at a most “generous” and liberal calculation) of exceptionally
rich and powerful states which plunder the whole world simply by “clipping coupons.” Capital exports yield an income
of eight to ten billion francs per annum, at prewar prices and according to prewar bourgeois statistics. Now, of course,
they yield much more.
¶3 Obviously, out of such enormous superprofits (since they are obtained over and above the profits which
capitalists squeeze out of the workers of their “own” country) it is possible to bribe the labor leaders and the upper
stratum of the labor aristocracy. And the capitalists of the “advanced” countries are bribing them; they bribe them in a
thousand different ways, direct and indirect, overt and covert.
¶4 This stratum of bourgeoisified workers, or the “labor aristocracy,” who are quite philistine in their mode of life,
in the size of their earnings and in their entire outlook, is the principal prop of the Second International, and, in our days,
the principal social (not military) prop of the bourgeoisie. For they are the real agents of the bourgeoisie in the
working-class movement, the labor lieutenants of the capitalist class, real channels of reformism and chauvinism. In the
civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie they inevitably, and in no small numbers, take the side of the
bourgeoisie, the “Versaillese” against the “Communards.”
¶5 Unless the economic roots of this phenomenon are understood and its political and social significance is
appreciated, not a step can be taken toward the solution of the practical problems of the Communist movement and of the
impending social revolution.
¶6 Imperialism is the eve of the social revolution of the proletariat. This has been confirmed since 1917 on a
worldwide scale.
July 6, 1920
N. Lenin
¶1 DURING the last fifteen to twenty years, especially since the Spanish-American War (1898), and the Anglo-Boer
War (1899-1902), the economic and also the political literature of the two hemispheres has more and more often adopted
the term “imperialism” in order to describe the present era. In 1902, a book by the English economist J. A. Hobson,
Imperialism, was published in London and New York. This author, whose point of view is that of bourgeois social
reformism and pacifism which, in essence, is identical with the present point of view of the ex-Marxist, K. Kautsky,
gives a very good and comprehensive description of the principal specific economic and political features of
imperialism. In 1910, there appeared in Vienna the work of the Austrian Marxist, Rudolf Hilferding, Finance Capital
(Russian edition: Moscow, 1912). In spite of the mistake the author commits on the theory of money, and in spite of a
certain inclination on his part to reconcile Marxism with opportunism, this work gives a very valuable theoretical
analysis of “the latest phase of capitalist development,” the subtitle of the book. Indeed, what has been said of
imperialism during the last few years, especially in an enormous number of magazine and newspaper articles, and also in
the resolutions, for example, of the Chemnitz and Basle congresses which took place in the autumn of 1912, has scarcely
gone beyond the ideas expounded, or, more exactly, summed up by the two writers mentioned above….
¶2 Later on, we shall try to show briefly, and as simply as possible, the connection and relationships between the
principal economic features of imperialism. We shall not be able to deal with non- economic aspects of the question,
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however much they deserve to be dealt with. We have put references to literature and other notes which, perhaps, would
not interest all readers, at the end of this pamphlet.[7]
I. CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION AND MONOPOLIES
¶1 The enormous growth of industry and the remarkably rapid process of concentration of production in ever-larger
enterprises are one of the most characteristic features of capitalism. Modern censuses of production give most complete
and most exact data on this process.
¶2 In Germany, for example, out of every 1,000 industrial enterprises, large enterprises, i.e., those employing more
than 50 workers, numbered three in 1882, six in 1895 and nine in 1907; and out of every 100 workers employed, this
group of enterprises employed 22, 30 and 37, respectively. Concentration of production, however, is much more intense
than the concentration of workers, since labor in the large enterprises is much more productive. This is shown by the
figures on steam engines and electric motors. If we take what in Germany is called industry in the broad sense of the
term, that is, including commerce, transport, etc., we get the following picture. Large-scale enterprises 30,588 out of a
total of 3,265,623, that is to say, 0.9 per cent. These enterprises employ 5,700,000 workers out of a total of 14,400,000,
i.e., 39.4 per cent; they use 6,600,000 steam horsepower out of a total of 8,800,000, i.e., 75.3 per cent, and 1,200,000
kilowatts of electricity out of a total of 1,500,000, i.e., 77.2 per cent.
¶3 Less than one-hundredth of the total enterprises utilize more than three-fourths of the total steam and electric
power! Two million nine hundred and seventy thousand small enterprises (employing up to five workers), constituting
91 per cent of the total, utilize only 7 per cent of the total steam and electric power! Tens of thousands of huge
enterprises are everything; millions of small ones are nothing.
¶4 In 1907, there were in Germany 586 establishments employing one thousand and more workers, nearly
one-tenth (1,380,000) of the total number of workers employed in industry, and they utilized almost one-third (32 per
cent) of the total steam and electric power.* [Figures taken from Annalen des Deutschen Reichs, 1911, Zahn.] As we
shall see, money capital and the banks make this superiority of a handful of the largest enterprises still more
overwhelming, in the most literal sense of the word, i.e., millions of small, medium and even some big “masters” are in
fact in complete subjection to some hundreds of millionaire financiers.
¶5 In another advanced country of modern capitalism, the United States of America, the growth of the
concentration of production is still greater. Here statistics single out industry in the narrow sense of the word and group
enterprises according to the value of their annual output. In 1904 large-scale enterprises with an output of one million
dollars and over numbered 1,900 (out of 216,180, i.e., 0.9 per cent). These employed 1,400,000 workers (out of
5,500,000, i.e., 25.6 per cent) and their output amounted to $5,600,000,000 (out of $14,800,000,000, i.e., 38 per cent).
Five years later, in 1909, the corresponding figures were: 3,060 enterprises (out of 268,491, i.e., 1.1 per cent) employing
2,000,000 workers (out of 6,600,000, i.e., 30.5 per cent) with an output of $9,000,000 (out of $20,700,000,000, i.e., 43.8
per cent).* [Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1912, p. 202.]
¶6 Almost half the total production of all the enterprises of the country was carried on by one- hundredth part of
these enterprises! These 3,000 giant enterprises embrace 25 branches of industry. From this it can be seen that, at a
certain stage of its development, concentration itself, as it were, leads right up to monopoly; for a score or so of giant
enterprises can easily arrive at an agreement, while on the other hand, the hindrance to competition, the tendency
towards monopoly, arises from the very dimensions of the enterprises. This transformation of competition into monopoly
is one of the most important–if not the most important–phenomena of modern capitalist economy, and we must deal
with it in greater detail. But first we must clear up one possible misunderstanding.
¶7 American statistics say: 3,000 giant enterprises in 250 branches of industry, as if there were only a dozen
enterprises of the largest scale for each branch of industry.
¶8 But this is not the case. Not in every branch of industry; are there large-scale enterprises; and moreover, a very
important feature of capitalism in its highest stage of development is so-called combination of production, that is to say,
the grouping in a single enterprise of different branches of industry, which either represent the consecutive stages in the
processing of raw materials (for example, the smelting of iron ore into pig iron, the conversion of pig iron into steel, and
then, perhaps, the manufacture of steel goods)– or are auxiliary to one another (for example, the utilization of scrap, or
of by-products, the manufacture of packing materials, etc.).
¶9 “Combination,” writes Hilferding, “levels out the fluctuations of trade and therefore assures to the combined
enterprises a more stable rate of profit. Secondly, combination has the effect of eliminating trade. Thirdly, it has the
effect of rendering possible technical improvements, and, consequently, the acquisition of superprofits over and above
those obtained by the ‘pure’ (i.e., non-combined) enterprises. Fourthly, it strengthens the position of the combined
4
enterprises compared with that of ‘pure’ enterprises, strengthens them in the competitive struggle in periods of serious
depression, when the fall in prices of raw materials does not keep pace with the fall in prices of manufactured
goods.”*[Finance Capital, Russ. ed., pp. 286-87.]
¶10 The German bourgeois economist, Heymann, who has written a book especially on “mixed,” that is, combined,
enterprises in the German iron industry, says: “Pure enterprises perish, they are crushed between the high price of raw
material and the low price of the finished product.” Thus we get the following picture: “There remain, on the one hand,
the big coal companies, producing millions of tons yearly, strongly organized in their coal syndicate, and on the other,
the big steel plants, closely allied to the coal mines, having their own steel syndicate. These giant enterprises, producing
400,000 tons of steel per annum, with a tremendous output of ore and coal and producing finished steel goods,
employing 10,000 workers quartered in company houses, and sometimes owning their own railways and ports, are the
typical representatives of the German iron and steel industry. And concentration goes on further and further. Individual
enterprises are becoming larger and larger. An ever-increasing number of enterprises in one, or in several different
industries, join together in giant enterprises, backed up and directed by half a dozen big Berlin banks. In relation to the
German mining industry, the truth of the teachings of Karl Marx on concentration is definitely proved, true, this applies
to a country where industry is protected by tariffs and freight rates. The German mining industry is ripe for
expropriation.”*[Hans Gideon Heymann, Die gernischten Werke im deutschen Grosseisengewerbe (Combined Plants in
the German Big Iron Industry–Tr.), Stuttgart, 1904, (SS. 256, 278).]
¶11 Such is the conclusion which a conscientious bourgeois economist, and such are the exception, had to arrive at.
It must be noted that he seems to place Germany in a special category because her industries are protected by high tariffs.
But this circumstance could only accelerate concentration and the formation of monopolist manufacturers’ combines,
cartels, syndicates, etc. It is extremely important to note that in free-trade England, concentration also leads to monopoly,
although somewhat later and perhaps in another form. Professor Hermann Levy, in his special work of research entitled
Monopolies, Cartels and Trusts, based on data on British economic development, writes as follows:
¶12 “In Great Britain it is the size of the enterprise and its high technical level which harbor a monopolist tendency.
This, for one thing, is due to the great investment of capital per enterprise, which gives rise to increasing demands for
new capital for the new enterprises and thereby renders their launching more difficult. Moreover (and this seems to us to
be the more important point) every new enterprise that wants to keep pace with the gigantic enterprises that have been
formed by concentration would here produce such an enormous quantity of surplus goods that it could dispose of them
only by being able to sell them profitably as a result of an enormous increase in demand; otherwise, this surplus would
force prices down to a level that would be unprofitable both for the new enterprise and for the monopoly combines.” In
England–unlike other countries where protective tariffs facilitate the formation of cartels–monopolist alliances of
entrepreneurs, cartels and trusts arise in the majority of cases only when the number of the chief competing enterprises is
reduced to “a couple of dozen or so.” “Here the influence of the concentration movement on the formation of large
industrial monopolies in a whole sphere of industry stands out with crystal clarity.”*[Hermann Levy, Monopole, Kartelle
und Trusts, Jena, 1909, SS. 286,290, 298.]
¶13 Half a century ago, when Marx was writing Capital, free competition appeared to the overwhelming majority of
economists to be a “natural law.” Official science tried, by a conspiracy of silence, to kill the works of Marx, who by a
theoretical and historical analysis of capitalism proved that free competition gives rise to the concentration of production,
which, in turn, at a certain stage of development, leads to monopoly. Today, monopoly has become a fact. The
economists are writing mountains of books in which they describe the diverse manifestations of monopoly, and continue
to declare in chorus that “Marxism is refuted.” But facts are stubborn things, as the English proverb says, and they have
to be reckoned with, whether we like it or not. The facts show that differences between capitalist countries, e.g., in the
matter of protection or free trade, only give rise to insignificant variations in the form of monopolies or in the moment of
their appearance; and that the rise of monopolies, as the result of the concentration of production, is a general and
fundamental law of the present stage of development of capitalism.
¶14 For Europe, the time when the new capitalism definitely superseded the old can be established with fair
precision: it was the beginning of the twentieth century. In one of the latest compilations on the history of the “formation
of monopolies,” we read:
¶15 “Isolated examples of capitalist monopoly could be cited from the period preceding 1860; in these could be
discerned the embryo of the forms that are so common today; but all this undoubtedly represents the prehistory of the
cartels. The real beginning of modern monopoly goes back, at the earliest, to the ‘sixties. The first important period of
development of monopoly commenced with the international industrial depression of the ‘seventies and lasted until the
beginning of the ‘nineties.” “If we examine the question on a European scale, we will find that the development of free
competition reached its apex in the ‘sixties and ‘seventies. Then it was that England completed the construction of its
old-style capitalist organization. In Germany, this organization had entered into a fierce struggle with handicraft and
domestic industry, and had begun to create for itself its own forms of existence.”
¶16 “The great revolution commenced with the crash of 1873, or rather, the depression which followed it and which,
5
with hardly discernible interruptions in the early ‘eighties, and the unusually violent, but short-lived boom about 1889,
marks twenty-two years of European economic history.” “During the short boom of 1889-90, the system of cartels was
widely resorted to in order to take advantage of the favorable business conditions. An ill-considered policy drove prices
up still more rapidly and still higher than would have been the case if there were no cartels, and nearly all these cartels
perished ingloriously in the smash. Another five-year period of bad trade and low prices followed, but a new spirit
reigned in industry; the depression was no longer regarded as something to be taken for granted: it was regarded as
nothing more than a pause before another boom.
¶17 “The cartel movement entered its second epoch: instead of being a transitory phenomenon, the cartels became
one of the foundations of economic life. They are winning one held of industry after another, primarily, the raw materials
industry. At the beginning of the ‘nineties the cartel system had already acquired–in the organization of the coke
syndicate on the model of which the coal syndicate was later formed–a cartel technique which could hardly be
improved. For the first time the great boom at the close of the nineteenth century and the crisis of 1900-03 occurred
entirely–in the mining and iron industries at least–under the aegis of the cartels. And while at that time it appeared to be
something novel, now the general public takes it for granted that large spheres of economic life have been, as a general
rule, removed from the realm of free competition.”* [Th. Vogelstein, Die finanzielle Organisation der kapitalistischen
Industrie und die Monopolbildungen (Financial Organization of the Capitalist Industry and the Formation of
Monopolies–Tr.J in Grundriss der Sozialökonomik (Outline of Social Economics–Tr.), VI Abt., Tübingen, 1914. Cf.,
also by the same author: Organisationsformen der Eisenindustrie und Textilindustrie in England und Amerika (The
Organizational Forms of the Iron and Textile Industry of England and America–Tr.), Bd. I, Lpz., 1910.]
¶18 Thus, the principal stages in the history of monopolies are the following: 1) 1860-70, the highest stage, the apex
of development of free competition; monopoly is in the barely discernible, embryonic stage. 2) After the crisis of 1873, a
lengthy period of development of cartels; but they are still the exception. They are not yet durable. They are still a
transitory phenomenon. 3) The boom at the end of the nineteenth century and the crisis of 1900-03. Cartels become one
of the foundations of the whole of economic life. Capitalism has been transformed into imperialism.
¶19 Cartels come to an agreement on the conditions of sale, terms of payment, etc. They divide the markets among
themselves. They fix the quantity of goods to be produced. They fix prices. They divide the profits among the various
enterprises, etc.
¶20 The number of cartels in Germany was estimated at about 250 in 1896 and at 385 in 1905, with about 12,000
firms participating.* [Dr. Riesser, Die deutschen Grossbanken und ihre Konzentration im Zusammenhange mit der
Entwicklung der Gesamtwirtschaft in Deutschland (The German Big Banks and Their Concentration in Connection with
the Development of the General Economy in Germany–Tr.), 4. Aufl., 1912, S. 149; Robert Liefmann, Kartelle und
Trusts und die Weiterbildung der volkswirtschaftlichen Organisation (Cartels and Trusts and the Further Development
of Economic Organization–Tr.), 2. Aufl., 1910, S. 25] But it is generally recognized that these figures are
underestimations. From the statistics of German industry for 1907 we quoted above, it is evident that even these 12,000
very big enterprises concentrate certainly more than half the steam and electric power used in the country. In the United
States of America, the number of trusts in 1900 was 185 and in 1907, 250. American statistics divide all industrial
enterprises into those belonging to individuals, to private firms or to corporations. The latter in 1904 comprised 23.6 per
cent, and in 1909, 25.9 per cent, i.e., more than one-fourth of the total industrial enterprises in the country. These
employed in 1904, 70.6 per cent, and in 1909 75.6 per cent, i.e., more than three-fourths of the total wage earners. Their
output amounted at these two dates to $10,900,000,000 and to $16,300,000,000, i.e., to 73.7 per cent and 79.0 per cent of
the total, respectively.
6
¶21 Not infrequently cartels and trusts concentrate in their hands seven- or eight-tenths of the total output of a given
branch of industry. The Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, at its foundation in 1893, concentrated 86.7 per cent of the
total coal output of the area, and in 1910 it already concentrated 95.4 per cent.** [Dr. Fritz Kestner, Der
Organisationstwang. Eine Untersuchung über die Kampfe zwischen Kartellen und Aussenseitern (Compulsory
Organization An Investigation of the Struggle Between Cartels and Outsiders –Tr.), Berlin, 1912, p. 11.] The monopoly
so created assures enormous profits, and leads to the formation of technical productive units of formidable magnitude.
The famous Standard Oil Company in the United States was founded in 1900: “It has an authorized capital of
$150,000,000. It issued $100,000,000 common and $106,000,000 preferred stock. From 1900 to 1907 the following
dividends were paid on the latter: 48, 48, 45, 44, 36, 40, 40, 40 per cent in the respective years, i.e., in all, $367,000,000.
From 1882 to 1907, out of total net profits amounting to $889,000,000, $606,000,000 were distributed in dividends, and
the rest went to reserve capital.”* [R. Liefmann, Beteiligungs- und Finanzierungsgesellschaften. Bine Studze über den
modernen Kapitalismus und das Eflektenwesen (Holding and Finance Companies–A Study in Modern Capitalism and
Securities–Tr.), I. Aufl., Jena, 1909, p. 212.] “In 1907 the various works of the United States Steel Corporation
employed no less than 210,180 workers and other employees. The largest enterprise in the German mining industry, the
Gelsenkirchen Mining Company (Gelsenkirchener Bergwerksgesellschaf t) in 1908 had a staff of 46,048 workers and
office employees.”**[Ibid., p. 218.] In 1902, the United States Steel Corporation already produced 9,000,000 tons of
steel.*** [Dr. S. Tschierschky, Kartell und Trust, Göttingen, 1903, p 13.] Its output constituted in 1901 66.3 per cent,
and in 1908, 56.I per cent of the total output of steel in the United States.**** [Th. Vogelstein, Organisationsformen, p.
275.] The output of ore was 43.9 per cent and 46.3 per cent, respectively.
¶22 The report of the American Government Commission on Trusts states: “Their superiority over competitors is
due to the magnitude of its enterprises and their excellent technical equipment. Since its inception, the Tobacco Trust has
devoted all its efforts to the substitution of mechanical for manual labor on an extensive scale. With this end in view it
bought up all patents that had anything to do with the manufacture of tobacco and spent enormous sums for this purpose.
Many of these patents at first proved to be of no use, and had to be modified by the engineers employed by the trust. At
the end of 1906, two subsidiary companies were formed solely to acquire patents. With the same object in view, the trust
built its own foundries, machine shops and repair shops. One of these establishments, that in Brooklyn, employs on the
average 300 workers; here experiments are carried out on inventions concerning the manufacture of cigarettes, cheroots,
snuff, tinfoil for packing, boxes, etc. Here, also, inventions are perfected.* [Report of the Commissioner of Corporations
on the Tobacco Industry, Washington, 1909, p. 266, cited according to Dr. Paul Tafel, Die nordamerikanischen Trusts
und ibre Wirkungen auf den Fortschritt der Technik (North American Trusts and Their Effect on Technical
Progress–Tr.), Stuttgart, 1913, p. 48.] “Other trusts also employ so-called developing engineers whose business it is to
devise new methods of production and to test technical improvements. The United States Steel Corporation grants big
bonuses to its workers and engineers for all inventions suitable for raising technical efficiency, or for reducing cost of
production.”** [Dr. P. Tafel, ibid., p. 49.]
¶23 In German large-scale industry, e.g., in the chemical industry, which has developed so enormously during these
last few decades, the promotion of technical improvement is organized in the same way. By 1908 the process of
concentration of production had already given rise to two main “groups” which, in their way, were also in the nature of
monopolies. First these groups constituted “dual alliances” of two pairs of big factories, each having a capital of from
twenty to twenty-one million marks: on the one hand, the former Meister Factory at Höchst and the Cassella Factory at
Frankfurt am Main; and on the other hand, the aniline and soda factory at Ludwigshafen and the former Bayer factory at
Elberfeld. Then, in 1905, one of these groups, and in 1908 the other group, each concluded an agreement with yet
another big factory. The result was the formation of two “triple alliances,” each with a capital of from forty to fifty
million marks. And these “alliances” have already begun to come “close” to one another, to reach “an understanding”
about prices, etc.* [Riesser, op. Cit., third edition, p. 547 et seq. The newspapers (June 1916) report the formation of a
new gigantic trust which combines the chemical industry of Germany.]
¶24 Competition becomes transformed into monopoly. The result is immense progress in the socialization of
production. In particular, the process of technical invention and improvement becomes socialized.
¶25 This is something quite different from the old free competition between manufacturers, scattered and out of
touch with one another, and producing for an unknown market. Concentration has reached the point at which it is
possible to make an approximate estimate of all sources of raw materials (for example, the iron ore deposits) of a country
and even, as we shall see, of several countries, or of the whole world. Not only are such estimates made, but these
sources are captured by gigantic monopolist combines. An approximate estimate of the capacity of markets is also made,
and the combines “divide” them up amongst themselves by agreement. Skilled labor is monopolized, the best engineers
are engaged; the means of transport are captured: railways in America, shipping companies in Europe and America.
Capitalism in its imperialist stage leads right up to the most comprehensive socialization of production; it, so to speak,
drags the capitalists, against their will and consciousness, into some sort of a new social order, a transitional one from
complete free competition to complete socialization.
¶26 Production becomes social, but appropriation remains private. The social means of production remain the
private property of a few. The general framework of formally recognized free competition remains, but the yoke of a few
monopolists on the rest of the population becomes a hundred times heavier, more burdensome and intolerable.
¶27 The German economist, Kestner, has written a book especially devoted to “the struggle between the cartels and
outsiders,” i.e., the capitalists outside the cartels. He entitled his work Compulsory Organization, although, in order to
present capitalism in its true light, he should, of course, have written about compulsory submission to monopolist
combines. It is instructive to glance at least at the list of the methods the monopolist combines resort to in the present
day, the latest, the civilized struggle for “organization”: 1) stopping supplies of raw materials (. . . “one of the most
important methods of compelling adherence to the cartel”); 2) stopping the supply of labor by means of “alliances” (i.e.,
of agreements between the capitalists and the trade unions by which the latter permit their members to work only in
cartelized enterprises); 3) stopping deliveries; 4) closing of trade outlets; 5) agreements with the buyers, by which the
latter undertakes to trade only with the cartels; 6) systematic price cutting (to ruin “outside” firms, i.e., those which
refuse to submit to the monopolists. Millions are spent in order to sell goods for a certain time below their cost price;
there were instances when the price of benzine was thus reduced from 40 to 22 marks, i.e., almost by half!); 7) stopping
credits; 8) boycott.
¶28 Here we no longer have competition between small and large, technically developed and backward enterprises.
We see here the monopolists throttling those which do not submit to them, to their yoke, to their dictation. This is how
7
this process is reflected in the mind of a bourgeois economist:
¶29
“Even in the purely economic sphere,” writes Kestner, “a certain change is taking place from commercial
activity in the old sense of the word towards organizational speculative activity. The greatest success no longer goes to
the merchant whose technical and commercial experience enables him best of all to estimate the needs of the buyer and
who is able to discover and, so to speak, ‘awaken’ a latent demand; it goes to the speculative genius” (?!) “who knows
how to estimate, or even only to sense in advance the organizational development and the possibilities of certain
connections between individual enterprises and the banks….”
¶30 Translated into ordinary human language this means that the development of capitalism has arrived at a stage
when, although commodity production still “reigns” and continues to be regarded as the basis of economic life, it has in
reality been undermined and the bulk of the profits go to the “geniuses” of financial manipulation. At the basis of these
manipulations and swindles lies socialized production; but the immense progress of mankind which achieved this
socialization, goes to benefit . . . the speculators. We shall see later how “on these grounds” reactionary, petty-bourgeois
critics of capitalist imperialism dream of going back to “free,” “peaceful,” and “honest” competition.
¶31 “The prolonged raising of prices which results from the formation of cartels,” says Kestner, “has hitherto been
observed only in relation to the most important means of production, particularly coal, iron and potassium, but has never
been observed in relation to manufactured goods. Similarly, the increase in profits resulting from this raising of prices
has been limited only to the industries which produce means of production. To this observation we must add that the
industries which process raw materials (and not semimanufactures) not only secure advantages from the cartel formation
in the shape of high profits, to the detriment of the finished goods industry, but secured also a dominating position over
the latter, which did not exist under free competition.”* [Kestner, op. cit., p. 254. ]
¶32 The words which we have italicized reveal the essence of the case which the bourgeois economists admit so
reluctantly and so rarely, and which the present-day defenders of opportunism, led by K. Kautsky, so zealously try to
evade and brush aside. Domination, and violence that is associated with it, such are the relationships that are typical of
the “latest phase of capitalist development”; this is what inevitably had to result, and has resulted, from the formation of
all-powerful economic monopolies.
¶33 We will give one more example of the methods employed by the cartels. Where it is possible to capture all or
the chief sources of raw materials, the rise of cartels and formation of monopolies is exceptionally easy. It would be
wrong, however, to assume that monopolies do not arise in other industries in which it is impossible to corner the
sources of raw materials. The cement industry, for instance, can find its raw materials everywhere. Yet in Germany this
industry too is strongly cartelized. The cement manufacturers have formed regional syndicates: South German,
Rhine-Westphalian, etc. The prices fixed are monopoly prices: 230 to 280 marks a carload, when the cost price is 180
marks! The enterprises pay a dividend of from 12 per cent to 16 per cent–and it must not be forgotten that the “geniuses”
of modern speculation know how to pocket big profits besides what they draw in dividends. In order to prevent
competition in such a profitable industry, the monopolists even resort to sundry stratagems: they spread false rumors
about the bad situation in their industry; anonymous warnings are published in the newspapers, like the following:
“Capitalists, don’t invest your capital in the cement industry!”; lastly, they buy up “outsiders” (those outside the
syndicates) and pay them “compensation” of 60,000, 80,000 and even 150,000 marks.* [L. Eschwege, “Zement” in Die
Bank, 1909, Vol. 1, p. 15 et seq.] Monopoly hews a path for itself everywhere without scruple as to the means, from
paying a “modest” sum to buy off competitors to the American device of “employing” dynamite against them.
¶34 The statement that cartels can abolish crises is a fable spread by bourgeois economists who at all costs desire to
place capitalism in a favorable light. On the contrary, monopoly which is created in certain branches of industry,
increases and intensifies the anarchy inherent in capitalist production as a whole. The disparity between the development
of agriculture and that of industry, which is characteristic of capitalism in general, is increased. The privileged position
of the most highly cartelized, so-called heavy industry, especially coal and iron, causes “a still greater lack of
coordination” in other branches of industry–as Jeidels, the author of one of the best works on “the relationship of the
German big banks to industry,” admits.* [O. Jeidels, Das Verhaltnis der deutschen Gtossbanken zur Industrie mit
besonderer Berucksichtigung der Eisenindustrie (The Relationship of the German Big Banks to Industry, With Special
Reference to the Iron Industry–Tr.), Leipzig, 1905, p. 271.]
¶35 “The more developed an economic system is,” writes Liefmann, an unblushing apologist of capitalism, “the
more it resorts to risky enterprises, or enterprises abroad, to those which need a great deal of time to develop, or finally,
to those which are only of local importance.”** [R. Liefmann, Beteiligungs- und FinanzierungsgeseUschaften, p. 434]
The increased risk is connected in the long run with the prodigious increase of capital, which overflows the brim, as it
were, flows abroad, etc. At the same time the extremely rapid rate of technical progress gives rise to increasing elements
of disparity between the various spheres of national economy, to anarchy and crises. Liefmann is obliged to admit that:
“In all probability mankind will see further important technical revolutions in the near future which will also affect the
organization of the economic system” … electricity and aviation…. “As a general rule, in such periods of radical
8
economic change, speculation develops on a large scale.” …*** [Ibid., pp. 465-66.]
¶36 Crises of every kind–economic crises most frequently, but not only these–in their turn increase very
considerably the tendency towards concentration and towards monopoly. In this connection, the following reflections of
Jeidels on the significance of the crisis of 1900, which, as we have already seen, marked the turning point in the history
of modern monopoly, are exceedingly instructive:
¶37 “Side by side with the gigantic plants in the basic industries, the crisis of 1900 still found many plants organized
on lines that today would be considered obsolete, the ‘pure’ ” (non-combined) “plants, which had arisen on the crest of
the industrial boom. The fall in prices and the falling off in demand put these ‘pure’ enterprises into a precarious position,
which did not affect the gigantic combined enterprises at all or only affected them for a very short time. As a
consequence of this the crisis of 1900 resulted in a far greater concentration of industry than the crisis of 1873: the latter
crisis also produced a sort of selection of the best equipped enterprises, but owing to the level of technical development
at that time, this selection could not place the firms which successfully emerged from the crisis in a position of
monopoly. Such a durable monopoly exists to a high degree in the gigantic enterprises in the modern iron and steel and
electrical industries owing to their very complicated technique far-reaching organization and magnitude of capital, and,
to a lesser degree, in the engineering industry, certain branches of the metallurgical industry, transport, etc.”* [Jeidels,
op. cit., p. 108.]
¶38 Monopoly! This is the last word in the “latest phase of capitalist development.” But we shall only have a very
insufficient, incomplete, and poor notion of the real power and the significance of modern monopolies if we do not take
into consideration the part played by the banks.
II. THE BANKS AND THEIR NEW ROLE
¶1 The principal and original function of banks is to serve as middlemen in the making of payments. In doing so they
transform inactive money capital into active, that is, into capital yielding a profit; they collect all kinds of money
revenues and place them at the disposal of the capitalist class.
¶2 As banking develops and becomes concentrated in a small number of establishments, the banks grow from
humble middlemen into powerful monopolies having at their command almost the whole of the money capital of all the
capitalists and small businessmen and also the larger part of the means of production and of the sources of raw materials
of the given country and in a number of countries. This transformation of numerous humble middlemen into a handful of
monopolists represents one of the fundamental processes in the growth of capitalism into capitalist imperialism; for this
reason we must first of all deal with the concentration of banking.
¶3 In 1907-08, the combined deposits of the German joint stock banks, each having a capital of more than a
million marks, amounted to 7,000,000,000 marks; in 1912-13, these deposits already amounted to 9,800,000,000 marks.
An increase of 40 per cent in five years; and of the 2,800,000,000 increase, 2,750,000,000 was divided amongst 57
banks, each having a capital of more than 10,000,000 marks. The distribution of the deposits between big and small
banks was as follows :*[ Alfred Lansburgh, “Funf Jahre deutsches Bankwesen” (Five Years of German Banking–Tr.), in
Die Bank, 1913, No. 8, p. 728.]
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DEPOSITS
In 9 Big Berlin
Banks
In the other 48 banks with a
capital of more than 10
million marks
In 115 banks with a
capital of 1-10
million marks
In the small banks (with a
capital of less than 1 million
marks)
1907-08 47 32.5 16.5 4
1912-13 48 36 12 3
¶4 The small banks are being ousted by the big banks, of which nine concentrate in their hands almost half the total
deposits. But we have left out of account many important details, for instance, the transformation of numerous small
banks practically into branches of the big banks, etc. Of this we shall speak later on.
¶5 At the end of 1913, Schulze-Gaevernitz estimated the deposits in the nine big Berlin banks at 5,100,000,000
marks, out of a total of about 10,000,000,000 marks. Taking into account not only the deposits, but the total bank capital,
this author wrote: “At the end of 1909, the nine big Berlin banks, together with their affiliated banks, controlled
11,300,000,000 marks, that is, about 83 per cent of the total German bank capital. The Deutsche Bank, which together
9
with its affiliated banks controls nearly 3,000,000,000 marks, represents, parallel with the Prussian State Railway
Administration, the biggest and also the most decentralized accumulation of capital in the old world.”* [
Schulze-Gaevernitz, “Die deutsche Kreditbank” in Grundriss der Sozialökonomik (The German Credit Bank in Outline
of Social economics–Tr.), Tübingen, 1915, pp. 12 and 137.]
¶6 We have emphasized the reference to the “affiliated” banks because this is one of the most important
distinguishing features of modern capitalist concentration. The big enterprises and the banks in particular, not only
completely absorb the small ones, but also “annex” them, subordinate them, bring them into their “own” group or
“concern” (to use the technical term) by acquiring “holdings” in their capital, by purchasing or exchanging shares, by a
system of credits, etc., etc. Professor Liefmann has written a voluminous “work” of about 500 pages describing modern
“holding and finance companies,”* [R. Liefmann, Beteiligungs- und Finanzierungsgesellschaften. Eine Studie über den
modernen Kapitalismus und das Effektenwesen, I. Aufl., Jena, 1909, p. 212.] unfortunately adding “theoretical”
reflections of a very poor quality to what is frequently undigested raw material. To what results this “holding” system
leads as regards concentration is best illustrated in the book written on the big German banks by Riesser, himself a
“banker.” But before examining his data, we will quote a concrete example of the “holding” system.
¶7 The Deutsche Bank “group” is one of the biggest, if not the biggest, of the big banking groups. In order to trace
the main threads which connect all the banks in this group, it is necessary to distinguish between “holdings” of the first,
second and third degree, or what amounts to the same thing, between dependence (of the lesser banks on the Deutsche
Bank) in the first, second and third degree. We then obtain the following picture:** [Alfred Lansburgh, “Das
Beteiligungssystem im deutschen Bankwesen” (The Holding System in German Banking — Tr.) in Die Bank, 1910, 1,
p.500.]
The Deutsche Bank
has holdings:
Dependence, 1st
Degree
Dependence, 2nd
Degree
Dependence, 3rd
Degree
Permanently in 17 banks of which 9 in 34 of which 4 in 7
For an indefinite
period
” 5 ” — —
Occasionally ” 8 ” ” 5 ” 14 ” ” 2 ” 2
Total in 30 banks of which 14 in 48 of which 6 in 9
¶8 Included in the eight banks dependent on the Deutsche Bank in the “first degree,” “occasionally,” are three
foreign banks: one Austrian (the Wiener Bankverein) and two Russian (the Siberian Commercial Bank and the Russian
Bank for Foreign Trade). Altogether, the Deutsche Bank group comprises, directly and indirectly, partially and totally,
87 banks; and the total capital–its own and others which it controls–is estimated at between two and three billion marks.
¶9 It is obvious that a bank which stands at the head of such a group, and which enters into agreement with half a
dozen other banks only slightly smaller than itself for the purpose of conducting exceptionally big and profitable
financial operations like floating state loans, has already outgrown the part of “middleman” and has become a combine
of a handful of monopolists.
¶10 The rapidity with which the concentration of banking proceeded in Germany at the end of the nineteenth and the
beginning of the twentieth centuries is shown by the following data which we quote in an abbreviated form from Riesser:
SIX BIG BERLIN BANKS
Year Branches in Germany Deposit banks and
exchange offices
Constant holdings in
German joint-stock
banks
Total establishments
1895 16 14 1 42
1900 21 40 8 80
1911 104 276 63 450
10
¶11 We see the rapid expansion of a close network of canals which cover the whole country, centralizing all capital
and all revenues, transforming thousands and thousands of scattered economic enterprises into a single national
capitalist, and then into a world capitalist economy. The “decentralization” that Schulze-Gaevernitz, as an exponent of
present-day bourgeois political economy, speaks of in the passage previously quoted, really means the subordination of
an increasing number of formerly relatively “independent,” or rather, strictly local economic units, to a single center. In
reality it is centralization, the enhancement of the role, the importance and the power of monopolist giants.
¶12 In the older capitalist countries this “banking network” is still more close. In Great Britain and Ireland, in 1910,
there were in all 7,151 branches of banks. Four big banks had more than 400 branches each (from 447 to 689); four had
more than 200 branches each, and eleven more than 100 each.
¶13 In France, three very big banks, Credit Lyonnais, the Comptoir National and the Societe Generale, extended
their operations and their network of branches in the following manner.* [Eugen Kaufmann, Das frantösische
BankaDesen, Tübingen, 1911, pp. 356.]
Number of branches and offices Capital in million francs
In the provinces In Paris Total Own capital Borrowed capital
1870 47 17 64 200 427
1890 192 66 258 265 1245
1909 1033 196 1229 887 4363
¶14 In order to show the “connections” of a big modern bank, Riesser gives the following figures of the number of
letters dispatched and received by the Disconto-Gesellschaft, one of the biggest banks in Germany and in the world (its
capital in 1914 amounted to 300,000,000 marks):
Letters received Letters dispatched
1852… 6,135 6,292
1870… 85,800 87,513
1900… 533,102 626,043
¶15 The accounts of the big Paris bank, the Credit Lyonnais, increased from 28,535 in 1875 to 633,539 in 1912.*
[Jean Lescure, L’epargne en France (Savings in France–Tr.), Paris, 1914, p. 52.]
¶16 These simple figures show perhaps better than lengthy disquisitions how the concentration of capital and the
growth of bank turnover are radically changing the significance of the banks. Scattered capitalists are transformed into a
single collective capitalist. When carrying the current accounts of a few capitalists, a bank, as it were, transacts a purely
technical and exclusively auxiliary operation. When, however, this operation grows to enormous dimensions we find that
a handful of monopolists subordinate to their will all the operations, both commercial and industrial, of the whole of
capitalist society; for they obtain the opportunity– by means of their banking connections, their current accounts and
other financial operations–first, to ascertain exactly the financial position of the various capitalists, then to control them,
to influence them by restricting or enlarging, facilitating or hindering credits, and finally entirely determine their fate,
determine their income, deprive them of capital, or permit them to increase their capital rapidly and to enormous
dimensions, etc.
¶17 We have just mentioned the 300,000,000 marks capital of the Disconto-Gesellschaft of Berlin. This increase of
the capital of the bank was one of the incidents in the struggle for hegemony between two of the biggest Berlin banks–
the Deutsche Bank and the Disconto. In 1870, the first was still a novice and had a capital of only 15,000,000 marks,
while the second a capital of 30,000,000 marks. In 1908, the first had a capital of 200,000,000, while the second had
170,000,000. In 1914 the first increased its capital to 250,000,000 and the second, by merging with another first-class big
bank, the Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein, increased its capital to 300,000,000. And of course, this struggle for
hegemony went hand in hand with the more and more frequent conclusion of “agreements” of an increasingly durable
character between the two banks. The following are the conclusions that this development of banking forces upon
specialists in banking who regard economic questions from a standpoint which does not in the least exceed the bounds of
the most moderate and cautious bourgeois reformism:
11
¶18 Commenting on the increase of the capital of the Disconto-Gesellschaft to 300,000,000 marks, the German
review, Die Bank, wrote: “Other banks will follow this same path and in time the three hundred men, who today govern
Germany economically, will gradually be reduced to fifty, twenty-five or still fewer. It cannot be expected that this latest
move towards concentration will be confined to banking. The close relations that exist between individual banks
naturally lead to the bringing together of the industrial syndicates which these banks favor…. One fine morning we shall
wake up in surprise to see nothing but trusts before our eyes, and to kind ourselves faced with the necessity of
substituting state monopolies for private monopolies. However, we have nothing to reproach ourselves with, except for
having allowed things to follow their own course, slightly accelerated by the manipulation of stocks.”* [A. Lansburgh,
“Die Bank mit den 300 Millionen” in Die Bank, 1914, , p. 426.]
¶19 This is an example of the impotence of bourgeois journalism which differs from bourgeois science only in that
the latter is less sincere and strives to obscure the essence of the matter, to conceal the wood by trees. To be “surprised ”
at the results of concentration, to “reproach” the government of capitalist Germany, or capitalist “society” (“ourselves”),
to fear that the introduction of stocks and shares might “accelerate” concentration in the same way as the German “cartel”
specialist Tschierschky fears the American trusts and “prefers” the German cartels on the grounds that they “may not,
like the trusts, excessively accelerate technical and economic progress”* [ S. Tschierschky, op.cit., p.128.]–is not this
impotence?
¶20 But facts remain facts. There are no trusts in Germany; there are “only” cartels–but Germany is governed by not
more than three hundred magnates of capital, and the number of these is constantly diminishing. At all events, in all
capitalist countries, notwithstanding all the differences in their banking laws, banks greatly intensify and accelerate the
process of concentration of capital and the formation of monopolies.
¶21 The banking system presents indeed the form of common bookkeeping and of the distribution of means of
production on a social scale, but only the form,” wrote Marx in Capital half a century ago (Russ. trans. Vol. III, part II, p.
144). [8] The figures we have quoted on the growth of bank capital, on the increase in the number of the branches and
offices of the biggest banks, the increase in the number of their accounts, etc., present a concrete picture of this “common
bookkeeping” of the whole capitalist class; and not only of the capitalists, for the banks collect, even though temporarily,
all kinds of money revenues–of small businessmen, office clerks, and of a tiny upper stratum of the working class. It is
“common distribution of means of production” that, from the formal aspect, grows out of the modern banks, numbering
some three to six of the biggest in France, and six to eight in Germany, control billions and billions. In substance,
however, the distribution of means of production is by no means “common,” but private, i.e., it conforms to the interests
of big capital, and primarily, of huge, monopoly capital, which operates under conditions in which the masses of the
population live in want, in which the whole development of agriculture hopelessly lags behind the development of
industry, while-within industry itself the “heavy industries” exact tribute from all other branches of industry.
¶22 In the matter of socializing capitalist economy the savings banks and post offices are beginning to compete with
the banks; they are more “decentralized,” i.e., their influence extends to a greater number of localities, to more remote
places, to wider sections of the population. Here is the data collected by an American commission on the comparative
growth of deposits in banks and savings banks:* [Statistics of the National Monetary Commission, quoted in Die Bank,
1910, I, p.1200.]
DEPOSITS (IN BILLIONS OF MARKS)
England France Germany
Banks Saving Banks Banks Savings
Banks
Banks Credit
Societies
Savings
Banks
1880 . . . 8.4 1.6 ? 0.9 0.5 0.4 2.6
1888 . . . 12.4 2.0 1.5 2.1 1.1 0.4 4.5
1908 . . . 23.2 4.2 3.7 4.2 7.1 2.2 13.9
¶23 As they pay interest at the rate of 4 per cent and 4.25 per cent on deposits, the savings banks must seek
“profitable” investments for their capital, they must deal in bills, mortgages, etc. The boundaries between the banks and
the savings banks “become more and more obliterated.” The Chambers of Commerce of Bochum and Erfurt, for
example, demand that savings banks be “prohibited” from engaging in “purely” banking business, such as discounting
bills; they demand the limitation of the “banking” operations of the post office.* [Die Bank, 1913, pp. 811, 1022; 1914,
p. 713.] The banking magnates seem to be afraid that state monopoly will steal upon them from an unexpected quarter. It
goes without saying, however, that this fear is no more than the expression of the rivalry, so to speak, between two
12
department managers in the same office; for, on the one hand, the billions entrusted to the savings banks are in the final
analysis actually controlled by these very same bank capital magnates, while, on the other hand, state monopoly in
capitalist society is merely a means of increasing and guaranteeing the income of millionaires in one branch of industry
or another who are on the verge of bankruptcy.
¶24 The change from the old type of capitalism, in which free competition predominated, to the new capitalism, in
which monopoly reigns, is expressed, among other things, by a decline in the importance of the Stock Exchange. The
review, Die Bank, writes: “The Stock Exchange has long ceased to be the indispensable medium of circulation that it was
formerly when the banks were not yet able to place the bulk of new issues with their clients.”** [Die Bank, 1914, p.316.
]
¶25 “‘Every bank is a Stock Exchange,’ and the bigger the bank, and the more successful the concentration of
banking, the truer does this modern aphorism become.”*[Dr. Oscar Stillich, Geid- und Bankroesen, Berlin, 1907, p. 169]
“While formerly, in the ‘seventies, the Stock Exchange, flushed with the exuberance of youth” (a “subtle” allusion to the
Stock Exchange crash of 1873, to the company promotion scandals, [9] etc.), “opened the era of the industrialization of
Germany, nowadays the banks and industry are able to ‘do it alone.’ The domination of our big banks over the Stock
Exchange… is nothing else than the expression of the completely organized German industrial state. If the domain of the
automatically functioning economic laws is thus restricted, and if the domain of conscious regulation by the banks is
considerably enlarged, the national economic responsibility of a few guiding heads is immensely increased,” so writes
the German Professor Schulze-Gaevernitz,**[Schulze-Gaevernit2, Die deutsche Kreditbank in Grundriss der
sozialökonomik, Tübingen, 1915, p. 101.] an apologist of German imperialism, who is regarded as an authority by the
imperialists of all countries, and who tries to gloss over a “detail,” viz., that the “conscious regulation” of economic life
by the banks consists in the fleecing of the public by a handful of “completely organized” monopolists. The task of a
bourgeois professor is not to lay bare the entire mechanism, or to expose all the machinations of the bank monopolists,
but rather to present them in a favorable light.
¶26 In the same way, Riesser, a still more authoritative economist and himself “a banker,” makes shift with
meaningless phrases in order to explain away undeniable facts:
“… the Stock Exchange is steadily losing the feature which is absolutely essential for national economy as a
whole and for the circulation of securities in particular–that of being not only a most exact measuring-rod, but
also an almost automatic regulator of the economic movements which converge on it.”* [Riesser, op. cit., 4th
ed, p. 629.]
¶27 In other words, the old capitalism, the capitalism of free competition with its indispensable regulator, the Stock
Exchange, is passing away. A new capitalism has come to take its place, bearing obvious features of something transient,
a mixture of free competition and monopoly. The question naturally arises: to what is this new capitalism “passing”? But
the bourgeois scholars are afraid to raise this question.
¶28 “Thirty years ago, businessmen, freely competing against one another, performed nine-tenths of the work
connected with their business other than manual labor. At the present time, nine-tenths of this “brain work” is performed
by officials. Banking is in the forefront of this evolution.”** [Schulze-Gaevernit2, “Die deutsche Kreditbank” in
Grundriss der Socialekonomik, Tübingen, 1915, p. 151.] This admission by Schulze-Gaevernitz brings us once again to
the question: to what is this new capitalism, capitalism in its imperialist stage, passing?
¶29 Among the few banks which remain at the head of all capitalist economy as a result of the process of
concentration, there is naturally to be observed an increasingly marked tendency towards monopolist agreements,
towards a bank trust. In America, not nine, but two very big banks, those of the billionaires Rockefeller and Morgan,
control a capital of eleven billion marks.* [Die Bank, 1912, 1, p. 435.] In Germany the absorption of the
Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein by the Disconto-Gesellschaft to which we referred above, was commented on in the
following terms by the Frankfurter Zeitung,[10] an organ of the Stock Exchange interests:
¶30 “The concentration movement of the banks is narrowing the circle of establishments from which it is possible to
obtain credits, and is consequently increasing the dependence of big industry upon a small number of banking groups. In
view of the close connection between industry and the financial world, the freedom of movement of industrial companies
which need banking capital is restricted. For this reason, big industry is watching the growing trustification of the banks
with mixed feelings. Indeed, we have repeatedly seen the beginnings of certain agreements between the individual big
banking concerns, which aim at restricting competition.”**[Quoted by Schulze-Gaevernitz, ibid.. p. 155.]
¶31 Again and again, the final word in the development of banking is monopoly.
¶32 As regards the close connection between the banks and industry, it is precisely in this sphere that the new role
of the banks is, perhaps, most strikingly felt. When a bank discounts a bill for a firm, opens a current account for it, etc.,
these operations, taken separately, do not in the least diminish its independence, and the bank plays no other part than
that of a humble middleman. But when such operations are multiplied and become an established practice, when the
bank “collects” in its own hands enormous amounts of capital, when the running of a current account for a given firm
13
enables the bank–and this is what happens–to obtain fuller and more detailed information about the economic position
of its client, the result is that the industrial capitalist becomes more completely dependent on the bank.
¶33 At the same time a personal union, so to speak, is established between the banks and the biggest industrial and
commercial enterprises, the merging of one with another through the acquisition of shares, through the appointment of
bank directors to the Supervisory Boards (or Boards of Directors) of industrial and commercial enterprises, and vice
versa. The German economist, Jeidels, has compiled most detailed data on this form of concentration of capital and of
enterprises. Six of the biggest Berlin banks were represented by their directors in 344 industrial companies; and by their
board members in 407 others, making a total of 751 companies. In 289 of these companies they either had two of their
representatives on each of the respective Supervisory Boards, or held the posts of chairmen. We find these industrial and
commercial companies in the most diverse branches of industry: insurance, transport, restaurants, theaters, art industry,
etc. On the other hand, on the Supervisory Boards of these six banks (in 1910) were fifty-one of the biggest industrialists,
including the director of Krupp, of the powerful “Hapag” (Hamburg-American Line), etc., etc. From 1895 to 1910, each
of these six banks participated in the share and bond issues of many hundreds of industrial companies (the number
ranging from 281 to 419).* [Jeidels, op. cit.; Riesser, op. cit.]
¶34 The “personal union” between the banks and industry is supplemented by the “personal union” between both
and the government. “Seats on Supervisory Boards,” writes Jeidels, “are freely offered to persons of title, also to ex-civil
servants, who are able to do a great deal to facilitate”relations with the authorities.”…”Usually, on the Supervisory Board
of a big bank, there is a member of parliament or a Berlin city councillor.”
¶35 The building, so to speak, of the big capitalist monopolies is therefore going on full steam ahead in all “natural”
and “supernatural” ways. A sort of division of labor is being systematically developed amongst some hundreds of kings
of finance who reign over modern capitalist society:
¶36 “Simultaneously with this widening of the sphere of activity of certain big industrialists” (joining the boards of
banks, etc.) “and with the allocation of provincial bank managers to definite industrial regions, there is a growth of
specialization among the directors of the big banks. Generally speaking, this specialization is only conceivable when
banking is conducted on a large scale, and particularly when it has widespread connections with industry. This division
of labor proceeds along two lines: on the one hand, relations with industry as a whole are entrusted to one director, as his
special function; on the other, each director assumes the supervision of several separate enterprises, or of a group of
enterprises in the same branch of industry or having similar interests.” … (Capitalism has already reached the stage of
organized supervision of individual enterprises.) … “One specializes in German industry, sometimes even in
West-German industry alone” (the West is the most industrialized part of Germany), “others specialize in relations with
foreign states and foreign industry, in information about the personality of industrialists and others, in Stock Exchange
questions, etc. Besides, each bank director is often assigned a special locality or a special branch of industry; one works
chiefly on Supervisory Boards of electric companies, another chemical, brewing, or beet-sugar plants, a third in a few
isolated industrial enterprises, but at the same time works on the Supervisory Boards of insurance companies…. In short,
there can be no doubt that the growth in the dimensions and diversity of the big banks’ operations is accompanied by an
increase in the division of labor among their directors with the object (and result) of, so to speak, lifting them somewhat
out of pure banking and making them better experts, better judges of the general problems of industry and the special
problems of each branch of industry, thus making them more capable of acting within the respective bank’s industrial
sphere of influence. This system is supplemented by the banks’ endeavors to elect to their Supervisory Boards men who
are experts in industrial affairs, such as industrialists, former officials, especially those formerly in the railway service or
in mining,” etc.* [Jeidels, op. cit., p. 57.]
¶37 We find the same system only in a slightly different form in French banking. For instance, one of the three
biggest French banks, the Credit Lyonnais, has organized a financial research service (service des etudes financieres),
which permanently employs over fifty engineers, statisticians, economists, lawyers, etc. This costs from six to seven
hundred thousand francs annually. The service is in turn divided into eight departments: one specializes in collecting
information concerning industrial establishments, another studies general statistics, a third with railway and steamship
companies, a fourth, securities, a fifth, financial reports, etc.* [An article by Eug. Kaufmann on French banks in Die
Bank, 1909, p. 851 et seq.]
¶38 The result is, on the one hand, the ever growing merger, or, as N. I. Bukharin aptly calls it, coalescence, of bank
and industrial capital and, on the other hand, the growth of the banks into institutions of a truly “universal character.” On
this question we think it necessary to quote the exact terms used by Jeidels, who has best studied the subject:
¶39 “An examination of the sum total of industrial relationships reveals the universal character of the financial
establishments working on behalf of industry. Unlike other kinds of banks, and contrary to the demand sometimes
expressed in literature that banks should specialize in one kind of business or in one branch of industry in order to
prevent the ground from slipping from under their feet– the big banks are striving to make their connections with
industrial enterprises as varied as possible regarding locality and branch of industry and are striving to eliminate the
unevenness in the distribution of capital among localities and branches of industry resulting from the historical
14
development of individual enterprises.” “One tendency is to make the connections with industry general; another
tendency is to make them durable and close. In the six big banks both these tendencies are realized, not in full, but to a
considerable extent and to an equal degree.”
¶40 Quite often industrial and commercial circles complain of the “terrorism” of the banks. And it is not surprising
that such complaints are heard, for the big banks “command,” as will be seen from the following example. On November
19, 1901, one of the big, so-called Berlin “D” banks (the names of the four biggest banks begin with the letter D) wrote
to the Board of Directors of the German Central Northwest Cement Syndicate in the following terms: “As we learn from
the notice you published in a certain newspaper of the 18th inst., we must reckon with the possibility that the next
general meeting of your syndicate, to be held on the 30th of this month, may decide on measures which are likely to
effect changes in your undertaking which are unacceptable to us. We deeply regret that, for these reasons, we are obliged
henceforth to withdraw the credit which had been hitherto allowed you…. But if the said next general meeting does not
decide upon measures which are unacceptable to us, and if we receive suitable guarantees on this matter for the future,
we shall be quite willing to open negotiations with you on the grant of a new credit.”* [Dr. Oscar Stillich, Geld- und
Bankwesen, Berlin, 1907, p. 148.]
¶41 As a matter of fact, this is small capital’s old complaint about being oppressed by big capital, but in this case it
was a whole syndicate that fell into the category of “small” capital! The old struggle between small and big capital is
being resumed at a new and immeasurably higher stage of development. It stands to reason that the big banks’
enterprises, worth billions, can accelerate technical progress with means that cannot possibly be compared with those of
the past. The banks, for example, set up special technical research societies, and, of course, only “friendly” industrial
enterprises benefit from their work. To this category belong the Electric Railway Research Association, the Central
Bureau of Scientific and Technical Research, etc.
¶42 The directors of the big banks themselves cannot fail to see that new conditions of national economy are being
created; but they are powerless in the face of these phenomena.
¶43 “Anyone who has watched, in recent years,” writes Jeidels, “the changes of incumbents of directorships and
seats on the Supervisory Boards of the big banks, cannot fail to have noticed that power is gradually passing into the
hands of men who consider the active intervention of the big banks in the general development of industry to be
necessary and of increasing importance. Between these new men and the old bank directors, disagreements of a business
and often of a personal nature are growing on this subject. The issue is whether or not the banks, as credit institutions,
will suffer from this intervention in industry, whether they are sacrificing tried principles and an assured profit to engage
in a field of activity which has nothing in common with their role as middlemen in providing credit, and which is leading
the banks into a field where they are more than ever before exposed to the blind forces of trade fluctuations. This is the
opinion of many of the older bank directors, while most of the young men consider active intervention in industry to be a
necessity as great as that which gave rise, simultaneously with big modern industry, to the big banks and modern
industrial banking. The two parties are agreed only on one point: that there are neither firm principles nor a concrete aim
in the new activities of the big banks.”* [Jeidels, op. cit., pp. 83-84]
¶44 The old capitalism has had its day. The new capitalism represents a transition towards something. It is hopeless,
of course, to seek for “firm principles and a concrete aim” for the purpose of “reconciling” monopoly with free
competition. The admission of the practical men has quite a different ring from the official praises of the charms of
“organized” capitalism sung by its apologists, Schulze-Gaevernitz, Liefmann and similar “theoreticians.”
¶45 At precisely what period were the “new activities” of the big banks finally established? Jeidels gives us a fairly
exact answer to this important question:
¶46 “The connections between the banks and industrial enterprises, with their new content, their new forms and
their new organs, namely, the big banks which are organized on both a centralized and a decentralized basis, were
scarcely a characteristic economic phenomenon before the nineties; in one sense, indeed this initial date may be
advanced to the year 1897, when the important ‘mergers’ took place and when, for the first time, the new form of
decentralized organization was introduced to suit the industrial policy of the banks. This starting point could perhaps be
placed at an even later date, for it was the crisis of 1900 that enormously accelerated and intensified the process of
concentration of industry and of banking, consolidated that process, for the first time transformed the connection with
industry into the actual monopoly of the big banks, and made this connection much closer and more active.”** [lbid., p.
181. ]
¶47 Thus, the twentieth century marks the turning point from the old capitalism to the new, from the domination of
capital in general to the domination of finance capital.
III. FINANCE CAPITAL AND THE FINANCIAL OLIGARCHY
15
¶1 “A steadily increasing proportion of capital in industry,” writes Hilferding, “ceases to belong to the industrialists who
employ it. They obtain the use of it only through the medium of the banks which, in relation to them, represent the
owners of the capital. On the other hand, the bank is forced to sink an increasing share of its funds in industry. Thus, to
an ever-increasing degree the banker is being transformed into an industrial capitalist. This bank capital, i.e., capital in
money form, which is thus actually transformed into industrial capital, I call ‘finance capital.’ ” “Finance capital is capital
controlled by banks and employed by industrialists.”* [R. Hilferding, Finance Capital, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1912, pp.
338-39.]
¶2 This definition is incomplete in so far as it is silent on one extremely important fact: the increase of
concentration of production and of capital to such an extent that concentration leads, and has led, to monopoly. But
throughout the whole of his work, and particularly in the two chapters which precede the one from which this definition
is taken Hilferding stresses the part played by capitalist monopolies.
¶3 The concentration of production; the monopolies arising therefrom; the merging or coalescence of the banks
with industry–such is the history of the rise of finance capital and such is the content of this term.
¶4 We now have to describe how, under the general conditions of commodity production and private property, the
“business operations” of capitalist monopolies inevitably become the domination of a financial oligarchy. It should be
noted that the representatives of bourgeois German– and not only German–science, like Riesser, Schulze-Gaevernitz,
Liefmann and others, are all apologists of imperialism and of finance capital. Instead of revealing the “mechanics” of the
formation of an oligarchy, its methods, the size of its revenues “innocent and sinful,” its connections with parliaments,
etc., etc., they obscure and embellish them. They evade these “vexed questions” by pompous and vague phrases, appeals
to the “sense of responsibility” of bank directors, by praising “the sense of duty” of Prussian officials, giving serious
study to the petty details of absolutely ridiculous parliamentary bills for the “supervision” and “regulation” of
monopolies, playing spillikins with theories, like, for example, the following “scientific” definition, arrived at by
Professor Liefmann: “Commerce is an occupation having for its object: collecting goods, storing them and making them
available.”* [R. Liefmann, op. cit., p. 476.] (The Professor’s italics.) . . . From this it would follow that commerce existed
in the time of primitive man, who knew nothing about exchange, and that it will exist under Socialism!
¶5 But the monstrous facts concerning the monstrous rule of the financial oligarchy are so glaring that in all
capitalist countries, in America, France and Germany, a whole literature has sprung up, written from the bourgeois point
of view, but which, nevertheless, gives a fairly truthful picture and criticism–petty-bourgeois, naturally–of this
oligarchy.
¶6 The “holding system,” to which we have already briefly referred above, should be made the cornerstone. The
German economist, Heymann, probably the first to call attention to this matter, describes the essence of it in this way:
¶7 “The head of the concern controls the principal company” (literally: the “mother company”); “the latter reigns
over the subsidiary companies” (“daughter companies”) “which in their turn control still other subsidiaries” [“grandchild
companies”], “etc. In this way, it is possible with a comparatively small capital to dominate immense spheres of
production. Indeed, if holding 50 per cent of the capital is always sufficient to control a company, the head of the
concern needs only one million to control eight million in the second subsidiaries. And if this ‘interlocking’ is extended,
it is possible with one million to control sixteen million, thirty-two million, etc.”* [Hans Gideon Heymann, Die
gemischten Werke im deutschen Grosseisengewerbe, Stuttgart, 1904, pp. 268-69.]
¶8 As a matter of fact, experience shows that it is sufficient to own 40 per cent of the shares of a company in order
to direct its affairs,** [Liefmann, Beteiligungsgesellschaften, etc., 1st ed., p. 258.] since a certain number of small,
scattered shareholders find it impossible, in practice, to attend general meetings, etc. The “democratization” of the
ownership of shares, from which the bourgeois sophists and opportunist so-called “Social-Democrats” expect (or say that
they expect) the ”democratization of capital,” the strengthening of the role and significance of small-scale production,
etc., is, in fact, one of the ways of increasing the power of the financial oligarchy. Incidentally, this is why, in the more
advanced, or in the older and more “experienced” capitalist countries, the law allows the issue of shares of smaller
denomination. In Germany, the law does not permit the issue of shares of less than one thousand marks denomination,
and the magnates of German finance look with an envious eye at England, where the issue of one-pound shares (= 20
marks, about 10 rubles) is permitted. Siemens, one of the biggest industrialists and “financial kings” in Germany, told the
Reichstag on June 7, 1900, that “the one pound share is the basis of British imperialism.”* [Schulze-Gaevernitz in
Grundriss da Sozialökonomie, V, 2, p. 110.] This merchant has a much deeper and more “Marxian” understanding of
imperialism than a certain disreputable writer who is held to be one of the founders of Russian Marxism [11] and
believes that imperialism is a bad habit of a certain nation….
¶9 But the “holding system” not only serves enormously to increase the power of the monopolists; it also enables
them to resort with impunity to all sorts of shady and dirty tricks to cheat the public, for the directors of the “mother
company” are not legally responsible for the “daughter company,” which is supposed to be “independent,” and through
the medium of which they can “pull off” anything. Here is an example taken from the German review, Die Bank, for May
16
1914:
¶10 “The Spring Steel Company of Kassel was regarded some years ago as being one of the most profitable
enterprises in Germany. Through bad management its dividends fell from 15 per cent to nil. It appears that the Board,
without consulting the shareholders, had loaned six million marks to one of its ‘daughter companies,’ the Hassia, Ltd.,
which had a nominal capital of only some hundreds of thousands of marks. This commitment, amounting to nearly treble
the capital of the ‘mother company,’ was never mentioned in its balance sheets. This omission was quite legal and could
be hushed up for two whole years because it did not violate any point of company law. The chairman of the Supervisory
Board, who as the responsible head had signed the false balance sheets, was, and still is, the president of the Kassel
Chamber of Commerce. The shareholders only heard of the loan to the Hassia, Ltd. long afterwards, when it had been
proved to have been a mistake”. . . (the writer should put this word in quotation marks) . . . “and when Spring Steel
shares dropped nearly 100 per cent, because those in the know were getting rid of them….
¶11 “This typical example of balance-sheet jugglery, quite common in joint-stock companies, explains why their
Boards of Directors are willing with a far lighter heart to undertake risky transactions than individual businessmen.
Modern methods of drawing up balance sheets not only make it possible to conceal doubtful undertakings from the
ordinary shareholder, but also allow the people most concerned to escape the consequence of unsuccessful speculation
by selling their shares in time while the individual businessman risks his own skin in everything he does….
¶12 “The balance sheets of many joint-stock companies put us in mind of the palimpsests of the Middle Ages from
which the visible inscription had first to be erased in order to discover beneath it another inscription giving the real
meaning of the document.” (Palimpsests are parchment documents from which the original inscription has been
obliterated and another inscription imposed.)
¶13 “The simplest and, therefore, most common procedure for making balance sheets indecipherable is to divide a
single business into several parts by setting up ‘daughter companies’–or by annexing such. The advantages of this system
for various objects–legal and illegal–are so evident that big companies which do not employ it are quite the exception.”*
[L. Eschwege, “Tochtergesellschaften” (Subsidiary companies — Tr.) in Die Bank, 1914, I, p.545.]
¶14 As an example of a huge monopolist company that extensively employs this system, the author quotes the
famous General Electric Company (to which we shall refer again later on). In 1912, it was calculated that this company
held shares in 175 to 200 other companies, dominating them, of course, and thus controlling a total capital of about
1,500,000,000 marks.** [Kurt Heinig, “Der Weg des Elektrotrusts” (The Path of the Electric Trust- Tr.) in Neue Zeit,
1912, 30 Jahrg., 2, p. 484. ]
¶15 All rules of control, the publication of balance sheets, the drawing up of balance sheets according to a definite
form, the public auditing of accounts, etc., the things about which well-intentioned professors and officials–that is, those
imbued with the good intention of defending and embellishing capitalism–discourse to the public, are of no avail. For
private property is sacred, and no one can be prohibited from buying, selling, exchanging or mortgaging shares, etc.
¶16 The extent to which this “holding system” has developed in the big Russian banks may be judged by the figures
given by E. Agahd, who for fifteen years was an official of the Russo-Chinese Bank and who, in May 1914 published a
book, not altogether correctly entitled Big Banks and the World Market.* [E. Agahd, Grossbanken und Weltmark. Die
wirtschaftliche und politische Bedeutung der Grossbanken im Weltmarkt unter Berücksichtigung ibres Einflusses auf
Russlands Volkswirtschaft und die deutschrussischen Beziehungen (Big Banks and the World Market. The economic and
political significance of the big hanks on the world market, with reference to their influence on Russia’s national
economy and GermanRussian relations.–Tr.), Berlin, 1914.] The author divides the big Russian banks into two main
categories: a) banks that come under the “holding system,” and b) “independent” banks–“independence,” however, being
arbitrarily taken to mean independence of foreign banks. The author divides the first group into three sub-groups: 1)
German holdings, 2) British holdings, and 3) French holdings, having in view the “holdings” and domination of the big
foreign banks of the particular country mentioned. The author divides the capital of the banks into “productively”
invested capital (in industrial and commercial undertakings), and “speculatively” invested capital (in Stock Exchange
and financial operations), assuming, from his petty-bourgeois reformist point of view, that it is possible, under
capitalism, to separate the first form of investment from the second and to abolish the second form.
¶17 Here are the figures he supplies:
BANK ASSETS
(According to Reports for October-November, 1913)
in millions of rubles
Groups of Russian Banks Capital invested
Productively Speculatively Total
17
a 1) Four banks: Siberian Commercial, Russian, International, and
Discount Bank
413.7 859.1 1,272.8
a 2) Two banks: Commercial and Industrial, and Russo-British 239.3 169.1 408.4
a 3) Five banks: Russian-Asiatic, St. Petersburg Private, Azov-Don,
Union Moscow, Russo-French Commercial
711.8 661.2 1.373.0
(11 banks) Total: a) = 1,364.8 1,689.4 3.054.2
b) Eight banks: Moscow Merchants, Volga-Kama, Junker and Co., St.
Petersburg Commercial (formerly Wawelberg), Bank of Moscow
(formerly Ryabushinsky), Moscow Discount, Moscow Commercial,
Moscow Private
504.2 391.1 895.3
(19 banks) Total: 1,869.0 2,080.5 3.949.5
¶18 According to these figures, of the approximately four billion rubles making up the “working” capital of the big
banks, more than three-fourths, more than three billion, belonged to banks which in reality were only “daughter
companies” of foreign banks, and chiefly of the Paris banks (the famous trio: Union Parisienne, Paris et Pays-Bas and
Societe Generale), and of the Berlin banks (particularly the Deutsche Bank and Disconto-Gesellschaft). Two of the
biggest Russian banks, the Russian (Russian Bank for Foreign Trade) and the International (St. Petersburg International
Commercial Bank), between 1906 and 1912 increased their capital from 44,000,000 to 98,000,000 rubles, and their
reserves from 15,000,000 to 39,000,000 “employing three-fourths German capital.” The first bank belongs to the Berlin
Deutsche Bank “concern” and the second to the Berlin Disconto-Gesellschaft. The worthy Agahd is deeply indignant at
the fact that the majority of the shares are held by the Berlin banks, and that, therefore, the Russian shareholders are
powerless. Naturally, the country which exports capital skims the cream: for example, the Berlin Deutsche Bank, in
placing the shares of the Siberian Commercial Bank on the Berlin market, kept them in its portfolio for a whole year, and
then sold them at the rate of 193 for 100, that is, at nearly twice their nominal value, “earning” a profit of nearly
6,000,000 rubles, which Hilferding calls “promoter’s profits.”
¶19 Our author puts the total “capacity” of the principal St. Petersburg banks at 8,235,000,000 rubles, about 8.25
billions, and the “holdings,” or rather, the extent to which foreign banks dominated them, he estimates as follows French
banks, 55 per cent; English, 10 per cent; German 35 per cent. The author calculates that of the total of 8,235,000,000
rubles of functioning capital, 3,687,000,000 rubles, or over 40 per cent, fall to the share of the syndicates Produgol and
Prodamet [12]–and the syndicates in the oil, metallurgical and cement industries. Thus, owing to the formation of
capitalist monopolies, the merging of bank and industrial capital has also made enormous strides in Russia.
¶20 Finance capital, concentrated in a few hands and exercising a virtual monopoly, exacts enormous and
ever-increasing profits from the floating of companies, issue of stock, state loans, etc., strengthens the domination of the
financial oligarchy and levies tribute upon the whole of society for the benefit of monopolists. Here is an example, taken
from a multitude of others, of the “business” methods of the American trusts, quoted by Hilferding: in 1887, Havemeyer
founded the Sugar Trust by amalgamating fifteen small firms, whose total capital amounted to 6,500,000 dollars.
Suitably “watered,” as the Americans say, the capital of the trust was declared to be 50,000,000 dollars. This
“over-capitalization” anticipated the monopoly profits, in the same way as the United States Steel Corporation anticipates
its future monopoly profits in buying up as many iron ore fields as possible. In fact, the Sugar Trust set up monopoly
prices, which secured it such profits that it could pay 10 per cent dividend on capital “watered” sevenfold, or about 70
per cent on the capital actually invested at the time the trust was formed! In 1909, the capital of the Sugar Trust
amounted to 90,000,000 dollars. In twenty-two years, it had increased its capital more than tenfold.
18
¶21 In France the domination of the “financial oligarchy” (Against the Financial Oligarchy in France, the title of
the well-known book by Lysis, the fifth edition of which was published in 1908) assumed a form that was only slightly
different. Four of the most powerful banks enjoy, not a relative, but an “absolute monopoly” in the issue of bonds. In
reality, this is a “trust of big banks.” And monopoly ensures monopolist profits from bond issues. Usually a borrowing
country does not get more than 90 per cent of the sum of the loan, the remaining 10 per cent goes to the banks and other
middlemen. The profit made by the banks out of the Russo-Chinese loan of 400,000,000 francs amounted to 8 per cent;
out of the Russian (1904) loan of 800,000,000 francs the profit amounted to 10 per cent; and out of the Moroccan (1904)
loan of 62,500,000 francs it amounted to 18.75 per cent. Capitalism, which began its development with petty usury
capital, is ending its development with gigantic usury capital. “The French,” says Lysis, “are the usurers of Europe.” All
the conditions of economic life are being profoundly modified by this transformation of capitalism. With a stationary
population, and stagnant industry, commerce and shipping, the “country” can grow rich by usury. “Fifty persons,
representing a capital of 8,000,000 francs, can control 2,000,000,000 francs deposited in four banks.” The “holding
system,” with which we are already familiar, leads to the same result. One of the biggest banks, the Societe Generale, for
instance, issues 64,000 bonds for its “daughter company,” the Egyptian Sugar Refineries. The bonds are issued at 150 per
cent, i.e., the bank gains 50 centimes on the franc. The dividends of the new company were found to be fictitious the
“public” lost from go to 100 million francs. “One of the directors of the Societe Generale was a member of the board of
directors of the Sugar Refineries.” It is not surprising that the author is driven to the conclusion that “the French Republic
is a financial monarchy”; “it is the complete domination of the financial oligarchy; the latter dominates over the press
and the government.”* [Lysis, Contre l’oligarchie financiere en France (Against the Financial Oligarchy in
France–Tr.), 5 ed., Paris, 1908, pp. 11, 12, 26, 39, 40, 48.]
¶22 The extraordinary high rate of profit obtained from the issue of securities, which is one of the principal
functions of finance capital, plays a very important part in the development and consolidation of the financial oligarchy.
“There is not a single business of this type within the country that brings in profits even approximately equal to those
obtained from the flotation of foreign loans,” says the German magazine, Die Bank.** [Die Bank, 1913, No. 7, p. 630. ]
¶23 “No banking operation brings in profits comparable with those obtained from the issue of securities!” According
to the German Economist, the average annual profits made on the issue of industrial stock were as follows:
Per cent Per cent
1895 38.6 1898 67.7
1896 36.1 1899 66.9
1897 66.7 1900 55.2
¶24 “In the ten years from 1891 to 1900 more than a billion marks were ‘earned’ by issuing German industrial
stock.”*** [Stillich, op. cit., p. 143, also W. Sombart, Die deutscbe Volleswirtschaft im 19. Jahrhundert (German
National Economy in the Nineteenth Century–Tr.), 2. Aufl., 1909, S. 526, Anlage 8.]
¶25 During periods of industrial boom, the profits of finance capital are immense, but during periods of depression,
small and unsound businesses go out of existence; the big banks acquire “holdings” in them by buying them up for a
mere song, or participate in profitable schemes for their “reconstruction” and “reorganization.” In the “reconstruction” of
undertakings which have been running at a loss, “the share capital is written down, that is, profits are distributed on a
smaller capital and continue to be calculated on this smaller basis. Or, if the income has fallen to zero new capital is
called in, which, combined with the old and less remunerative capital, will bring in an adequate return. Incidentally,”
adds Hilferding, “all these reorganizations and reconstructions have a twofold significance for the banks: first, as
profitable transactions; and secondly, as opportunities for securing control of the companies in difficulties.”* [Finance
Capital, p. 172.]
¶26 Here is an instance. The Union Mining Company of Dortmund was founded in 1872. Share capital was issued
to the amount of nearly 40,000,000 marks and the market price of the shares rose to 170 after it had paid a 12 per cent
dividend for its first year. Finance capital skimmed the cream and earned a trifle of something like 28,000,000 marks.
The principal sponsor of this company was that very big German Disconto-Gesellschaft which so successfully attained a
capital of 300,000,000 marks. Later, the dividends of the Union declined to nil: the shareholders had to consent to a
“writing down” of capital, that is, to losing some of it in order not to lose it all. By a series of “reconstructions,” more
than 73,000,000 marks were written off the books of the Union in the course of thirty years. “At the present time, the
original shareholders of the company possess only 5 per cent of the nominal value of their shares,”* [Stillich, op. cit., p.
138, and Liefmann, p. 51.] but the banks “earned something” out of every “reconstruction.”
¶27 Speculation in land situated in the suburbs of rapidly growing big towns is a particularly profitable operation for
finance capital. The monopoly of the banks merges here with the monopoly of ground rent and with monopoly of the
means of communications, since the rise in the price of land and the possibility of selling it profitably in allotments, etc.,
is mainly dependent on good means of communication with the center of the town; and these means of communication
are in the hands of large companies which are connected, by means of the holding system and by the distribution of
positions on the directorates, with the interested banks. As a result we get what the German writer, L. Eschwege, a
contributor to Die Bank, who has made a special study of real estate business and mortgages, etc., calls a “bog.” Frantic
speculation in suburban building lots; collapse of building enterprises (like that of the Berlin firm of Boswau and
Knauer, which raked in as much as 100,000,000 marks with the help of the “sound and solid” Deutsche Bank– the latter,
of course, acting through the holding system, i.e., secretly, behind the scenes, and getting out of it with a loss of “only”
12,000,000 marks), then the ruin of small proprietors and of workers who get nothing from the fictitious building firms,
19
fraudulent deals with the “honest” Berlin police and administration for the purpose of gaining control of the issue of
building site tenders, building licenses, etc., etc.* [ In Die Bank, 1913, p. 952, L, Eschwege, Der Sumpf; ibid., 1912, 1, p.
223 et seq. ]
¶28 “American ethics,” which the European professors and well-meaning bourgeois so hypocritically deplore, have,
in the age of finance capital, become the ethics of literally every large city in every country.
¶29 At the beginning of 1914, there was talk in Berlin of the formation of a “transport trust,” i.e., of establishing
“community of interests” between the three Berlin transport undertakings: The city electric railway, the tramway
company and the omnibus company. “We have known,” wrote Die Bank, “that this plan is contemplated since it became
known that the majority of the shares in the bus company had been acquired by the other two transport companies…. We
may fully believe those who are pursuing this aim when they say that by uniting the transport services, they will secure
economies, part of which will in time benefit the public. But the question is complicated by the fact that behind the
transport trust that is being formed are the banks, which, if they desire, can subordinate the means of transportation,
which they have monopolized, to the interests of their real estate business. To be convinced of the reasonableness of such
a conjecture, we need only recall that the interests of the big bank that encouraged the formation of the Elevated Railway
Company were already involved in it at the time the company was formed. That is to say: the interests of this transport
undertaking were interlocked with the real estate interests. The point is that the eastern line of this railway was to run
through land which, when it became certain the line was to be laid down, this bank sold at an enormous profit for itself
and for several partners in the transactions.”…* [“Verkehrstrust” in Die Bank, 1914, I, p. 89. ]
¶30 A monopoly, once it is formed and controls thousands of millions, inevitably penetrates into every sphere of
public life. regardless of the form of government and all other “details.” In the economic literature of Germany one
usually comes across obsequious praise of the integrity of the Prussian bureaucracy, and allusions to the French Panama
scandal [13] and to political corruption in America. But the fact is that even the bourgeois literature devoted to German
banking matters constantly has to go far beyond the field of purely banking operations and to speak, for instance, about
“the attraction of the banks” in reference to the increasing frequency with which public officials take employment with
the banks, as follows: “How about the integrity of a state official who in his inmost heart is aspiring to a soft job in the
Behrenstrasse?”** [“Der Zug zur Bank” The Attraction of the Bank–Tr.) in Die Bank, 1909, I, p. 79. ] (the street in
Berlin in which the head office of the Deutsche Bank is situated). In 1909, the publisher of Die Bank, Alfred Lansburgh,
wrote an article entitled “The Economic Significance of Byzantinism,” in which he incidentally referred to Wilhelm II’s
tour of Palestine, and to “the im mediate result of this journey, the construction of the Baghdad railway, that fatal ‘great
product of German enterprise,’ which is more responsible for the ‘encirclement’ than all our political blunders put
together.”* [Ibid., p. 301. ] (By encirclement is meant the policy of Edward VII to isolate Germany and surround her
with an imperialist anti-German alliance.) In 1911, Eschwege, the contributor to this same magazine to whom we have
already referred, wrote an article entitled “Plutocracy and Bureaucracy,” in which he exposed, for example, the case of a
German official named Volker, who was a zealous member of the Cartel Committee and who, it turned out some time
later, obtained a lucrative post in the biggest cartel, i.e., the Steel Syndicate. Similar cases, by no means casual, forced
this bourgeois author to admit that “the economic liberty guaranteed by the German Constitution has become in many
departments of economic life, a meaningless phrase” and that under the existing rule of the plutocracy, “even the widest
political liberty cannot save us from being converted into a nation of unfree people.”** [Ibid 1911, 2, p. 825; 1913, 2, p.
962.]
¶31 As for Russia, we will limit ourselves to one example. Some years ago, all the newspapers announced that
Davydov, the director of the Credit Department of the Treasury, had resigned his post to take employment with a certain
big bank at a salary which, according to the contract, was to amount to over one million rubles in the course of several
years. The Credit Department is an institution, the function of which is to “coordinate the activities of all the credit
institutions of the country” and which grants subsidies to banks in St. Petersburg and Moscow amounting to between 800
and 1,000 million rubles.* [E. Agahd, op. cit., p. 202.]
¶32 It is characteristic of capitalism in general that the ownership of capital is separated from the application of
capital to production, that money capital is separated from industrial or productive capital, and that the rentier who lives
entirely on income obtained from money capital is separated from the entrepreneur and from all who are directly
concerned in the management of capital. Imperialism, or the domination of finance capital, is that highest stage of
capitalism at which this separation reaches vast proportions. The supremacy of finance capital over all other forms of
capital means the predominance of the rentier and of the financial oligarchy; it means the singling out of a small number
of financially “powerful” states from among all the rest. The extent to which this process is going on may be judged from
the statistics on emissions, i.e., the issue of all kinds of securities.
¶33 In the Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute, A. Neymarck** [Bulletin de l’institut international da
statistique, t. XIX, livr. II, La Haye, 1912. Data concerning small states. second column, are approximately calculated by
adding 20 per cent to the 1902 figures.] has published very comprehensive, complete and comparative figures covering
the issue of securities all over the world, which have been repeatedly quoted in part in economic literature. The following
20
are the totals he gives for decades:
TOTAL ISSUES IN BILLIONS OF FRANCS
(Decades)
1871-1880…………76.1
1881-1890…………64.5
1891-1900………..100.4
1901-1910………..197.8
¶34 In the 1870’s, the total amount of issues for the whole world was high, owing particularly to the loans floated in
connection with the Franco-Prussian War, and the company-promoting boom which set in in Germany after the war. On
the whole, the increase is relatively not very rapid during the three last decades of the nineteenth century, and only in the
first ten years of the twentieth century is an enormous increase observed of almost 100 per cent. Thus the beginning of
the twentieth century marks the turning point, not only in regard to the growth of monopolies (cartels, syndicates, trusts),
of which we have already spoken, but also in regard to the growth of finance capital.
¶35 Neymarck estimates the total amount of issued securities current in the world in 1910 at about 815,000,000,000
francs. Deducting from this sum amounts which might have been duplicated, he reduces the total to 575-600 billion,
which is distributed among the various countries as follows: (We will take 600,000,000,000.)
FINANCIAL SECURITIES CURRENT IN 1910
(In billions of francs)
Great Britain 142 Total 479
United States 132 ”
France 110 ”
Germany 95 ”
Russia 31
Austria-Hungary 24
Italy 14
Japan 12
Holland 12.5
Belgium 7.5
Spain 7.5
Switzerland 6.25
Denmark 3.75
Sweden, Norway, Rumania,
etc.
2.5
Total 600
¶36 From these figures we at once see standing out in sharp relief four of the richest capitalist countries, each of
which holds securities to amounts ranging approximately from 100 to 150 billion francs. Of these four countries, two,
England and France, are the oldest capitalist countries, and, as we shall see, possess the most colonies; the other two, the
United States and Germany, are leading capitalist countries as regards rapidity of development and the degree of
extension of capitalist monopolies in industry. Together, these four countries own 479,000,000,000 francs, that is, nearly
80 per cent of the world’s finance capital. In one way or another, nearly the whole of the rest of the world is more or less
21
the debtor to and tributary of these international banker countries, these four “pillars” of world finance capital.
¶37 It is particularly important to examine the part which the export of capital plays in creating the international
network of dependence and connections of finance capital.
IV. THE EXPORT OF CAPITAL
¶1 Typical of the old capitalism, when free competition had undivided sway, was the export of goods. Typical of the
latest stage of capitalism, when monopolies rule, is the export of capital.
¶2 Capitalism is commodity production at its highest stage of development, when labor power itself becomes a
commodity. The growth of internal exchange, and particularly of international exchange, is the characteristic
distinguishing feature of capitalism. Uneven and spasmodic development of individual enterprises, of individual
branches of industry and individual countries, is inevitable under the capitalist system. England became a capitalist
country before any other, and by the middle of the nineteenth century, having adopted free trade, claimed to be the
“workshop of the world,” the purveyor of manufactured goods to all countries, which in exchange were to keep her
supplied with raw materials. But in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, this monopoly was already undermined; for
other countries, sheltering themselves by “protective” tariffs, developed into independent capitalist states. On the
threshold of the twentieth century we see the formation of a new type of monopoly: firstly, monopolist capitalist
combines in all capitalistically developed countries; secondly, the monopolist position of a few very rich countries, in
which the accumulation of capital has reached gigantic proportions. An enormous “superabundance of capital” has arisen
in the advanced countries.
¶3 It goes without saying that if capitalism could develop agriculture, which today frightfully lags behind industry
everywhere, if it could raise the standard of living of the masses, who are everywhere still half-starved and
poverty-stricken, in spite of the amazing technical progress, there could be no talk of a superabundance of capital. This
“argument” is very often advanced by the petty-bourgeois critics of capitalism. But if capitalism did these things it would
not be capitalism; for both uneven development and a semi-starvation level of existence of the masses are fundamental
and inevitable conditions and premises of this mode of production. As long as capitalism remains what it is, surplus
capital will be utilized not for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the masses in a given country, for this
would mean a decline in profits for the capitalists, but for the purpose of increasing profits by exporting capital abroad to
the backward countries. In these backward countries profits are usually high, for capital is scarce, the price of land is
relatively low, wages are low, raw materials are cheap. The possibility of exporting capital is created by the fact that a
number of backward countries have already been drawn into world capitalist intercourse; main railways have either been
or are being built there, the elementary conditions for industrial development have been created, etc. The necessity for
exporting capital arises from the fact that in a few countries capitalism has become “overripe” and (owing to the
backward stage of agriculture and the impoverished state of the masses) capital cannot find a field for “profitable”
investment.
¶4 Here are approximate figures showing the amount of capital invested abroad by the three principal countries:*
[Hobson. Imperialism, London, 1902, p. 58; Riesser, op. cit., pp. 395 and 404; P. Arndt in Weltwirtschaftlicbes Archiv,
Bd. 7, 1916, S. 35, Neymarck in Bulletin; Hilferding. Finance Capital, p. 492; Lloyd George, Speech in the House of
Commons, May 4, 1915, reported in the Daily Telegraph, May 5, 1915; B. Harms, Probleme der Weltwirtschaft, Jena,
1912, S. 235 et seq., Dr. Siegmund Schilder, Entwicklungstendenzen der Weltwirtschaft (Trends of Development of
World Economy–Tr.), Berlin, 1912, Band I, S. 150; George Paish, “Great Britain’s Capital Investments, etc.,” in Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. LXXIV, 1910-11, p. 67 et seq.; Georges Diouritch, L’expansion des barques
allemandes a l’etranger, ses rapports avec le developpement economique de 1’Allemagne (Expansion of German Banks
Abroad in Connection with the Economic Development of Germany–Tr.), Paris, 1909, p. 84.]
CAPITAL INVESTED ABROAD
(In billions of francs)
Year Great Britain France Germany
1862 3.6 — —
1872 15.0 10 (1869) —
1882 22.0 15 (1880) ?
22
1893 42.0 20 (1890) ?
1902 62.0 27-37 12.5
1914 75-100.0 60 44.0
¶5 This table shows that the export of capital reached formidable dimensions only in the beginning of the twentieth
century. Before the war the capital invested abroad by the three principal countries amounted to between
175,000,000,000 and 200,000,000,000 francs. At the modest rate of 5 per cent, the income from this sum should have
reached from 8 to 10 billion francs a year. A solid basis for imperialist oppression and the exploitation of most of the
countries and nations of the world, for the capitalist parasitism of a handful of wealthy states!
¶6 How is this capital invested abroad distributed among the various countries? Where is it invested? Only an
approximate answer can be given to this question, but one sufficient to throw light on certain general relations and
connections of modern imperialism.
APPROXIMATE DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN CAPITAL
(ABOUT 1910)
(In billions of marks)
Great Britain France Germany Total
Europe 4 23 18 45
America 37 4 10 51
Asia, Africa and
Australia
29 8 7 44
Total 70 35 35 140
¶7 The principal spheres of investment of British capital are the British colonies, which are very large also in
America (for example, Canada) not to mention Asia, etc. In this case, enormous exports of capital are bound up most
closely with vast colonies, of the importance of which for imperialism we shall speak later. In the case of France the
situation is different. French capital exports are invested mainly in Europe, primarily in Russia (at least ten billion
francs). This is mainly loan capital, government loans and not investments in industrial undertakings. Unlike British,
colonial imperialism, French imperialism might be termed usury imperialism. In the case of Germany, we have a third
type; colonies are inconsiderable, and German capital invested abroad is divided most evenly between Europe and
America.
¶8 The export of capital affects and greatly accelerates the development of capitalism in those countries to which it
is exported. While, therefore, the export of capital may tend to a certain extent to arrest development in the capital
exporting countries, it can only do so by expanding and deepening the further development of capitalism throughout the
world.
¶9 The countries which export capital are nearly always able to obtain certain “advantages,” the character of which
throws light on the peculiarity of the epoch of finance capital and monopoly. The following passage, for instance,
occurred in the Berlin review, Die Bank, for October 1913:
¶10 “A comedy worthy of the pen of Aristophanes is lately being played on the international capital market.
Numerous foreign countries, from Spain to the Balkan states, from Russia to Argentina, Brazil and China, are openly or
secretly coming into the big money market with demands, sometimes very persistent, for loans. The money market-is not
very bright at the moment and the political outlook is not promising. But not a single money market dares to refuse a
foreign loan for fear that its neighbor may forestall it, consent to grant a loan and so secure some reciprocal service. In
these international transactions the creditor nearly always manages to secure some extra benefit: a favorable clause in a
commercial treaty, a coaling station, a contract to construct a harbor, a fat concession, or an order for guns.”* [Die Bank,
1913, 2, p. 1024. ]
¶11 Finance capital has created the epoch of monopolies, and monopolies introduce everywhere monopolist
principles: the utilization of “connections” for profitable transactions takes the place of competition on the open market.
The most usual thing is to stipulate that part of the loan that is granted shall be spent on purchases in the creditor country,
23
particularly on orders for war materials, or for ships, etc. In the course of the last two decades (1890-1910), France has
very often resorted to this method. The export of capital abroad thus becomes a means for encouraging the export of
commodities. In this connection, transactions between particularly big firms assume a form which, as Schilder**
[Schilder, op. cit., pp. 346, 350 and 371.] “mildly” puts it, “borders on corruption.” Krupp in Germany, Schneider in
France, Armstrong in England are instances of firms which have close connections with powerful banks and
governments and cannot easily be “ignored” when a loan is being arranged.
¶12 France, when granting loans to Russia, “squeezed” her in concluding the commercial treaty of September 16,
1905, in which she stipulated for certain concessions to run till 1917. She did the same thing when the Franco-Japanese
commercial treaty was concluded on August 19, 1911. The tariff war between Austria and Serbia, which lasted with a
seven months’ interval, from 1906 to 1911, was partly caused by competition between Austria and France for supplying
Serbia with war materials. In January 1912, Paul Deschanel stated in the Chamber of Deputies that from 1908 to 1911
French firms had supplied war materials to Serbia to the value of 45,000,000 francs.
¶13 A report from the Austro-Hungarian Consul at Sao-Paulo (Brazil) states: “The construction of the Brazilian
railways is being carried out chiefly by French, Belgian, British and German capital. In the financial operations
connected with the construction of these railways the countries involved stipulate for orders for the necessary railway
materials.”
¶14 Thus finance capital, literally, one might say, spreads its net over all countries of the world. An important role
in this is played by banks founded in the colonies and by their branches. German imperialists look with envy at the “old”
colonizing countries which have been particularly “successful” in providing for themselves in this respect. In 1904 Great
Britain had 50 colonial banks with 2,279 branches (in 1910 there were 72 banks with 5,449 branches), France had 20
with 136 branches; Holland 16 with 68 branches; and Germany had “only” 13 with 70 branches.* [Riesser, op. cit., 4th
ea., p. 375; Diouritch, p. 283.] The American capitalists, in their turn, are jealous of the English and German: “In South
America,” they complained in 1915, “five German banks have forty branches and five English banks have seventy
branches…. England and Germany have invested in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in the last twenty-five years
approximately four thousand million dollars, and as a result enjoy together 46 per cent of the total trade of these three
countries.”** [ The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. LIX, May 1915, p. 301. In the
same volume on p. 331, we read that the well-known statistician Paish, in the last issue of the financial magazine The
Statist, estimated the amount of capital exported by England, Germany, France, Belgium and Holland at
$40,000,000,000, i.e., 200,000,000,000 francs. ]
¶15 The capital exporting countries have divided the world among themselves in the figurative sense of the term.
But finance capital has led to the actual division of the world.
V. THE DIVISION OF THE WORLD AMONG CAPITALIST
COMBINES
¶1 Monopolist capitalist combines, cartels, syndicates and trusts divide among themselves, first of all, the home market,
seize more or less complete possession of the industry of a country. But under capitalism the home market is inevitably
bound up with the foreign market. Capitalism long ago created a world market. As the export of capital increased, and as
the foreign and colonial connections and “spheres of influence” of the big monopolist combines expanded in all ways,
things “naturally” gravitated towards an international agreement among these combines, and towards the formation of
international cartels.
¶2 This is a new stage of world concentration of capital and production, incomparably higher than the preceding
stages. Let us see how this supermonopoly develops.
¶3 The electrical industry is the most typical of the latest technical achievements, most typical of capitalism at the
end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries.
¶4 This industry has developed most in the two most advanced of the new capitalist countries, the United States
and Germany. In Germany, the crisis of 1900 gave a particularly strong impetus to its concentration. During the crisis,
the banks, which by this time had become fairly well merged with industry, enormously accelerated and intensified the
ruin of relatively small firms and their absorption by the large ones. “The banks,” writes Jeidels, “in refusing a helping
hand to the very companies which are in greatest need of capital bring on first a frenzied boom and then the hopeless
failure of the companies which have not been attached to them closely enough.”* [Jeidels, op. Cit., p. 232]
¶5 As a result, after 1900, concentration in Germany progressed with giant strides. Up to 1900 there had been eight
24
or seven “groups” in the electrical industry. Each consisted of several companies (altogether there were 28) and each was
backed by from 2 to 11 banks. Between 1908 and 1912 all these groups were merged into two, or one. The diagram
below shows the process:
GROUPS IN THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY
Prior to
1900:
Felten &
Guillaume
Lahmeyer Union
A.E.G.
Siemens &
Halske
Schuckert &
Co.
Bergmann Kummer
Felten & Lahmeyer A.E.G (Gen. El.
Co.)
Siemens &
Halske-Schuckert
Bergmann Failed in
1900
By 1912: A.E.G. (General Electric Co.) Siemens & Halske-Schuckert
(In close “cooperation” since 1908)
¶6 The famous A.E.G. (General Electric Company), which grew up in this way, controls 175 to 200 companies
(through the “holding” system), and a total capital of approximately 1,500,000,000 marks. Of direct agencies abroad
alone, it has thirty-four, of which twelve are joint-stock companies, in more than ten countries. As early as 1904 the
amount of capital invested abroad by the German electrical industry was estimated at 233,000,000 marks. Of this sum,
62,000,000 were invested in Russia. Needless to say, the A.E.G. is a huge “combine”–its manufacturing companies
alone number no less than sixteen–producing the most diverse articles, from cables and insulators to motor cars and
flying machines.
¶7 But concentration in Europe was also a component part of the process of concentration in America, which
developed in the following way:
General Electric Company
United
States:
Thomson-Houston Co.
establishes a firm in Europe
Edison Co. establishes in Europe the French Edison Co. which
transfers its patents to the German firm
Germany: Union Electric Co. General Electric Co. (A.E.G.)
General Electric Co. (A. E. G.)
¶8 Thus, two electrical “Great Powers” were formed: “there are no other electric companies in the world
completely independent of them,” wrote Heinig in his article “The Path of the Electric Trust.” An idea, although far from
complete, of the turnover and the size of the enterprises of the two “trusts” can be obtained from the following figures:
Turnover
(Mill. marks)
No. of employees Net profits
(Mill. marks)
America: General Electric
Co. (G.E.C.)
1907: 252 28,000 35.4
1910: 298 32,000 45.6
Germany: General Electric
Co. (A. E. G.)
1907: 216 30,700 14.5
1911: 362 60,800 21.7
¶9 Well, in 1907, the German and American trusts concluded an agreement by which they divided the world
between themselves. Competition between them ceased. The American General Electric Company (G.E.C.) “got” the
United States and Canada. The German General Electric Company (A.E.G.) “got” Germany, Austria, Russia, Holland,
25
Denmark, Switzerland, Turkey and the Balkans. Special agreements, naturally secret, were concluded regarding the
penetration of “daughter companies” into new branches of industry, into “new” countries formally not yet allotted. The
two trusts were to exchange inventions and experiments.* [Riesser, op. cit.; Diouritch, op. cit., p. 239; Kurt Heinig, op.
cit.]
¶10 The difficulty of competing against this trust, which is practically world-wide, controls a capital of several
billion, and has its “branches,” agencies, representatives, connections, etc., in every corner of the world, is self-evident.
But the division of the world between two powerful trusts does not preclude redivision if the relation of forces changes
as a result of uneven development, war, bankruptcy, etc.
¶11 An instructive example of attempts at such a redivision, of the struggle for redivision, is provided by the oil
industry.
¶12 “The world oil market,” wrote Jeidels in 1905, “is even today still divided between two great financial
groups–Rockefeller’s American Standard Oil Co., and Rothschild and Nobel, the controlling interests of the Russian oil
fields in Baku. The two groups are closely connected. But for several years five enemies have been threatening their
monopoly”:* [Jeidels, op. cit., p. 193.] 1) The exhaustion of the American oil fields; 2) the competition of the firm of
Mantashev of Baku; 3) the Austrian oil fields; 4) the Rumanian oil fields; 5) the overseas oil fields, particularly in the
Dutch colonies (the extremely rich firms, Samuel, and Shell, also connected with British capital). The three last groups
are connected with the big German banks, headed by the huge Deutsche Bank. These banks independently and
systematically developed the oil industry in Rumania, for example, in order to have a foothold of their “own.” In 1907,
the foreign capital invested in the Rumanian oil industry was estimated at 185,000,000 francs, of which 74,000,000 was
German capital.** [Diouritch, op. cit., p. 245. ]
¶13 A struggle began for the “division of the world,” as, in fact, it is called in economic literature. On one side, the
Rockefeller “oil trust,” wishing to capture everything, formed a “daughter company” right in Holland, and bought up oil
fields in the Dutch Indies, in order to strike at its principal enemy, the Anglo-Dutch Shell trust. On the other side, the
Deutsche Bank and the other German banks aimed at “retaining” Rumania “for themselves” and at uniting it with Russia
against Rockefeller. The latter possessed far more capital and an excellent system of oil transportation and distribution.
The struggle had to end, and did end in 1907, with the utter defeat of the Deutsche Bank, which was confronted with the
alternative: either to liquidate its “oil interests” and lose millions, or submit. It chose to submit, and concluded a very
disadvantageous agreement with the “oil trust.” The Deutsche Bank agreed “not to attempt anything which might injure
American interests.” Provision was made however, for the annulment of the agreement in the event of Germany
establishing a state oil monopoly.
¶14 Then the “comedy of oil” began. One of the German finance kings, von Gwinner, a director of the Deutsche
Bank through his private secretary, Stauss, launched a campaign for a state oil monopoly. The gigantic machine of the
huge German bank and all its wide “connections” were set in motion. The press bubbled over with “patriotic” indignation
against the “yoke” of the American trust, and, on March 15, 1911 the Reichstag by an almost unanimous vote, adopted a
motion asking the government to introduce a bill for the establishment of an oil monopoly. The government seized upon
this “popular” idea, and the game of the Deutsche Bank, which hoped to cheat its American partner and improve its
business by a state monopoly, appeared to have been won. The German oil magnates already saw visions of enormous
profits, which would not be less than those of the Russian sugar refiners…. But, firstly, the big German banks quarreled
among themselves over the division of the spoils. The Disconto-Gesellschaft exposed the covetous aims of the Deutsche
Bank; secondly, the government took fright at the prospect of a struggle with Rockefeller, for it was very doubtful
whether Germany could be sure of obtaining oil from other sources (the Rumanian output was small); thirdly, just at that
time the 1913 credits of a billion marks were voted for Germany’s war preparations. The oil monopoly project was
postponed. The Rockefeller “oil trust” came out of the struggle, for the time being, victorious.
¶15 The Berlin review, Die Bank, wrote in this connection that Germany could fight the oil trust only by
establishing an electricity monopoly and by converting water power into cheap electricity. “But,” the author added, “the
electricity monopoly will come when the producers need it, that is to say when the next great crash in the electrical
industry will be standing at the door, and when the gigantic, expensive electric stations which are now being put up at
great cost everywhere by private electrical ‘concerns,’ which are already obtaining partial monopolies from towns, from
states, etc., can no longer work at a profit. Water power will then have to be used. But it will be impossible to convert it
into cheap electricity at state expense; it will also have to be handed over to a ‘private monopoly controlled by the state,’
because private industry has already concluded a number of contracts and has stipulated for heavy compensation…. So it
was with the nitrate monopoly, so it is with the oil monopoly; so it will be with the electric power monopoly. It is time
our state socialists, who allow themselves to be blinded by a beautiful principle, understood, at last, that in Germany the
monopolies have never pursued the aim, nor have they had the result, of benefiting the consumer, or even of handing
over to the state part of the promoter’s profits; they have served only to facilitate at the expense of the state, the recovery
of private industries which were on the verge of bankruptcy.”* [Die Bank, 1912, 1, p. 1036; 1912, 2, p. 629; 1913, 1, p.
388.]
26
¶16 Such are the valuable admissions which the German bourgeois economists are forced to make. We see plainly
here how private and state monopolies are interwoven in the age of finance capital; how both are but separate links in the
imperialist struggle between the big monopolists for the division of the world.
¶17 In mercantile shipping, the tremendous development of concentration has ended also in the division of the
world. In Germany two powerful companies have come to the front: the Hamburg-Amerika and the Norddeutscher
Lloyd, each having a capital of 200,000,000 marks (in stocks and bonds) and possessing shipping tonnage to the value of
185 to 189 million marks. On the other side, in America, on January 1, 1903, the so-called Morgan trust, the
International Mercantile Marine Co., was formed which united nine American and British steamship companies, and
which possessed a capital of 120,000,000 dollars (480,000,000 marks). As early as 1903, the German giants and this
American-British trust concluded an agreement to divide the world in connection with the division of profits. The
German companies undertook not to compete in the Anglo-American traffic. Which ports were to be “allotted” to each
was precisely stipulated; a joint committee of control was set up, etc. This agreement was concluded for twenty years,
with the prudent provision for its annulment in the event of war.* [Riesser, op. cit., p. 125. ]
¶18 Extremely instructive also is the story of the formation of the International Rail Cartel. The first attempt of the
British, Belgian and German rail manufacturers to form such a cartel was made as early as 1884, during a severe
industrial depression. The manufacturers agreed not to compete with one another in the home markets of the countries
involved, and they divided the foreign markets in the following quotas: Great Britain 66 per cent; Germany 27 per cent;
Belgium 7 per cent. India was reserved entirely for Great Britain. Joint war was declared against a British firm which
remained outside the cartel, the cost of which was met by a percentage levy on all sales. But in 1886 the cartel collapsed
when two British firms retired from it. It is characteristic that agreement could not be achieved during subsequent boom
periods.
¶19 At the beginning of 1904, the German steel syndicate was formed. In November 1904, the International Rail
Cartel was revived, with the following quotas: England 53.5 per cent; Germany 28.83 per cent; Belgium 17.67 per cent.
France came in later and received 4.8 per cent, 5.8 per cent and 6.4 per cent in the first, second and third years
respectively, over and above the 100 per cent limit, i.e., out of a total of 104.8 per cent, etc. In 1905, the United States
Steel Corporation entered the cartel; then Austria and Spain. “At the present time,” wrote Vogelstein in 1910, “the
division of the world is completed, and the big consumers, primarily the state railways–since the world has been
parceled out without consideration for their interests–can now dwell like the poet in the heaven of Jupiter.”* [Vogelstein,
Organisationsformen, p. 100. ]
¶20 We will mention also the International Zinc Syndicate which was established in 1909 and which precisely
apportioned output among five groups of factories: German, Belgian, French, Spanish and British; and also the
International Dynamite Trust, which, Liefmann says, is “quite a modern, close alliance of all the German explosives
manufacturers who, with the French and American dynamite manufacturers, organized in a similar manner, have divided
the whole world among themselves, so to speak.”** [Liefmann, Kartelle und Trusts, 2. A.., p. 161.]
¶21 Liefmann calculated that in 1897 there were altogether about forty international cartels in which Germany had a
share, while in 1910 there were about a hundred.
¶22 Certain bourgeois writers (whom K. Kautsky, who has completely abandoned the Marxist position he held, for
example, in 1909, has now joined) have expressed the opinion that international cartels, being one of the most striking
expressions of the internationalization of capital, give the hope of peace among nations under capitalism. Theoretically,
this opinion is absolutely absurd, while in practice it is sophistry and a dishonest defense of the worst opportunism.
International cartels show to what point capitalist monopolies have developed, and the object of the struggle between the
various capitalist combines. This last circumstance is the most important, it alone shows us the historico-economic
meaning of what is taking place; for the forms of the struggle may and do constantly change in accordance with varying,
relatively particular and temporary causes, but the substance of the struggle, its class content, positively cannot change
while classes exist. Naturally, it is in the interests of, for example, the German bourgeoisie, to whose side Kautsky has in
effect gone over in his theoretical arguments (we will deal with this later), to obscure the substance of the present
economic struggle (the division of the world) and to emphasize now this and now another form of the struggle. Kautsky
makes the same mistake. Of course, we have in mind not only the German bourgeoisie, but the bourgeoisie all over the
world. The capitalists divide the world, not out of any particular malice, but because the degree of concentration which
has been reached forces them to adopt this method in order to obtain profits. And they divide it “in proportion to capital,”
“in proportion to strength,” because there cannot be any other method of division under commodity production and
capitalism. But strength varies with the degree of economic and political development. In order to understand what is
taking place, it is necessary to know what questions are settled by the changes in strength. The question as to whether
these changes are “purely” economic or non-economic (e.g., military) is a secondary one, which cannot in the least affect
the fundamental views on the latest epoch of capitalism. To substitute the question of the form of the struggle and
agreements (today peaceful, tomorrow warlike, the next day warlike again) for the question of the substance of the
struggle and agreements between capitalist combines is to sink to the role of a sophist.
27
¶23 The epoch of the latest stage of capitalism shows us that certain relations between capitalist combines grow up,
based on the economic division of the world, while parallel and in connection with it, certain relations grow up between
political combines, between states, on the basis of the territorial division of the world, of the struggle for colonies, of the
“struggle for economic territory.”
VI. THE DIVISION OF THE WORLD AMONG THE GREAT POWERS
¶1 In his book, on “the territorial development of the European colonies,” A. Supan,* [A. Supan, Die territoriale
Entwicklung der europäischen Kolonien, 1906, p. 254.] the geographer, gives the following brief summary of this
development at the end of the nineteenth century:
PERCENTAGE OF TERRITORY BELONGING TO THE EUROPEAN COLONIAL POWERS (INCLUDING THE
UNITED STATES)
1876 1900 Increase or decrease
In Africa 10.8% 90.4%
0.796
” Polynesia 56.8% 98.9%
0.421
” Asia 51.5% 56.6%
0.051
” Australia 100.0% 100.0% —
” America 27.5% 27.2% – 0.3%
¶2 “The characteristic feature of this period,” he concludes, “is, therefore, the division of Africa and Polynesia.” As
there are no unoccupied territories–that is, territories that do not belong to any state–in Asia and America, it is necessary
to amplify Supan’s conclusion and say that the characteristic feature of the period under review is the final partition of
the globe–final, not in the sense that a repartition is impossible; on the contrary, repartitions are possible and
inevitable–but in the sense that the colonial policy of the capitalist countries has completed the seizure of the unoccupied
territories on our planet. For the first time the world is completely divided up, so that in the future only redivision is
possible, i.e., territories can only pass from one “owner” to another, instead of passing as ownerless territory to an
“owner.”
¶3 Hence, we are passing through a peculiar epoch of world colonial policy, which is most closely connected with
the “latest stage in the development of capitalism,” with finance capital. For this reason, it is essential first of all to deal
in greater detail with the facts, in order to ascertain as exactly as possible what distinguishes this epoch from those
preceding it, and what the present situation is. In the first place, two questions of fact arise here: is an intensification of
colonial policy, a sharpening of the struggle for colonies, observed precisely in this epoch of finance capital? And how,
in this respect, is the world divided at the present time?
¶4 The American writer, Morris, in his book on the history of colonization,* [Henry C. Morris, The History of
Colonization, New York, 1900, Vol. II, p. 88; Vol. I, p. 419; Vol. II, p. 304.] has made an attempt to sum up the data on
the colonial possessions of Great Britain, France and Germany during different periods of the nineteenth century. The
following is a brief summary of the results he has obtained:
COLONIAL POSSESSIONS
Year Great Britain France Germany
Area (mill. sq.m.) Pop.(mill.) Area (mill.
sq.m.)
Pop. (mill.) Area (mill.
sq.m.)
Pop. (mill.)
1815-30 ? 126.4 0.02 0.5 _ _
1860 2.5 145.1 0.2 3.4 _ _
28
1880 7.7 267.9 0.7 7.5 _ _
1899 9.3 309.0 3.7 56.4 1.0 14.7
¶5 For Great Britain, the period of the enormous expansion of colonial conquests is that between 1860 and 1880,
and it was also very considerable in the last twenty years of the nineteenth century. For France and Germany this period
falls precisely in these twenty years. We saw above that the development of premonopolist-capitalism, of capitalism in
which free competition was predominant, reached its limit in the 1860’s and 1870’s. We now see that it is precisely after
that period that the tremendous “boom” in colonial conquests begins, and that the struggle for the territorial division of
the world becomes extraordinarily keen. It is beyond doubt, therefore, that capitalism’s transition to the stage of
monopoly capitalism, to finance capital, is connected with the intensification of the struggle for the partition of the
world.
¶6 Hobson, in his work on imperialism, marks the years 1884-1900 as the epoch of intensified “expansion” of the
chief European states. According to his estimate, Great Britain during these years acquired 3,700,000 square miles of
territory with a population of 57,000,000; France acquired 3,600,000 square miles with a population of 36,500,000;
Germany 1,000,000 square miles with a population of 14,700,000; Belgium 900,000 square miles with 30,000,000
inhabitants
¶7 Portugal 800,000 square miles with 9,000,000 inhabitants. The pursuit of colonies by all the capitalist states at
the end of the nineteenth century and particularly since the 1880’s is a commonly known fact in the history of diplomacy
and of foreign politics.
¶8 In the most flourishing period of free competition in Great Britain, i.e., between 1840 and 1860, the leading
British bourgeois politicians were opposed to colonial policy and were of the opinion that the liberation of the colonies,
their complete separation from Britain was inevitable and desirable. M. Beer, in an article, “Modern British
Imperialism,”* [Die Neue Zeù, XVI, I, 1898, S. 302.] published in 1898, shows that in 1852, Disraeli, a statesman who
was generally inclined towards imperialism, declared: “The colonies are millstones round our necks.” But at the end of
the nineteenth century the heroes of the hour in England were Cecil Rhodes and Joseph Chamberlain, who openly
advocated imperialism and applied the imperialist policy in the most cynical manner!
¶9 It is not without interest to observe that already at that time these leading British bourgeois politicians saw the
connection between what might be called the purely economic and the politico-social roots of modern imperialism.
Chamberlain advocated imperialism as a “true, wise and economical policy,” and pointed particularly to the German,
American and Belgian competition which Great Britain was encountering in the world market. Salvation lies in
monopolies, said the capitalists as they formed cartels, syndicates and trusts. Salvation lies in monopolies, echoed the
political leaders of the bourgeoisie, hastening to appropriate the parts of the world not yet shared out. And Cecil Rhodes,
we are informed by his intimate friend, the journalist Stead, expressed his imperialist views to him in 1895 in the
following terms: “I was in the East End of London” (working-class quarter) “yesterday and attended a meeting of the
unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, which were just a cry for ‘bread,’ ‘bread!’ and on my way home I pondered
over the scene and I became more than ever convinced of the importance of imperialism…. My cherished idea is a
solution for the social problem, i.e., in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody
civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the
goods produced in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want
to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists.”* [lbid., S. 304. ]
¶10 This is what Cecil Rhodes, millionaire, a king of finance, the man who was mainly responsible for the
Anglo-Boer War, said in 1895. True, his defence of imperialism is crude and cynical, but in substance it does not differ
from the “theory” advocated by Messrs. Maslov, Südekum, Potressov, David and the founder of Russian Marxism, and
others. Cecil Rhodes was a somewhat more honest social-chauvinist….
¶11 To present as precise a picture as possible of the territorial division of the world and of the changes which have
occurred during the last decades in this respect, we will utilize the data furnished by Supan in the work already quoted on
the colonial possessions of all the powers of the world. Supan takes the years 1876 and 1900; we will take the year 1876
– a year very aptly selected, for it is precisely by that time that the premonopolist stage of development of
West-European capitalism can be said to have been completed, in the main–and the year 1914, and instead of Supan’s
figures we will quote the more recent statistics of Hübner’s Geographical and Statistical Tables. Supan gives figures
only for colonies; we think it useful, in order to present a complete picture of the division of the world, to add brief
figures on non-colonial and semicolonial countries, in which category we place Persia, China and Turkey: the first of
these countries is already almost completely a colony, the second and third are becoming such.
¶12 We thus get the following summary:
29
COLONIAL POSSESSIONS OP THE GREAT POWERS
(Million square kilometers and million inhabitants)
Colonies Metropolitan
countries
Total
1876 1914 1914 1914
Area Pop. Area Pop. Area Pop. Area Pop.
Great Britain 22.5 251.9 33.5 393.5 0.3 46.5 33.8 440.0
Russia 17.0 15.9 17.4 33.2 5.4 136.2 22.8 169.4
France 0.9 6.0 10.6 55.5 0.5 39.6 11.1 95.1
Germany — — 2.9 12.3 0.5 64.9 3.4 77.2
U.S.A. — — 0.3 9.7 9.4 97.0 9.7 106.7
Japan — — 0.3 19.2 0.4 53.0 0.7 72.2
Total for 6 Great
Powers
40.4 273.8 65.0 523.4 16.5 437.2 81.5 960.6
Colonies of other powers (Belgium, Holland, etc.) 9.9 45.3
Semicolonial countries (Persia, China, Turkey)
14.5 361.2
Other countries
28.0 289.9
Total for whole world 133.9 1,657.0
¶13 We clearly see from these figures how “complete” was the partition of the world on the border line between the
nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. After 1876 colonial possessions increased to enormous dimensions, more than
fifty per cent, from 40,000,000 to 25,000,000 square kilometers in area for the six biggest powers; the increase amounts
to 25,000,000 square kilometers, fifty per cent larger than the area of the metropolitan countries (16,500,000 square
kilometers). In 1876 three powers had no colonies, and a fourth, France, had scarcely any. By 1914 these four powers
had acquired colonies of an area of 14,100,000 square kilometers, i.e., about kitty per cent larger than that of Europe,
with a population of nearly 100,000,000. The unevenness in the rate of expansion of colonial possessions is very great.
If, for instance, we compare France, Germany and Japan, which do not differ very much in area and population, we will
see that the first has acquired almost three times as much colonial territory as the other two combined. In regard to
finance capital, France, at the beginning of the period we are considering, was also, perhaps, several times richer than
Germany and Japan put together. In addition to, and on the basis of, purely economic conditions, geographical and other
conditions also affect the dimensions of colonial possessions. However strong the process of leveling the world, of
leveling the economic and living conditions in different countries, may have been in the past decades as a result of the
pressure of large-scale industry, exchange and finance capital, considerable differences still remain; and among the six
powers mentioned we see, firstly, young capitalist countries (America, Germany, Japan) whose progress has been
extraordinarily rapid; secondly, countries with an old capitalist development (France and Great Britain), whose progress
lately has been much slower than that of the previously mentioned countries, and thirdly, a country which is
economically most backward (Russia), where modern capitalist imperialism is enmeshed, so to speak, in a particularly
close network of precapitalist relations.
¶14 Alongside the colonial possessions of the Great Powers, we have placed the small colonies of the small states,
which are, so to speak, the next objects of a possible and probable “redivision” of colonies. Most of these small states are
able to retain their colonies only because of the conflicting interests, friction, etc., among the big powers, which prevent
them from coming to an agreement in regard to the division of the spoils. The “semicolonial” states provide an example
of the transitional forms which are to be found in all spheres of nature and society. Finance capital is such a great, it may
be said, such a decisive force in all economic and in all international relations, that it is capable of subjecting, and
30
actually does subject to itself even states enjoying the fullest political independence; we shall shortly see examples of
this. Of course, finance capital finds most “convenient,” and is able to extract the greatest profit from such a subjection
as involves the loss of the political independence of the subjected countries and peoples. In this connection, the
semicolonial countries provide a typical example of the “middle stage.” It is natural that the struggle for these
semidependent countries should have become particularly bitter in the epoch of finance capital, when the rest of the
world has already been divided up.
¶15 Colonial policy and imperialism existed before this latest stage of capitalism, and even before capitalism. Rome,
founded on slavery, pursued a colonial policy and practiced imperialism. But “general” disquisitions on imperialism,
which ignore, or put into the background, the fundamental difference between social-economic systems, inevitably
degenerate into the most vapid banality or bragging, like the comparison: “Greater Rome and Greater Britain.”* [C. P.
Lucas, Greater Rome and Greater Britain, Oxford, 1912 or the Earl of Cromer’s Ancient and Modern Imperialism,
London, 1910.] Even the capitalist colonial policy of previous stages of capitalism is essentially different from the
colonial policy of finance capital.
¶16 The principal feature of the latest stage of capitalism is the domination of monopolist combines of the big
capitalists. These monopolies are most firmly established when all the sources of raw materials are captured by one
group, and we have seen with what zeal the international capitalist combines exert every effort to make it impossible for
their rivals to compete with them by buying up, for example, iron ore fields, oil fields, etc. Colonial possession alone
gives the monopolies complete guarantee against all contingencies in the struggle with competitors, including the
contingency that the latter will defend themselves by means of a law establishing a state monopoly. The more capitalism
is developed, the more strongly the shortage of raw materials is felt, the more intense the competition and the hunt for
sources of raw materials throughout the whole world, the more desperate is the struggle for the acquisition of colonies.
¶17 “It may be asserted,” writes Schilder, “although it may sound paradoxical to some, that in the more or less
discernible future the growth of the urban and industrial population is more likely to be hindered by a shortage of raw
materials for industry than by a shortage of food.” For example, there is a growing shortage of timber–the price of which
is steadily rising–of leather, and of raw materials for the textile industry.
¶18 “Associations of manufacturers are making efforts to create an equilibrium between agriculture and industry in
the whole of world economy; as an example of this we might mention the International Federation of Cotton Spinners’
Associations in several of the most important industrial countries, founded in 1904, and the European Federation of Flax
Spinners’ Associations, founded on the same model in 1910.”* [Schilder, op. cit., pp. 38-42.]
¶19 The bourgeois reformists, and among them particularly the present-day adherents of Kautsky, of course, try to
belittle the importance of facts of this kind by arguing that it “would be possible” to obtain raw materials in the open
market without a “costly and dangerous” colonial policy; and that it “would be possible” to increase the supply of raw
materials to an enormous extent “simply” by improving conditions in agriculture in general. But such arguments become
an apology for imperialism, an attempt to embellish it, because they ignore the principal feature of the latest stage of
capitalism: monopolies. Free markets are becoming more and more a thing of the past; monopolist syndicates and trusts
are restricting them more and more every day, and “simply” improving conditions in agriculture means improving the
conditions of the masses, raising wages and reducing profits. Where, except in the imagination of sentimental reformists,
are there any trusts capable of interesting themselves in the condition of the masses instead of the conquest of colonies?
¶20 Finance capital is interested not only in the already discovered sources of raw materials but also in potential
sources, because present-day technical development is extremely rapid, and land which is useless today may be made
fertile tomorrow if new methods are applied (to devise these new methods a big bank can equip a special expedition of
engineers, agricultural experts, etc.), and if large amounts of capital are invested. This also applies to prospecting for
minerals, to new methods of working up and utilizing raw materials, etc., etc. Hence, the inevitable striving of finance
capital to enlarge its economic territory and even its territory in general. In the same way that the trusts capitalize their
property at two or three times its value, taking into account its “potential” (and not present) profits, and the further results
of monopoly, so finance capital strives in general to seize the largest possible amount of land of all kinds in all places,
and by every means, taking into account potential sources of raw materials and fearing to be left behind in the fierce
struggle for the last scraps of undivided territory, or for the repartition of those that have been already divided.
¶21 The British capitalists are exerting every effort to develop cotton growing in their colony, Egypt (in 1904, out of
2,300,000 hectares of land under cultivation, 600,000, or more than one-fourth, were devoted to cotton growing); the
Russians are doing the same in their colony, Turkestan, because in this way they will be in a better position to defeat
their foreign competitors, to monopolize the sources of raw materials and form a more economical and profitable textile
trust in which all the processes of cotton production and manufacturing will be “combined” and concentrated in the
hands of one set of owners.
¶22 The interests pursued in exporting capital also give an impetus to the conquest of colonies, for in the colonial
market it is easier to employ monopolist methods (and sometimes they are the only methods that can be employed) to
31
eliminate competition, to make sure of contracts, to secure the necessary “connections,” etc.
¶23 The non-economic superstructure which grows up on the basis of finance capital, its politics and its ideology,
stimulates the striving for colonial conquest. “Finance capital does not want liberty, it wants domination,” as Hilferding
very truly says. And a French bourgeois writer, developing and supplementing, as it were, the ideas of Cecil Rhodes
quoted above, [14] writes that social causes should be added to the economic causes of modern colonial policy: “owing
to the growing complexities of life and the difficulties which weigh not only on the masses of the workers” but also on
the middle classes, ‘impatience, irritation and hatred are accumulating in all the countries of the old civilization and are
becoming a menace to public order; the energy which is being hurled out of the definite class channel must be given
employment abroad in order to avert an explosion at home.'”* [Wahl, La France aux colonies (France in the
Colonies–Tr.), quoted by Henri Russier, Le partage de l’Océanie (The Partition of Oceania–Tr.), Paris, 1905, p. 165]
¶24 Since we are speaking of colonial policy in the epoch of capitalist imperialism, it must be observed that finance
capital and its corresponding foreign policy, which reduces itself to the struggle of the Great Powers for the economic
and political division of the world, give rise to a number of transitional forms of state dependence. Typical of this epoch
is not only the two main groups of countries: those owning colonies, and colonies, but also the diverse forms of
dependent countries which, officially, are politically independent, but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and
diplomatic dependence. We have already referred to one form of dependence–the semicolony. An example of another is
provided by Argentina.
¶25 “South America, and especially Argentina,” writes Schulze-Gaevernitz in his work on British imperialism, “is
so dependent financially on London that it ought to be described as almost a British commercial colony.”*
[Schulze-Gaevernitz, Britischer Imperialismus und engliseber Freihandel zu Beginn des 20-ten Jabrhunderts (British
Imperialism and English Free Trade at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century–Tr.), Leipzig, 1906, p. ’18. Sartorius v.
Waltershausen says the same in Das volkswirtschaftiche System der Kapitalanlage im Auslande (The National Economic
System of Capital Investments Abroad–Tr.), Berlin, 1907, p. 46.] Basing himself on the report of the Austro-Hungarian
consul at Buenos Aires for 1909, Schilder estimates the amount of British capital invested in Argentina at 8,750,000
francs. It is not difficult to imagine what strong connections British finance capital (and its faithful “friend,” diplomacy)
thereby acquires with the Argentine bourgeoisie, with the circles that control the whole of that country’s economic and
political life.
¶26 A somewhat different form of financial and diplomatic dependence, accompanied by political independence, is
presented by Portugal. Portugal is an independent sovereign state, but actually, for more than two hundred years, since
the war of the Spanish Succession (1701-14), it has been a British protectorate. Great Britain has protected Portugal and
her colonies in order to fortify her own positions in the fight against her rivals, Spain and France. In return Great Britain
has received commercial privileges, preferential conditions for importing goods and especially capital into Portugal and
the Portuguese colonies, the right to use the ports and islands of Portugal, her telegraph cables, etc.** [Schilder, op. cit.,
Vol. 1, pp. 160-61.] Relations of this kind have always existed between big and little states, but in the epoch of capitalist
imperialism they become a general system, they form part of the sum total of “divide the world” relations, become links
in the chain of operations of world finance capital.
¶27 In order to finish with the question of the division of the world, we must make the following additional
observation. This question was raised quite openly and definitely not only in American literature after the
Spanish-American War, and in English literature after the Anglo-Boer War, at the very end of the nineteenth century and
the beginning of the twentieth; not only has German literature, which has “most jealously” watched “British
imperialism,” systematically given its appraisal of this fact; it has also been raised in French bourgeois literature in terms
as wide and definite as they can be made from the bourgeois point of view. We will quote Driault, the historian, who, in
his book, Political and Social Problems at the End of the Nineteenth Century, in the chapter “The Great Powers and the
Division of the World,” wrote the following: “During the past few years, all the free territory of the globe, with the
exception of China, has been occupied by the powers of Europe and North America. Several conflicts and displacements
of influence have already occurred over this matter, which foreshadow more terrible upheavals in the near future. For it
is necessary to make haste. The nations which have not yet made provision for themselves run the risk of never receiving
their share and never participating in the tremendous exploitation of the globe which will be one of the most essential
features of the next century” (i.e., the twentieth). “That is why all Europe and America have lately been afflicted with the
fever of colonial expansion, of ‘imperialism,’ that most noteworthy feature of the end of the nineteenth century.” And the
author added: “In this partition of the world, in this furious hunt for the treasures and the big markets of the globe, the
relative power of the empires founded in this nineteenth century is totally out of proportion to the place occupied in
Europe by the nations which founded them. The dominant powers in Europe, the arbiters of her destiny, are not equally
preponderant in the whole world. And, as colonial power, the hope of controlling as yet unassessed wealth, will evidently
react upon the relative strength of the European powers, the colonial question–‘imperialism,’ if you will– which has
already modified the political conditions of Europe itself, will modify them more and more.”* [J. I. Driault, Problèmes
politiques et sociaux, Paris, 1907 p. 299.]
32
VII. IMPERIALISM, AS A SPECIAL STAGE OF CAPITALISM
¶1 We must now try to sum up, put together, what has been said above on the subject of imperialism. Imperialism
emerged as the development and direct continuation of the fundamental characteristics of capitalism in general. But
capitalism only became capitalist imperialism at a definite and very high stage of its development, when certain of its
fundamental characteristics began to change into their opposites, when the features of the epoch of transition from
capitalism to a higher social and economic system had taken shape and revealed themselves all along the line.
Economically, the main thing in this process is the displacement of capitalist free competition by capitalist monopoly.
Free competition is the fundamental characteristic of capitalism, and of commodity production generally; monopoly is
the exact opposite of free competition, but we have seen the latter being transformed into monopoly before our eyes,
creating large-scale industry and forcing out small industry, replacing large-scale by still larger-scale industry, and
carrying concentration of production and capital to the point where out of it has grown and is growing monopoly: cartels,
syndicates and trusts, and merging with them, the capital of a dozen or so banks, which manipulate thousands of millions
At the same time the monopolies, which have grown out of free competition, do not eliminate the latter, but exist over it
and alongside of it, and thereby give rise to a number of very acute, intense antagonisms, frictions and conflicts.
Monopoly is the transition from capitalism to a higher system.
¶2 If it were necessary to give the briefest possible definition of imperialism we should have to say that
imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism. Such a definition would include what is most important, for, on the one
hand, finance capital is the bank capital of a few very big monopolist banks, merged with the capital of the monopolist
combines of industrialists; and, on the other hand, the division of the world is the transition from a colonial policy which
has extended without hindrance to territories unseized by any capitalist power, to a colonial policy of monopolistic
possession of the territory of the world which has been completely divided up.
¶3 But very brief definitions, although convenient, for they sum up the main points, are nevertheless inadequate,
since very important features of the phenomenon that has to be defined have to be especially deduced. And so, without
forgetting the conditional and relative value of all definitions in general, which can never embrace all the concatenations
of a phenomenon in its complete development, we must give a definition of imperialism that will include the following
five of its basic features: 1) the concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has
created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; 2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital,
and the creation, on the basis of this “finance capital,” of a financial oligarchy; 3) the export of capital as distinguished
from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance; 4) the formation of international monopolist capitalist
combines which share the world among themselves, and 5) the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest
capitalist powers is completed. Imperialism is capitalism in that stage of development in which the dominance of
monopolies and finance capital has established itself; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance;
in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun; in which the division of all territories of the
globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed.
¶4 We shall see later that imperialism can and must be defined differently if we bear in mind, not only the basic,
purely economic concepts–to which the above definition is limited–but also the historical place of this stage of
capitalism in relation to capitalism in general, or the relation between imperialism and the two main trends in the
working-class movement. The point to be noted just now is that imperialism, as interpreted above, undoubtedly
represents a special stage in the development of capitalism. To enable the reader to obtain the most well-grounded idea
of imperialism possible, we deliberately tried to quote as largely as possible bourgeois economists who are obliged to
admit the particularly incontrovertible facts concerning the latest stage of capitalist economy. With the same object in
view, we have quoted detailed statistics which enable one to see to what degree bank capital, etc., has grown, in what
precisely the transformation of quantity into quality, of developed capitalism into imperialism, was expressed. Needless
to say, of course, all boundaries in nature and in society are conditional and changeable, that it would be absurd to argue,
for example, about the particular year or decade in which imperialism “definitely” became established.
¶5 In the matter of defining imperialism, however, we have to enter into controversy, primarily, with K. Kautsky,
the principal Marxian theoretician of the epoch of the so-called Second International–that is, of the twenty-five years
between 1889 and 1914. The fundamental ideas expressed in our definition of imperialism were very resolutely attacked
by Kautsky in 1915, and even in November 1914, when he said that imperialism must not be regarded as a “phase” or
stage of economy, but as a policy, a definite policy “preferred” by finance capital; that imperialism must not be
“identified” with “present-day capitalism”; that if imperialism is to be understood to mean “all the phenomena of
present-day capitalism”–cartels, protection, the domination of the financiers, and colonial policy–then the question as to
whether imperialism is necessary to capitalism becomes reduced to the “flattest tautology,” because, in that case,
“imperialism is naturally a vital necessity for capitalism,” and so on. The best way to present Kautsky’s idea is to quote
33
his own definition of imperialism, which is diametrically opposed to the substance of the ideas which we have set forth
(for the objections coming from the camp of the German Marxists, who have been advocating similar ideas for many
years already, have been long known to Kautsky as the objections of a definite trend in Marxism).
¶6 Kautsky’s definition is as follows:
“Imperialism is a product of highly developed industrial capitalism. It consists in the striving of every industrial
capitalist nation to bring under its control or to annex larger and larger areas of agrarian” (Kautsky’s italics) “territory,
irrespective of what nations inhabit those regions.”* [Die Neue Zeit, 1914, 2 (Vol. 32), p. 909, Sept. 11, 1914; cf. 1915,
2, p. 107 et seq.]
¶7 This definition is utterly worthless because it one-sidedly, i.e., arbitrarily, singles out only the national question
(although the latter is extremely important in itself as well as in its relation to imperialism), it arbitrarily and inaccurately
connects this question only with industrial capital in the countries which annex other nations, and in an equally arbitrary
and inaccurate manner pushes into the forefront the annexation of agrarian regions.
¶8 Imperialism is a striving for annexations–this is what the political part of Kautsky’s definition amounts to. It is
correct, but very incomplete, for politically, imperialism is, in general, a striving towards violence and reaction. For the
moment, however, we are interested in the economic aspect of the question, which Kautsky himself introduced into his
definition. The inaccuracies in Kautsky’s definition are glaring. The characteristic feature of imperialism is not industrial
lout finance capital. It is not an accident that in France it was precisely the extraordinarily rapid development of finance
capital, and the weakening of industrial capital, that, from the ‘eighties onwards, gave rise to the extreme intensification
of annexationist (colonial) policy. The characteristic feature of imperialism is precisely that it strives to annex not only
agrarian territories, but even most highly industrialized regions (German appetite for Belgium; French appetite for
Lorraine), because I) the fact that the world is already divided up obliges those contemplating a redivision to reach out
for every kind of territory, and 2) an essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry between several Great Powers in the
striving for hegemony, i.e., for the conquest of territory, not so much directly for themselves as to weaken the adversary
and undermine his hegemony. (Belgium is particularly important for Germany as a base for operations against England;
England needs Baghdad as a base for operations against Germany, etc.)
¶9 Kautsky refers especially–and repeatedly–to Englishmen who, he alleges, have given a purely political
meaning to the word “imperialism” in the sense that he, Kautsky, understands it. We take up the work by the Englishman
Hobson, Imperialism, which appeared in 1902, and there we read:
¶10 “The new imperialism differs from the older, first, in substituting for the ambition of a single growing empire
the theory and the practice of competing empires, each motivated by similar lusts of political aggrandizement and
commercial gain; secondly, in the dominance of financial or investing over mercantile interests.”* [Hobson, Imperialism,
London, 1902, p. 324.]
¶11 We see that Kautsky is absolutely wrong in referring to Englishmen generally (unless he meant the vulgar
English imperialists, or the avowed apologists for imperialism). We see that Kautsky, while claiming that he continues to
advocate Marxism, as a matter of fact takes a step backward compared with the social-liberal Hobson, who more
correctly takes into account two “historically concrete” (Kautsky’s definition is a mockery of historical concreteness 1)
features of modern imperialism: I) the competition between several imperialisms, and 2) the predominance of the
financier over the merchant. If it is chiefly a question of the annexation of agrarian countries by industrial countries, then
the role of the merchant is put in the forefront.
¶12 Kautsky’s definition is not only wrong and un-Marxian. It serves as a basis for a whole system of views which
signify a rupture with Marxian theory and Marxian practice all along the line. We shall refer to this later. The argument
about words which Kautsky raises as to whether the latest stage of capitalism should be called “imperialism” or “the
stage of finance capital” is absolutely frivolous. Call it what you will, it makes no difference. The essence of the matter is
that Kautsky detaches the politics of imperialism from its economics, speaks of annexations as being a policy “preferred”
by finance capital, and opposes to it another bourgeois policy which, he alleges, is possible on this very same basis of
finance capital. It follows, then, that monopolies in economics are compatible with non-monopolistic, non-violent,
non-annexationist methods in politics. It follows, then, that the territorial division of the world, which was completed
precisely during the epoch of finance capital, and which constitutes the basis of the present peculiar forms of rivalry
between the biggest capitalist states, is compatible with a non-imperialist policy. The result is a slurring-over and a
blunting of the most profound contradictions of the latest stage of capitalism, instead of an exposure of their depth; the
result is bourgeois reformism instead of Marxism.
¶13 Kautsky enters into controversy with the German apologist of imperialism and annexations, Cunow, who
clumsily and cynically argues that imperialism is present-day capitalism; the development of capitalism is inevitable and
progressive; therefore imperialism is progressive; therefore, we should grovel before it and glorify it! This is something
like the caricature of the Russian Marxists which the Narodniks drew in 1894-95. They argued: if the Marxists believe
that capitalism is inevitable in Russia, that it is progressive, then they ought to open a tavern and begin to implant
34
capitalism! Kautsky’s reply to Cunow is as follows: imperialism is not present-day capitalism; it is only one of the forms
of the policy of present-day capitalism. This policy we can and should fight, fight imperialism, annexations, etc.
¶14 The reply seems quite plausible, but in effect it is a more subtle and more disguised (and therefore more
dangerous) advocacy of conciliation with imperialism, because a “fight” against the policy of the trusts and banks that
does not affect the basis of the economics of the trusts and banks is nothing more than bourgeois reformism and
pacifism, the benevolent and innocent expression of pious wishes. Evasion of existing contradictions, forgetting the most
important of them, instead of revealing their full depth–such is Kautsky’s theory, which has nothing in common with
Marxism. Naturally, such a “theory” can only serve the purpose of advocating unity with the Cunows!
¶15 “From the purely economic point of view,” writes Kautsky, “it is not impossible that capitalism will yet go
through a new phase, that of the extension of the policy of the cartels to foreign policy, the phase of ultra-imperialism,”*
[Die Neue Zeit, 1914, 2 (Vol. 32), p. 921, Sept. 11, 1914. Cf. 1915, p. 107 et seq.] i.e., of a superimperialism, of a union
of the imperialisms of the whole world and not struggles among them, a phase when wars shall cease under capitalism, a
phase of “the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital.”** [Die Neue Zeit, 1915 I, p. 144,
April 30. 1915]
¶16 We shall have to deal with this “theory of ultra-imperialism” later on in order to show in detail how definitely
and utterly it breaks with Marxism. At present, in keeping with the general plan of the present work, we must examine
the exact economic data on this question. “From the purely economic point of view,” is “ultra-imperialism” possible, or
is it ultra-nonsense?
¶17 If by purely economic point of view a “pure” abstraction is meant, then all that can be said reduces itself to the
following proposition: development is proceeding towards monopolies, hence, towards a single world monopoly,
towards a single world trust. This is indisputable, but it is also as completely meaningless as is the statement that
“development is proceeding” towards the manufacture of foodstuffs in laboratories. In this sense the “theory” of
ultra-imperialism is no less absurd than a “theory of ultra-agriculture” would be.
¶18 If, however, we are discussing the “purely economic” conditions of the epoch of finance capital as a historically
concrete epoch which opened at the beginning of the twentieth century, then the best reply that one can make to the
lifeless abstractions of “ultra-imperialism” (which serve exclusively a most reactionary aim: that of diverting attention
from the depth of existing antagonisms) is to contrast them with the concrete economic realities of present-day world
economy. Kautsky’s utterly meaningless talk about ultra-imperialism encourages, among other things, that profoundly
mistaken idea which only brings grist to the mill of the apologists of imperialism, viz., that the rule of finance capital
lessens the unevenness and contradictions inherent in world economy, whereas in reality it increases them.
¶19 R. Calwer, in his little book, An Introduction to World Economics,* [R. Calwer, Einfûhrung in die
Weltwirtschaft, Berlin, 1906.] made an attempt to summarize the main, purely economic, data that enable one to obtain a
concrete picture of the internal relations of world economy on the border line between the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. He divides the world into five “main economic areas,” as follows: 1) Central Europe (the whole of Europe
with the exception of Russia and Great Britain); 2) Great Britain; 3) Russia; 4) Eastern Asia; 5) America, he includes the
colonies in the “areas” of the states to which they belong and “leaves aside” a few countries not distributed according to
areas, such as Persia, Afghanistan, and Arabia in Asia, Morocco and Abyssinia in Africa, etc.
¶20 Here is a brief summary of the economic data he quotes on these regions:
Principal
economic
areas
Area Pop. Transport Trade Industry
Million
sq. Km.
Millions Railways
(thous.
Km.)
Mercantile
fleet (million
tons)
Imports &
exports
(billion
marks)
Output
Cotton
spindles
(millions)
of coal
(million
tons)
of pig iron
(million
tons)
1) Central
Europe
27.6
(23.6)*
388
(146)
204 8 41 251 15 26
35
2) British 28.9
(28.6)*
398
(355)
140 11 25 249 9 51
3) Russian 22 131 63 1 3 16 3 7
4) East
Asian
12 389 8 1 2 8 0.02 2
5)
American
30 148 379 6 14 245 14 19
* The figures in parentheses show the area and population of the colonies.
¶21 We see three areas of highly developed capitalism (high development of means of transport, of trade and of
industry): the Central European, the British and the American areas. Among these are three states which dominate the
world: Germany, Great Britain, the United States. Imperialist rivalry and the struggle between these countries have
become extremely keen because Germany has only an insignificant area and few colonies; the creation of “Central
Europe” is still a matter for the future, it is being born in the midst of a desperate struggle. For the moment the distinctive
feature of the whole of Europe is political incohesion. In the British and American areas, on the other hand, political
concentration is very highly developed, but there is a vast disparity between the immense colonies of the one and the
insignificant colonies of the other. In the colonies, however, capitalism is only beginning to develop. The struggle for
South America is becoming more and more acute.
¶22 There are two areas where capitalism is little developed: Russia and Eastern Asia. In the former, the density of
population is extremely low, in the latter it is extremely high; in the former political concentration is high, in the latter it
does not exist. The partition of China is only just beginning, and the struggle between Japan, U.S.A., etc. for it is
continually gaining in intensity.
¶23 Compare this reality–the vast diversity of economic and political conditions, the extreme disparity in the rate of
development of the various countries, etc., and the violent struggles among the imperialist states–with Kautsky’s silly
little fable about “peaceful” ultra-imperialism. Is this not the reactionary attempt of a frightened philistine to hide from
stern reality? Are not the international cartels which Kautsky imagines are the embryos of “ultra-imperialism” (in the
same way as one “can” describe the manufacture of tabloids in a laboratory as ultra-agriculture in embryo) an example of
the division and the redivision of the world, the transition from peaceful division to non-peaceful division and vice
versa? Is not American and other finance capital, which divided the whole world peacefully with Germany’s participation
in, for example, the international rail syndicate, or in the international mercantile shipping trust, now engaged in
redividing the world on the basis of a new relation of forces, which is being changed by methods altogether
non-peaceful?
¶24 Finance capital and the trusts do not diminish but increase the differences in the rate of growth of the various
parts of the world economy. Once the relation of forces is changed, what other solution of the contradictions can be
found under capitalism than that of force? Railway statistics* [Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich, 1915;
Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen, 1892 (Statistical Yearbook for the German Empire; Railroad Archive–Tr.). Minor details
for the distribution of railways among the colonies of the various countries in 1890 had to be estimated approximately.]
provide remarkably exact data on the different rates of growth of capitalism and finance capital in world economy. In the
last decades of imperialist development, the total length of railways has changed as follows:
RAILWAYS
(Thousand kilometers)
1890 1913
Europe 224 346 +122
U.S.A. 268 411 +143
All colonies 82 Tot. 125 210 Tot. 347 +128 Tot. +222
Independent and
semiindependent states of Asia
and America
43 137 +94
36
Total 617 1,104
¶25 Thus, the development of railways has been most rapid in the colonies and in the independent (and
semi-independent) states of Asia and America. Here, as we know, the finance capital of the four or five biggest capitalist
states reigns undisputed. Two hundred thousand kilometers of new railways in the colonies and in the other countries of
Asia and America represent more than 40,000,000,000 marks in capital, newly invested on particularly advantageous
terms, with special guarantees of a good return and with profitable orders for steel works, etc., etc.
¶26 Capitalism is growing with the greatest rapidity in the colonies and in overseas countries. Among the latter, new
imperialist powers are emerging (e.g., Japan). The struggle among the world imperialisms is becoming more acute. The
tribute levied by finance capital on the most profitable colonial and overseas enterprises is increasing. In the division of
this “booty,” an exceptionally large part goes to countries which do not always stand at the top of the list as far as
rapidity of development of productive forces is concerned. In the case of the biggest countries, considered with their
colonies, the total length of railways was as follows:
(Thousands of kilometers)
1890 1913
U.S.A. 268 413 +145
British Empire 107 208 +101
Russia 32 78 +46
Germany 43 68 +25
France 41 63 +22
Total f or 5 Powers 491 830 +339
¶27 Thus, about 80 per cent of the total existing railways are concentrated in the hands of the five biggest powers.
But the concentration of the ownership of these railways, the concentration of finance capital, is immeasurably greater,
for the French and English millionaires, for example, own an enormous amount of shares and bonds in American,
Russian and other railways.
¶28 Thanks to her colonies, Great Britain has increased the length of “her” railways by 100,000 kilometers, four
times as much as Germany. And yet, it is well known that the development of productive forces in Germany, and
especially the development of the coal and iron industries, has been incomparably more rapid during this period than in
England–not to speak of France and Russia. In 1892, Germany produced 4,900,000 tons of pig iron and Great Britain
produced 6,800,000 tons; in 1912, Germany produced 17,600,000 tons and Great Britain, 9,000,000 tons. Germany,
therefore, had an overwhelming superiority over England in this respect.* [Cf. also Edgar Crammond, “The Economic
Relations of the British and German Empires” in The Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, July 1914, p.777 et seq.]
The question is: what means other than war could there be under capitalism of removing the disparity between the
development of productive forces and the accumulation of capital on the one side, and the division of colonies and
“spheres of influence” for finance capital on the other?
VIII. THE PARASITISM AND DECAY OF CAPITALISM
¶1 We now have to examine yet another very important aspect of imperialism to which, usually, insufficient importance
is attached in most of the discussions on this subject. One of the shortcomings of the Marxist Hilferding is that he takes a
step backward compared with the non-Marxist Hobson. We refer to parasitism, which is characteristic of imperialism.
¶2 As we have seen, the deepest economic foundation of imperialism is monopoly. This is capitalist monopoly,
i.e., monopoly which has grown out of capitalism and exists in the general environment of capitalism, commodity
production and competition, in permanent and insoluble contradiction to this general environment. Nevertheless, like all
monopoly, it inevitably engenders a tendency to stagnation and decay. Since monopoly prices are established, even
temporarily, the motive cause of technical and, consequently, of all progress, disappears to a certain extent and, further,
the economic possibility arises of deliberately retarding technical progress. For instance, in America, a certain Owens
37
invented a machine which revolutionized the manufacture of bottles. The German bottle-manufacturing cartel purchased
Owens’ patent, but pigeonholed it, refrained from utilizing it. Certainly, monopoly under capitalism can never
completely, and for a very long period of time, eliminate competition in the world market (and this, by the by, is one of
the reasons why the theory of ultra-imperialism is so absurd). Certainly, the possibility of reducing cost of production
and increasing profits by introducing technical improvements operates in the direction of change. But the tendency to
stagnation and decay, which is characteristic of monopoly, continues to operate, and in certain branches of industry, in
certain countries, for certain periods of time, it gains the upper hand.
¶3 The monopoly ownership of very extensive, rich or well situated colonies, operates in the same direction.
¶4 Further, imperialism is an immense accumulation of money capital in a few countries, amounting, as we have
seen, to 100-150 billion francs in securities. Hence the extraordinary growth of a class, or rather, of a social stratum of
rentiers, i.e., people who live by “clipping coupons,” who take no part in any enterprise whatever, whose profession is
idleness. The export of capital, one of the most essential economic bases of imperialism, still more completely isolates
the rentiers from production and sets the seal of parasitism on the whole country that lives by exploiting the labor of
several overseas countries and colonies.
¶5 “In 1893,” writes Hobson, “the British capital invested abroad represented about 15 per cent of the total wealth
of the United Kingdom.”* [Hobson, op. cit., pp. 59, 60.] We will remind the reader that by 1915 this capital had
increased about two and a half times. “Aggressive imperialism,” says Hobson further on, “which costs the taxpayer so
dear, which is of so little value to the manufacturer and trader … is a source of great gain to the investor…. The annual
income Great Britain derives from commissions in her whole foreign and colonial trade, import and export, is estimated
by Sir R. Giffen at 18,000,000 for 1899, taken at 2.5 per cent, upon a turnover of 800,000,000.” Great as this sum is, it
cannot explain the aggressive imperialism of Great Britain. It is explained by the income of go to 100 million pounds
sterling from “invested” capital, the income of the rentiers.
¶6 The income of the rentiers is five times greater than the income obtained from the foreign trade of the biggest
“trading” country in the world. This is the essence of imperialism and imperialist parasitism.
¶7 For that reason the term, “rentier state” (Rentnerstaat) or usurer state, is coming into common use in the
economic literature that deals with imperialism. The world has become divided into a handful of usurer states and a vast
majority of debtor states. “At the top of the list of foreign investments,” says Schulze-Gaevernitz, “are those placed in
politically dependent or allied countries: Great Britain grants loans to Egypt, Japan, China and South America. Her navy
plays here the part of bailiff in case of necessity. Great Britain’s political power protects her from the indignation of her
debtors.”* [Schulze-Gaevernitz, Britischer Imperialismus, p.320 et seq.] Sartorius von Waltershausen in his book, The
National Economic System of Foreign Investments, cites Holland as the model “rentier state” and points out that Great
Britain and France are now becoming such.** [Sartorius von Waltershausen, Das volkswirtschaftliche System, etc.,
Berlin, 1907, Buch IV.] Schilder is of the opinion that five industrial states have become ”definitely pronounced creditor
countries”: Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland. He does not include Holland in this list simply
because she is “industrially little developed.”*** [Schilder, op. cit., p. 393.] The United States is a creditor only of the
American countries.
¶8 “Great Britain,” says Schulze-Gaevernitz, “is gradually becoming transformed from an industrial into a creditor
state. Notwithstanding the absolute increase in industrial output and the export of manufactured goods, the relative
importance of income from interest and dividends, issues of securities, commissions and speculation is on the increase in
the whole of the national economy. In my opinion it is precisely this that forms the economic basis of imperialist
ascendancy. The creditor is more firmly attached to the debtor than the seller is to the buyer.”* [Schulze-Gaevernitz,
Britischer Imperialismus, p. 122.] In regard to Germany, A. Lansburgh, the publisher of the Berlin Die Bank, in 1911, in
an article entitled “Germany–a Rentier State,” wrote the following: “People in Germany are ready to sneer at the
yearning to become rentiers that is observed among the people in France. But they forget that as far as the bourgeoisie is
concerned the situation in Germany is becoming more and more like that in France.”** [Die Bank, 1911, 1, pp. 10-11.]
¶9 The rentier state is a state of parasitic, decaying capitalism, and this circumstance cannot fail to influence all the
social-political conditions of the countries affected in general, and the two fundamental trends in the working-class
movement, in particular. To demonstrate this in the clearest possible manner we will quote Hobson, who is the most
“reliable” witness, since he cannot be suspected of leanings towards “Marxist orthodoxy”; on the other hand, he is an
Englishman who is very well acquainted with the situation in the country which is richest in colonies, in finance capital,
and in imperialist experience.
¶10 With the Anglo-Boer War fresh in his mind, Hobson describes the connection between imperialism and the
interests of the “financiers,” the growing profits from contracts, etc., and writes: “While the directors of this definitely
parasitic policy are capitalists, the same motives appeal to special classes of the workers. In many towns, most important
trades are dependent upon government employment or contracts; the imperialism of the metal and ship-building centers
is attributed in no small degree to this fact.” In this writer’s opinion there are two causes which have weakened the old
38
empires: 1) “economic parasitism,” and 2) the formation of armies composed of subject peoples. “There is first the habit
of economic parasitism, by which the ruling state has used its provinces, colonies, and dependencies in order to enrich its
ruling class and to bribe its lower classes into acquiescence.” And we would add that the economic possibility of such
bribery, whatever its form may be, requires high monopolist profits.
¶11 As for the second cause, Hobson writes: “One of the strangest symptoms of the blindness of imperialism is the
reckless indifference with which Great Britain, France and other imperial nations are embarking on this perilous
dependence. Great Britain has gone farthest. Most of the fighting by which we have won our Indian Empire has been
done by natives; in India, as more recently in Egypt, great standing armies are placed under British commanders; almost
all the fighting associated with our African dominions, except in the southern part, has been done for us by natives.”
¶12 Hobson gives the following economic appraisal of the prospect of the partition of China: “The greater part of
Western Europe might then assume the appearance and character already exhibited by tracts of country in the South of
England, in the Riviera, and in the tourist-ridden or residential parts of Italy and Switzerland, little clusters of wealthy
aristocrats drawing dividends and pensions from the Far East, with a somewhat larger group of professional retainers and
tradesmen and a large body of personal servants and workers in the transport trade and in the final stages of production
of the more perishable goods; all the main arterial industries would have disappeared, the staple foods and manufactures
flowing in as tribute from Asia and Africa.” “We have foreshadowed the possibility of even a larger alliance of Western
States, a European federation of great powers which, so far from forwarding the cause of world civilization, might
introduce the gigantic peril of a Western parasitism, a group of advanced industrial nations, whose upper classes drew
vast tribute from Asia and Africa, with which they supported great tame masses of retainers, no longer engaged in the
staple industries of agriculture and manufacture, but kept in the performance of personal or minor industrial services
under the control of a new financial aristocracy. Let those who would scout such a theory” (it would be better to say:
prospect) “as undeserving of consideration examine the economic and social condition of districts in Southern England
today which are already reduced to this condition, and reflect upon the vast extension of such a system which might be
rendered feasible by the subjection of China to the economic control of similar groups of financiers, investors, and
political and business officials, draining the greatest potential reservoir of profit the world has ever known, in order to
consume it in Europe. The situation is far too complex, the play of world-forces far too incalculable, to render this or any
other single interpretation of the future very probable; but the influences which govern the Imperialism of Western
Europe today are moving in this direction, and, unless counteracted or diverted, make towards some such
consummation.”* [Hobson, op. cit., pp. 103, 205, 144, 335, 186.]
¶13 The author is quite right: if the forces of imperialism had not been counteracted they would have led precisely to
what he has described. The significance of a “United States of Europe” in the present imperialist situation is correctly
appraised. He should have added, however, that, also within the working-class movement, the opportunists, who are for
the moment victorious in most countries, are “working” systematically and undeviatingly in this very direction.
Imperialism, which means the partition of the world, and the exploitation of other countries besides China, which means
high monopoly profits for a handful of very rich countries, creates the economic possibility of bribing the upper strata of
the proletariat, and thereby fosters, gives form to, and strengthens opportunism. We must not, however, lose sight of the
forces which counteract imperialism in general, and opportunism in particular, and which, naturally, the social-liberal
Hobson is unable to perceive.
¶14 The German opportunist, Gerhard Hildebrand, who was expelled from the Party for defending imperialism, and
who could today be a leader of the so-called “Social-Democratic” Party of Germany, supplements Hobson well by his
advocacy of a “United States of Western Europe” (without Russia) for the purpose of “joint” action… against the African
Negroes, against the “great Islamic movement,” for the maintenance of a “powerful army and navy,” against a “SinoJapanese
coalition,”* [Gerhard Hildebrand, Die Errschutterung der Industrieherrschaft und des Industriesozialismus
(The Shattering of the Rule of Industrialism and Industrial Socialism–Tr.), 1910, p. 229 et seq.] etc.
¶15 The description of “British imperialism” in Schulze-Gaevernitz’s book reveals the same parasitical traits. The
national income of Great Britain approximately doubled from 1865 to 1898, while the income “from abroad” increased
ninefold in the same period. While the “merit” of imperialism is that it “trains the Negro to habits of industry” (not
without coercion, of course …), the “danger” of imperialism lies in that “Europe will shift the burden of physical toil
–first agricultural and mining, then the rougher work in industry–on to the colored races, and itself be content with the
role of rentier, and in this way, perhaps, pave the way for the economic, and later, the political emancipation of the
colored races.”
¶16 An increasing proportion of land in Great Britain is being taken out of cultivation and used for sport, for the
diversion of the rich. About Scotland–the most aristocratic playground in the world–it is said that “it lives on its past and
on Mr. Carnegie.” On horse racing and fox hunting alone Britain annually spends 14,000,000. The number of rentiers in
England is about one million. The percentage of the productively-employed population to the total population is
declining:
39
Population No. of workers in basic industries Per cent of total population
(Millions)
1851 17.9 4.1 23%
1901 32.5 4.9 15%
¶17 And in speaking of the British working class the bourgeois student of “British imperialism at the beginning of
the twentieth century” is obliged to distinguish systematically between the “upper stratum” of the workers and the “lower
stratum of the proletariat proper.” The upper stratum furnishes the bulk of the membership of cooperatives, of trade
unions, of sporting clubs and of numerous religious sects. To this level is adapted the electoral system, which in Great
Britain is still “sufficiently restricted to exclude the lower stratum of the proletariat proper”!! In order to present the
condition of the British working class in a rosy light, only this upper stratum–which constitutes a minority of the
proletariat–is generally spoken of. For instance, “the problem of unemployment is mainly a London problem and that of
the lower proletarian stratum, to which the politicians attach little importance. …”* [Schulze-Gaevernitz, Britischer
Imperialismus, p. 301.] He should have said: to which the bourgeois politicians and the “Socialist” opportunists attach
little importance.
¶18 One of the special features of imperialism connected with the facts we are describing, is the decline in
emigration from imperialist countries and the increase in immigration into these countries from the more backward
countries where lower wages are paid. As Hobson observes, emigration from Great Britain has been declining since
1884. In that year the number of emigrants was 242,000, while in 1900, the number was 169,000. Emigration from
Germany reached the highest point between 1881 and 1890, with a total of 1,453,000 emigrants. In the course of the
following two decades, it fell to 544,000 and to 341,000. On the other hand, there was an increase in the number of
workers entering Germany from Austria, Italy, Russia and other countries. According to the 1907 census, these were
1,342,294 foreigners in Germany, of whom 440,800 were industrial workers and 257,329 agricultural workers.*
[Schulze-Gaevernitz, Britischer Imperialismus, p. 301.] In France, the workers employed in the mining industry are, “in
great part,” foreigners: Poles, Italians and Spaniards.** [Henger, Die Kapitalsanlage der Franzosen (French
Investments), Stuttgart, 1913.] In the United States, immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe are engaged in the
most poorly paid occupations, while American workers provide the highest percentage of overseers or of the better-paid
workers.*** [Hourwich, Immigration and Labour, New York, 1913.] Imperialism has the tendency to create privileged
sections also among the workers, and to detach them from the broad masses of the proletariat.
¶19 It must be observed that in Great Britain the tendency of imperialism to divide the workers, to strengthen
opportunism among them and to cause temporary decay in the working-class movement, revealed itself much earlier
than the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries; for two important distinguishing features of
imperialism were already observed in Great Britain in the middle of the nineteenth century, viz., vast colonial
possessions and a monopolist position in the world market. Marx and Engels traced this connection between
opportunism in the working-class movement and the imperialist features of British capitalism systematically, during the
course of several decades. For example, on October 7, 1858, Engels wrote to Marx: “The English proletariat is becoming
more and more bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all nations is apparently aiming ultimately at the possession of a
bourgeois aristocracy, and a bourgeois proletariat as well as a bourgeoisie. For a nation which exploits the whole world
this is, of course, to a certain extent justifiable.” [15] Almost a quarter of a century later, in a letter dated August 11,
1881, Engels speaks of “… the worst type of English trade unions which allow themselves to be led by men bought by, or
at least paid by, the bourgeoisie.” [16] In a letter to Kautsky, dated September 12, 1882, Engels wrote: “You ask me what
the English workers think about colonial policy? Well, exactly the same as they think about politics in general. There is
no workers’ party here, there are only Conservatives and Liberal Radicals, and the workers merrily share the feast of
England’s monopoly of the colonies and the world market”* [ Briefwechsel von Marx und Engels, Bd. II, S. 290; IV,
453–Karl Kautsky, Sozialismus und Kolonialpolitik, Berlin, 1907, p. 79; this pamphlet was written by Kautsky in those
infinitely distant days when he was still a Marxist.] (Engels expressed similar ideas in the press in his preface to the
second edition of The Condition of the Working Class in England, which appeared in 1892).
¶20 This clearly shows the causes and effects. The causes are: 1) exploitation of the whole world by this country; 2)
its monopolistic position in the world market; 3) its colonial monopoly. The effects are: 1) a section of the British
proletariat becomes bourgeois; 2) a section of the proletariat permits itself to be led by men bought by, or at least paid
by, the bourgeoisie. The imperialism of the beginning of the twentieth century completed the division of the world
among a handful of states, each of which today exploits (i.e., draws superprofits from) a part of the “whole world” only a
little smaller than that which England exploited in 1858; each of them occupies a monopoly position in the world market
thanks to trusts, cartels, finance capital and creditor and debtor relations; each of them enjoys to some degree a colonial
monopoly (we have seen that out of the total of 75,000,000 sq. km., which comprise the whole colonial world,
40
65,000,000 sq. km., or 86 per cent, belong to six powers; 61,000,000 sq. km., or 81 per cent, belong to three powers).
¶21 The distinctive feature of the present situation is the prevalence of such economic and political conditions as
could not but increase the irreconcilability between opportunism and the general and vital interests of the working-class
movement: imperialism has grown from the embryo into the predominant system; capitalist monopolies occupy first
place in economics and politics; the division of the world has been completed; on the other hand, instead of the
undivided monopoly of Great Britain, we see a few imperialist powers contending for the right to share in this monopoly,
and this struggle is characteristic of the whole period of the beginning of the twentieth century. Opportunism cannot now
be completely triumphant in the working-class movement of one country for decades as it was in England in the second
half of the nineteenth century; but in a number of countries it has grown ripe, overripe, and rotten, and has become
completely merged with bourgeois policy in the form of “social chauvinism.”* [Russian social-chauvinism in its avowed
form represented by Messrs. the Potressovs, Chkhenkelis, Maslovs, etc., as well as in its tacit form, as represented by
Messrs. Chkheidze, Skobelev, Axelrod, Martov, etc., also emerged from the Russian variety of opportunism, namely,
Liquidatorism.]
IX. THE CRITIQUE OF IMPERIALISM
¶1 By the critique of imperialism, in the broad sense of the term, we mean the attitude towards imperialist policy of the
different classes of society in connection with their general ideology.
¶2 The enormous dimensions of finance capital concentrated in a few hands and creating an extraordinarily
far-flung and close network of relationships and connections which subordinates not only the small and medium, but also
even the very small capitalists and small masters, on the one hand, and the increasingly intense struggle waged against
other national state groups of financiers for the division of the world and domination over other countries, on the other
hand, cause the possessing classes to go over entirely to the side of imperialism. “General” enthusiasm over the prospects
of imperialism, furious defense of it and painting it in the brightest colors–such are the signs of the times. The
imperialist ideology also penetrates the working class. No Chinese Wall separates it from the other classes. The leaders
of the present-day, so-called, “Social-Democratic” Party of Germany are justly called “social-imperialists,” that is,
Socialists in words and imperialists in deeds; but as early as 1902, Hobson noted the existence in England of “Fabian
imperialists” who belonged to the opportunist Fabian Society.
¶3 Bourgeois scholars and publicists usually come out in defense of imperialism in a somewhat veiled form; they
obscure its complete domination and its profound roots, strive to push into the forefront particular and secondary details
and do their very best to distract attention from essentials by means of absolutely ridiculous schemes for “reform,” such
as police supervision of the trusts or banks, etc. Less frequently, cynical and frank imperialists come forward who are
bold enough to admit the absurdity of the idea of reforming the fundamental characteristics of imperialism.
¶4 We will give an example. The German imperialists attempt, in the magazine Archives of World Economy to
follow the movements for national emancipation in the colonies, particularly, of course, in colonies other than those
belonging to Germany. They note the unrest and the protest movements in India, the movement in Natal (South Africa),
in the Dutch East Indies, etc. One of them, commenting on an English report of a conference held on June 28-30, 1910,
of representatives of various subject nations and races, of peoples of Asia, Africa and Europe who are subject to foreign
rule, writes as follows in appraising the speeches delivered at this conference: “We are told that we must fight
imperialism, that the ruling states should recognize the right of subject peoples to independence, that an international
tribunal should supervise the fulfilment of treaties concluded between the great powers and weak peoples. Further than
the expression of these pious wishes they do not go. We see no trace of understanding of the fact that imperialism is
inseparably bound up with capitalism in its present form and that, therefore (!!), an open struggle against imperialism
would be hopeless, unless, perhaps, the fight is confined to protests against certain of its especially abhorrent excesses.”*
[Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Bd. II, p. 193.] Since the reform of the basis of imperialism is a deception, a “pious wish,”
since the bourgeois representatives of the oppressed nations go no “further” forward, the bourgeois representative of an
oppressing nation goes “further” backward, to servility towards imperialism under cover of the claim to be “scientific.”
“Logic,” indeed!
¶5 The questions as to whether it is possible to reform the basis of imperialism, whether to go forward to the
further intensification and deepening of the antagonisms which it engenders, or backwards, towards allaying these
antagonisms, are fundamental questions in the critique of imperialism. Since the specific political features of imperialism
are reaction all along the line and increased national oppression resulting from the oppression of the financial oligarchy
and the elimination of free competition, a petty-bourgeois-democratic opposition to imperialism arose in the beginning of
the twentieth century in nearly all imperialist countries. And the desertion of Kautsky and of the broad international
Kautskyan trend from Marxism consists precisely in the fact that Kautsky not only did not trouble to oppose, was not
41
only unable to oppose this petty-bourgeois reformist opposition, which is really reactionary in its economic basis, but
became merged with it in practice.
¶6 In the United States, the imperialist war waged against Spain in 1898 stirred up the opposition of the
“anti-imperialists,” the last of the Mohicans of bourgeois democracy, who declared this war to be “criminal,” regarded
the annexation of foreign territories as a violation of the Constitution, declared that the treatment of Aguinaldo, leader of
the native Filipinos (the Americans promised him the independence of his country, but later they landed troops and
annexed it) as “Jingo treachery,” and quoted the words of Lincoln: “When the white man governs himself, that is
self-government; but when he governs himself and also governs others, it is no longer self-government; it is despotism.”*
[J. Patouillet, L’impérialisme américain, Dijon, 1904, p. 272.] But while all this criticism shrank from recognizing the
inseverable bond between imperialism and the trusts, and, therefore, between imperialism and the foundations of
capitalism, while it shrank from joining the forces engendered by large-scale capitalism and its development–it remained
a “pious wish.”
¶7 This is also the main attitude taken by Hobson in his critique of imperialism. Hobson anticipated Kautsky in
protesting against the “inevitability of imperialism” argument, and in urging the necessity of “increasing the consuming
capacity” of the people (under capitalism!). The petty-bourgeois point of view in the critique of imperialism, the
omnipotence of the banks, the financial oligarchy, etc., is adopted by the authors we have often quoted, such as Agahd,
A. Lansburgh, L. Eschwege, and among the French writers, Victor Bérard, author of a superficial book entitled England
and Imperialism which appeared in 1900. All these authors, who make no claim to be Marxists, contrast imperialism
with free competition and democracy, condemn the Baghdad railway scheme as leading to conflicts and war, utter “pious
wishes” for peace, etc. This applies also to the compiler of international stock and share issue statistics, A. Neymarck,
who, after calculating the hundreds of billions of francs representing “international” securities, exclaimed in 1912: “Is it
possible to believe that peace may be disturbed … that, in the face of these enormous figures, anyone would risk starting
a war?”* [Bulletin de l’lnstitut International de Statistique, t. XIX, livr. II p. 225.]
¶8 Such simple-mindedness on the part of the bourgeois economists is not surprising; moreover, it is in their
interest to pretend to be so naive and to talk “seriously” about peace under imperialism. But what remains of Kautsky’s
Marxism, when, in 1914, 1915 and 1916, he takes up the same bourgeois-reformist point of view and affirms that
“everybody is agreed” (imperialists, pseudo Socialists and social-pacifists) on the matter of peace? Instead of an analysis
of imperialism and an exposure of the depths of its contradictions, we have nothing but a reformist “pious wish” to wave
them aside, to evade them.
¶9 Here is a sample of Kautsky’s economic criticism of imperialism. He takes the statistics of the British export
and import trade with Egypt for 1872 and 1912; it transpires that this export and import trade has grown more slowly
than British foreign trade as a whole. From this Kautsky concludes that: “we have no reason to suppose that without
military occupation the growth of British trade with Egypt would have been less, simply as a result of the mere operation
of economic factors.” “The urge of capital to expand . . . can be best promoted, not by the violent methods of
imperialism, but by peaceful democracy.”* [Kautsky, Nationalstaat, imperialistischer Staat und Staatenbund (National
State, Imperialist State and Union of States–Tr.), Nürnberg, , pp. 72 and 70. ]
¶10 This argument of Kautsky’s which is repeated in every key by his Russian armor-bearer (and Russian shielder of
the social-chauvinists), Mr. Spectator, [17] constitutes the basis of Kautskyan critique of imperialism, and that is why we
must deal with it in greater detail. We will begin with a quotation from Hilferding, whose conclusions Kautsky on many
occasions, and notably in April 1915, has declared to have been “unanimously adopted by all socialist theoreticians.”
¶11 “It is not the business of the proletariat,” writes Hilferding, “to contrast the more progressive capitalist policy
with that of the now bygone era of free trade and of hostility towards the state. The reply of the proletariat to the
economic policy of finance capital, to imperialism, cannot be free trade, but Socialism. The aim of proletarian policy
cannot now be the ideal of restoring free competition–which has now become a reactionary ideal–but the complete
elimination of competition by the abolition of capitalism.”** [ Finance Capital, p. 567.]
¶12 Kautsky broke with Marxism by advocating in the epoch of finance capital a “reactionary ideal,” “peaceful
democracy,” “the mere operation of economic factors,” for objectively this ideal drags us back from monopoly to
non-monopolist capitalism, and is a reformist swindle.
¶13 Trade with Egypt (or with any other colony or semicolony) “would have grown more” without military
occupation, without imperialism, and without finance capital. What does this mean? That capitalism would have
developed more rapidly if free competition had not been restricted by monopolies in general, or by the “connections,”
yoke (i.e., also the monopoly) of finance capital, or by the monopolist possession of colonies by certain countries?
¶14 Kautsky’s argument can have no other meaning, and this “meaning” is meaningless. Let us assume that free
competition, without any sort of monopoly, would have developed capitalism and trade more rapidly. But the more
rapidly trade and capitalism develop, the greater is the concentration of production and capital which gives rise to
monopoly. And monopolies have already arisen–precisely out of free competition! Even if monopolies have now begun
42
to retard progress, it is not an argument in favour of free competition, which has become impossible after it has given
rise to monopoly.
¶15 Whichever way one turns Kautsky’s argument, one will kind nothing in it except reaction and bourgeois
reformism.
¶16 Even if we correct this argument and say, as Spectator says, that the trade of the British colonies with England
is now developing more slowly than their trade with other countries, it does not save Kautsky; for it is also monopoly,
also imperialism that is beating Great Britain, only it is the monopoly and imperialism of another country (America,
Germany). It is known that the cartels have given rise to a new and peculiar form of protective tariffs, i.e., goods suitable
for export are protected (Engels noted this in Vol. III of Capital). [18] It is known, too, that the cartels and finance
capital have a system peculiar to themselves, that of “exporting goods at cut-rate prices,” or “dumping,” as the English
call it: within a given country the cartel sells its goods at high monopoly prices, but sells them abroad at a much lower
price to undercut the competitor, to enlarge its own production to the utmost, etc. If Germany’s trade with the British
colonies is developing more rapidly than Great Britain’s, it only proves that German imperialism is younger, stronger and
better organized than British imperialism, is superior to it; but it by no means proves the “superiority” of free trade, for it
is not a fight between free trade and protection and colonial dependence, but between two rival imperialisms, two
monopolies, two groups of finance capital. The superiority of German imperialism over British imperialism is more
potent than the wall of colonial frontiers or of protective tariffs: to use this as an “argument” in favour of free trade and
“peaceful democracy” is banal, it means forgetting the essential features and characteristics of imperialism, substituting
petty-bourgeois reformism for Marxism.
¶17 It is interesting to note that even the bourgeois economist, A. Lansburgh, whose criticism of imperialism is as
pettybourgeois as Kautsky’s, nevertheless got closer to a more scientific study of trade statistics. He did not compare
only one country, chosen at random, and only a colony with the other countries; he examined the export trade of an
imperialist country: 1) with countries which are financially dependent upon it, which borrow money from it; and 2) with
countries which are financially independent. He obtained the following results:
EXPORT TRADE OF GERMANY
(Million marks)
1889 1908 Per cent increase
To Countries Financially Dependent
on Germany
Rumania 48.2 70.8 47%
Portugal 19.0 32.8 73%
Argentina 60.7 147.0 143%
Brazil 48.7 84.5 73%
Chile 28.3 52.4 85%
Turkey 29.9 64.0 114%
Total 234.8 451.5 92%
To Countries Financially Independent
of Germany
Great Britain 651.8 997.4 53%
France 210.2 437.9 108%
Belgium 137.2 322.8 135%
Switzerland 177.4 401.1 127%
Australia 21.2 64.5 205%
Dutch East Indies 8.8 40.7 363%
43
Total 1,206.6 2,264.4 87%
¶18 Lansburgh did not draw conclusions and therefore, strangely enough, failed to observe that if the figures prove
anything at all, they prove that he is wrong for the exports to countries financially dependent on Germany have grown
more rapidly, if only slightly, than those to the countries which are financially independent. (We emphasize the “if,” for
Lansburgh’s figures are far from complete.)
¶19 Tracing the connection between exports and loans, Lansburgh writes:
“In 1890-91 a Rumanian loan was floated through the German banks, which had already in previous years made
advances on this loan. It was used chiefly to purchase railway materials in Germany. In 1891 German exports to
Rumania amounted to 55,000,000 marks. The following year they dropped to 39,400,000 marks and, with fluctuations,
to 25,400,000 in 1900. Only in very recent years have they regained the level of 1891 thanks to two new loans.
¶20 “German exports to Portugal rose, following the loans of 1888-89, to 21,100,000 (1890); then, in the two
following years, they dropped to 16,200,000 and 7,400,000, and regained their former level only in 1903.
¶21 “The figures of German trade with Argentina are still more striking. Following the loans floated in 1888 and
1890, German exports to Argentina reached, in 1889, 60,700,000 marks. Two years later they only reached 18,600,000
marks, less than one-third of the previous figure. It was not until 1901 that they regained and surpassed the level of 1889,
and then only as a result of new loans floated by the state and by municipalities, with advances to build power stations,
and with other credit operations.
¶22 “Exports to Chile, as a consequence of the loan of 1889, rose to 45,200,000 marks (in 1892) and a year later
dropped to 22,500,000 marks. A new Chilean loan floated by the German banks in 1906 was followed by a rise of
exports to 84,700,000 marks in 1907, only to fall again to 52,400,000 marks in 1908.* [Die Bank, 1909, 2 p.819 et seq.]
¶23 From these facts Lansburgh draws the amusing pettybourgeois moral of how unstable and irregular export trade
is when it is bound up with loans, how bad it is to invest capital abroad instead of “naturally” and “harmoniously”
developing home industry, how “costly” are the millions in backsheesh that Krupp has to pay in floating foreign loans;
etc. But the facts tell us clearly: the increase in exports is precisely connected with the swindling tricks of finance capital,
which is not concerned with bourgeois morality, but with skinning the ox twice–first, it pockets the profits from the
loan; then it pockets other profits from the same loan which the borrower uses to make purchases from Krupp, or to
purchase railway material from the Steel Syndicate, etc.
¶24 We repeat that we do not by any means consider Lansburgh’s figures to be perfect; but we had to quote them
because they are more scientific than Kautsky’s and Spectator’s, and because Lansburgh showed the correct way to
approach the question. In discussing the significance of finance capital in regard to exports, etc., one must be able to
single out the connection of exports especially and solely with the tricks of the financiers, especially and solely with the
sale of goods by cartels, etc. Simply to compare colonies with non-colonies, one imperialism with another imperialism,
one semicolony or colony (Egypt) with all other countries, is to evade and to obscure the very essence of the question.
¶25 Kautsky’s theoretical critique of imperialism has nothing in common with Marxism and serves only as a
preamble to propaganda for peace and unity with the opportunists and the social-chauvinists, precisely for the reason that
it evades and obscures the very profound and fundamental contradictions of imperialism: the contradictions between
monopoly and free competition which exists side by side with it, between the gigantic “operations” (and gigantic profits)
of finance capital and “honest” trade in the free market, the contradiction between cartels and trusts, on the one hand, and
non-cartelized industry, on the other, etc.
¶26 The notorious theory of “ultraimperialism,” invented by Kautsky, is just as reactionary. Compare his arguments
on this subject in 1915, with Hobson’s arguments in 1902.
¶27 Kautsky: “. . . Cannot the present imperialist policy be supplanted by a new, ultraimperialist policy, which will
introduce the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital in place of the mutual rivalries of
national finance capitals? Such a new phase of capitalism is at any rate conceivable. Can it be achieved? Sufficient
premises are still lacking to enable us to answer this question.”* [Die Neue Zeit, April 30, 1915, p. 144.]
¶28 Hobson: “Christendom thus laid out in a few great federal empires, each with a retinue of uncivilized
dependencies, seems to many the most legitimate development of present tendencies, and one which would offer the best
hope of permanent peace on an assured basis of inter-Imperialism.”
¶29 Kautsky called ultraimperialism or superimperialism what Hobson, thirteen years earlier, described as
interimperialism. Except for coining a new and clever catchword, replacing one Latin pretax by another, the only
progress Kautsky has made in the sphere of “scientific” thought is that he gave out as Marxism what Hobson, in effect,
described as the cant of English parsons. After the Anglo-Boer War it was quite natural for this highly honourable caste
to exert their main efforts to console the British middle class and the workers who had lost many of their relatives on the
44
battlefields of South Africa and who were obliged to pay higher taxes in order to guarantee still higher profits for the
British financiers. And what better consolation could there be than the theory that imperialism is not so bad; that it stands
close to inter- (or ultra-) imperialism, which can ensure permanent peace? No matter what the good intentions of the
English parsons, or of sentimental Kautsky, may have been, the only objective, i.e., real, social significance Kautsky’s
“theory” can have, is: a most reactionary method of consoling the masses with hopes of permanent peace being possible
under capitalism, by distracting their attention from the sharp antagonisms and acute problems of the present times, and
directing it towards illusory prospects of an imaginary “ultraimperialism” of the future. Deception of the masses–there is
nothing but this in Kautsky’s “Marxian” theory.
¶30 Indeed, it is enough to compare well-known and indisputable facts to become convinced of the utter falsity of
the prospects which Kautsky tries to conjure up before the German workers (and the workers of all lands). Let us
consider India, Indo-China and China. It is known that these three colonial and semicolonial countries, with a population
of six to seven hundred million, are subjected to the exploitation of the finance capital of several imperialist powers:
Great Britain, France, Japan, the U.S.A., etc. Let us assume that these imperialist countries form alliances against one
another in order to protect or enlarge their possessions, their interests and their “spheres of influence” in these Asiatic
states; these alliances will be “interimperialist,” or “ultraimperialist” alliances. Let us assume that all the imperialist
countries conclude an alliance for the “peaceful” division of these parts of Asia; this alliance would be an alliance of
“internationally united finance capital.” There are actual examples of alliances of this kind in the history of the twentieth
century, for instance, the attitude of the powers to China. We ask, is it “conceivable,” assuming that the capitalist system
remains intact–and this is precisely the assumption that Kautsky does make–that such alliances would be more than
temporary, that they would eliminate friction, conflicts and struggle in every possible form?
¶31 It is sufficient to state this question clearly to make it impossible for any reply to be given other than in the
negative; for any other basis under capitalism for the division of spheres of influence, of interests, of colonies, etc., than
a calculation of the strength of the participants in the division, their general economic, financial, military strength, etc., is
inconceivable. And the strength of these participants in the division does not change to an equal degree, for the even
development of different undertakings, trusts, branches of industry, or countries is impossible under capitalism. Half a
century ago Germany was a miserable, insignificant country, as far as her capitalist strength was concerned, compared
with the strength of England at that time; Japan was the same compared with Russia. Is it “conceivable” that in ten or
twenty years’ time the relative strength of the imperialist powers will have remained unchanged? Absolutely
inconceivable.
¶32 Therefore, in the realities of the capitalist system, and not in the banal Philistine fantasies of English parsons, or
of the German “Marxist,” Kautsky, “interimperialist” or “ultraimperialist” alliances, no matter what form they may
assume, whether of one imperialist coalition against another, or of a general alliance embracing all the imperialist
powers, are inevitably nothing more than a “truce” in periods between wars. Peaceful alliances prepare the ground for
wars, and in their turn grow out of wars; the one conditions the other, giving rise to alternating forms of peaceful and
non-peaceful struggle out of one and the same basis of imperialist connections and relations within world economics and
world politics. But in order to pacify the workers and to reconcile them with the social-chauvinists who have deserted to
the side of the bourgeoisie, wise Kautsky separates one link of a single chain from the other, separates the present
peaceful (and ultraimperialist, nay, ultra-ultraimperialist) alliance of all the powers for the “pacification” of China
(remember the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion) from the non-peaceful conflict of tomorrow, which will prepare the
ground for another “peaceful” general alliance for the partition, say, of Turkey, on the day after tomorrow, etc., etc.
Instead of showing the living connection between periods of imperialist peace and periods of imperialist war, Kautsky
presents the workers with a lifeless abstraction in order to reconcile them to their lifeless leaders.
¶33 An American writer, Hill, in his A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe notes in
his preface to the following periods in the recent history of diplomacy: 1) the era of revolution; 2) the constitutional
movement; 3) the present era of “commercial imperialism.”* [David Jayne Hill, A History of the Diplomacy in the
International Development of Europe, Vol. 1, p. x.] Another writer divides the history of Great Britain’s “world policy”
since 1870 into four periods: 1) the first Asiatic period (that of the struggle against Russian advance in Central Asia
towards India); 2) the African period (approximately 1885-1902): that of the struggle against France for the partition of
Africa (the “Fashoda incident” of 1898 which brought her within a hair’s breadth of war with France); 3) the second
Asiatic period (alliance with Japan against Russia), and 4) the “European” period, chiefly anti-German.* [Schilder, op.
cit., p. 178.] “The political skirmishes of outposts take place on the financial field,” wrote the “banker,” Riesser, in 1905,
in showing how French finance capital operating in Italy was preparing the way for a political alliance of these countries,
and how a conflict was developing between Germany and Great Britain over Persia, between all the European capitalists
over Chinese loans, etc. Behold, the living reality of peaceful “ultraimperialist” alliances in their inseverable connection
with ordinary imperialist conflicts!
45
¶34 Kautsky’s obscuring of the deepest contradictions of imperialism, which inevitably becomes the embellishment
of imperialism, leaves its traces in this writer’s criticism of the political features of imperialism. Imperialism is the epoch
of finance capital and of monopolies, which introduce everywhere the striving for domination, not for freedom. The
result of these tendencies is reaction all along the line, whatever the political system, and an extreme intensification of
existing antagonisms in this domain also. Particularly intensified become the yoke of national oppression and the striving
for annexations, i.e., the violation of national independence (for annexation is nothing but the violation of the right of
nations to self-determination). Hilferding rightly notes the connection between imperialism and the intensification of
national oppression. “In the newly opened up countries,” he writes, “the capital imported into them intensifies
antagonisms and excites against the intruders the constantly growing resistance of the peoples who are awakening to
national consciousness; this resistance can easily develop into dangerous measures against foreign capital. The old social
relations become completely revolutionized, the agelong agrarian isolation of ‘nations without history’ is destroyed and
they are drawn into the capitalist whirlpool. Capitalism itself gradually provides the subjugated with the means and
resources for their emancipation and they set out to achieve the goal which once seemed highest to the European nations:
the creation of a united national state as a means to economic and cultural freedom. This movement for national
independence threatens European capital in its most valuable and most promising fields of exploitation, and European
capital can maintain its domination only by continually increasing its military forces.”* [Finance Capital, p.487.]
¶35 To this must be added that it is not only in newly opened up countries, but also in the old, that imperialism is
leading to annexation, to increased national oppression, and, consequently, also to increasing resistance. While objecting
to the intensification of political reaction by imperialism, Kautsky leaves in the shade a question that has become
particularly urgent, viz., the impossibility of unity with the opportunists in the epoch of imperialism. While objecting to
annexations, he presents his objections in a form that is most acceptable and least offensive to the opportunists. He
addresses himself to a German audience, yet he obscures the most topical and important point, for instance, the
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany. In order to appraise this “mental aberration” of Kautsky’s we will take the
following example. Let us suppose that a Japanese is condemning the annexation of the Philippines by the Americans.
The question is: will many believe that he is doing so because he has a’ horror of annexations as such. and not because he
himself has a desire to annex the Philippines? And shall we not be constrained to admit that the “fight” the Japanese is
waging against annexations can be regarded as being sincere and politically honest only if he fights against the
annexation of Korea by Japan, and urges freedom for Korea to secede from Japan?
¶36 Kautsky’s theoretical analysis of imperialism, as well as his economic and political criticism of imperialism, are
permeated through and through, with a spirit, absolutely irreconcilable with Marxism, of obscuring and glossing over the
fundamental contradictions of imperialism and with a striving to preserve at all costs the crumbling unity with
opportunism in the European working-class movement.
X. THE PLACE OF IMPERIALISM IN HISTORY
¶1 We have seen that in its economic essence imperialism is monopoly capitalism. This in itself determines its place in
history, for monopoly that grows out of the soil of free competition, and precisely out of free competition, is the
transition from the capitalist system to a higher social-economic order. We must take special note of the four principal
types of monopoly, or principal manifestations of monopoly capitalism, which are characteristic of the epoch we are
examining.
¶2 Firstly, monopoly arose out of a very high stage of development of the concentration of production. This refers
to the monopolist capitalist combines, cartels, syndicates and trusts. We have seen the important part these play in
present-day economic life. At the beginning of the twentieth century, monopolies had acquired complete supremacy in
the advanced countries, and although the first steps towards the formation of the cartels were first taken by countries
enjoying the protection of high tariffs (Germany, America), Great Britain, with her system of free trade, revealed the
same basic phenomenon, only a little later, namely, the birth of monopoly out of the concentration of production.
¶3 Secondly, monopolies have stimulated the seizure of the most important sources of raw materials, especially for
the basic and most highly cartelized industries in capitalist society: the coal and iron industries. The monopoly of the
most important sources of raw materials has enormously increased the power of big capital, and has sharpened the
antagonism between cartelized and non-cartelized industry.
¶4 Thirdly, monopoly has sprung from the banks. The banks have developed from humble middlemen enterprises
into the monopolists of finance capital. Some three to five of the biggest banks in each of the foremost capitalist
countries have achieved the “personal union” of industrial and bank capital, and have concentrated in their hands the
control of thousands upon thousands of millions which form the greater part of the capital and income of entire countries.
A financial oligarchy, which throws a close network of dependence relationships over all the economic and political
institutions of present-day bourgeois society without exception–such is the most striking manifestation of this monopoly.
¶5 Fourthly, monopoly has grown out of colonial policy. To the numerous “old” motives of colonial policy,
finance capital has added the struggle for the sources of raw materials, for the export of capital, for “spheres of
46
influence,” i.e., for spheres for profitable deals, concessions, monopolist profits and so on, and finally, for economic
territory in general When the colonies of the European powers in Africa, for instance, comprised only one-tenth of that
territory (as was the case in 1876), colonial policy was able to develop by methods other than those of monopoly–by the
“free grabbing” of territories, so to speak. But when nine-tenths of Africa had been seized (by 1900), when the whole
world had been divided up, there was inevitably ushered in the era of monopoly ownership of colonies and,
consequently, of particularly intense struggle for the division and the redivision of the world.
¶6 The extent to which monopolist capital has intensified all the contradictions of capitalism is generally known. It
is sufficient to mention the high cost of living and the tyranny of the cartels. This intensification of contradictions
constitutes the most powerful driving force of the transitional period of history, which began from the time of the final
victory of world finance capital.
¶7 Monopolies, oligarchy, the striving for domination instead of striving for liberty, the exploitation of an
increasing number of small or weak nations by a handful of the richest or most powerful nations–all these have given
birth to those distinctive characteristics of imperialism which compel us to define it as parasitic or decaying capitalism.
More and more prominently there emerges, as one of the tendencies of imperialism, the creation of the “rentier state,” the
usurer state, in which the bourgeoisie to an ever increasing degree lives on the proceeds of capital exports and by
“clipping coupons.” It would be a mistake to believe that this tendency to decay precludes the rapid growth of capitalism.
It does not. In the epoch of imperialism, certain branches of industry, certain strata of the bourgeoisie and certain
countries betray, to a greater or lesser degree, now one and now another of these tendencies. On the whole, capitalism is
growing far more rapidly than before; but this growth is not only becoming more and more uneven in general, its
unevenness also manifests itself, in particular, in the decay of the countries which are richest in capital (England).
¶8 In regard to the rapidity of Germany’s economic development, Riesser, the author of the book on the big
German banks, states: “The progress of the preceding period (1848-70), which had not been exactly slow, stood in about
the same ratio to the rapidity with which the whole of Germany’s national economy, and with it German banking,
progressed during this period (1870-1905) as the speed of the mail coach in the good old days stood to the speed of the
present-day automobile . . . which is whizzing past so fast that it endangers not only innocent pedestrians in its path, but
also the occupants of the car.” In its turn, this finance capital which has grown with such extraordinary rapidity is not
unwilling, precisely because it has grown so quickly, to pass on to a more “tranquil” possession of colonies which have
to be seized–and not only by peaceful methods–from richer nations. In the United States, economic development in the
last decades has been even more rapid than in Germany, and for this very reason, the parasitic features of modern
American capitalism have stood out with particular prominence. On the other hand, a comparison of, say, the republican
American bourgeoisie with the monarchist Japanese or German bourgeoisie shows that the most pronounced political
distinction diminishes to an extreme degree in the epoch of imperialism–not because it is unimportant in general, but
because in all these cases we are discussing a bourgeoisie which has definite features of parasitism.
¶9 The receipt of high monopoly profits by the capitalists in one of the numerous branches of industry, in one of
the numerous countries, etc., makes it economically possible for them to bribe certain sections of the workers, and for a
time a fairly considerable minority of them, and win them to the side of the bourgeoisie of a given industry or given
nation against all the others. The intensification of antagonisms between imperialist nations for the division of the world
increases this striving. And so there is created that bond between imperialism and opportunism, which revealed itself
first and most clearly in England, owing to the fact that certain features of imperialist development were observable there
much earlier than in other countries. Some writers, L. Martov, for example, are prone to wave aside the connection
between imperialism and opportunism in the working-class movement–a particularly glaring fact at the present time–by
resorting to “official optimism” (à la Kautsky and Huysmans) like the following: the cause of the opponents of capitalism
would be hopeless if it were precisely progressive capitalism that led to the increase of opportunism, or, if it were
precisely the best paid workers who were inclined towards opportunism, etc. We must have no illusions about
“optimism” of this kind. It is optimism in regard to opportunism; it is optimism which serves to conceal opportunism. As
a matter of fact the extraordinary rapidity and the particularly revolting character of the development of opportunism is
by no means a guarantee that its victory will be durable: the rapid growth of a malignant abscess on a healthy body can
only cause it to burst more quickly and thus relieve the body of it. The most dangerous of all in this respect are those
who do not wish to understand that the fight against imperialism is a sham and humbug unless it is inseparably bound up
with the fight against opportunism.
¶10 From all that has been said in this book on the economic essence of imperialism, it follows that we must define
it as capitalism in transition, or, more precisely, as moribund capitalism. It is very instructive in this respect to note that
the bourgeois economists, in describing modern capitalism, frequently employ catchwords and phrases like
“interlocking,” “absence of isolation,” etc.; “in conformity with their functions and course of development,” banks are
“not purely private business enterprises; they are more and more outgrowing the sphere of purely private business
regulation.” And this very Riesser, who uttered the words just quoted, declares with all seriousness that the “prophecy”
of the Marxists concerning “socialization” has “not come true”!
47
¶11 What then does this catchword “interlocking” express? It merely expresses the most striking feature of the
process going on before our eyes. It shows that the observer counts the separate trees, but cannot see the wood. It
slayishly copies the superficial, the fortuitous, the chaotic. It reveals the observer as one who is overwhelmed by the
mass of raw material and is utterly incapable of appreciating its meaning and importance. Ownership of shares, the
relations between owners of private property “interlock in a haphazard way.” But underlying this interlocking, its very
base, is the changing social relations of production. When a big enterprise assumes gigantic proportions, and, on the
basis of an exact computation of mass data, organizes according to plan the supply of primary raw materials to the extent
of two-thirds, or three-fourths of all that is necessary for tens of millions of people; when the raw materials are
transported in a systematic and organized manner to the most suitable place of production, sometimes hundreds or
thousands of miles, when a single centre directs all the consecutive stages of work right up to the manufacture of
numerous varieties of finished articles; when these products are distributed according to a single plan among tens and
hundreds of millions of consumers (the distribution of oil in America and Germany by the American “oil trust”)– then it
becomes evident that we have socialization of production, and not mere “interlocking”; that private economic and private
property relations constitute a shell which no longer fits its contents, a shell which must inevitably decay if its removal
by artificial means be delayed; a shell which may continue in a state of decay for a fairly long period (if, at the worst, the
cure of the opportunist abscess is protracted), but which will inevitably be removed.
¶12 The enthusiastic admirer of German imperialism, Schulze-Gaevernitz exclaims:
“Once the supreme management of the German banks has been entrusted to the hands of a dozen persons, their
activity is even today more significant for the public good than that of the majority of the Ministers of State.” (The
“interlocking” of bankers, ministers, magnates of industry and rentiers is here conveniently forgotten.) . . . “If we
conceive of the development of those tendencies which we have noted carried to their logical conclusion we will have:
the money capital of the nation united in the banks; the banks themselves combined into cartels; the investment capital of
the nation cast in the shape of securities. Then the forecast of that genius Saint-Simon will be fulfilled; ‘The present
anarchy of production, which corresponds to the fact that economic relations are developing without uniform regulation,
must make way for organization in production. Production will no longer be directed by isolated manufacturers,
independent of each other and ignorant of man’s economic needs; that will be done by a certain public institution. A
central committee of management, being able to survey the large field of social economy from a more elevated point of
view, will regulate it for the benefit of the whole of society, will put the means of production into suitable hands, and
above all will take care that there be constant harmony between production and consumption. Institutions already exist
which have assumed as part of their functions a certain organization of economic labour: the banks.’ We are still a long
way from the fulfilment of Saint-Simon’s forecast, but we are on the way towards it: Marxism, different from what Marx
imagined, but different only in form.”* [Grundriss der Sozialôkonomik, p. 146. ]
¶13 A crushing “refutation” of Marx, indeed, which retreats a step from Marx’s precise, scientific analysis to
Saint-Simon’s guesswork, the guesswork of a genius, but guesswork all the same.
Written January-June 1916
Published in pamphlet form in Petrograd, April 1917
NOTES
1. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism was written in the first half of 1916. While Lenin was in Berne during
1915 he began to study various works on imperialism that had been published in many countries. He started work on this
book in January 1916 and at the end of the month he moved to Zurich, where he continued his work at the Zurich
Cantonal Library. From hundreds of books, periodicals, newspapers and statistical abstracts published in different
languages he made numerous extracts, summaries, notes and tables, which make up more than 40 printing sheets. These
materials were published as a separate pamphlet in 1939 under the title of Notebooks on Imperialism.
On June 19 (July 2) 1916 Lenin sent his completed manuscript on imperialism to the Parus Publishers.
Menshevik elements among the management deleted from the book parts sharply criticizing the opportunist theories of
Kautsky and the Russian Mensheviks (Martov and Co.). Lenin’s terms pererastaniye (capitalism growing into capitalist
imperialism) was altered to prevrashcheniye (transformation); reaktsionny kharakter (reactionary nature of the theory
of Ultraimperialism) to otstaly kharakter (backward character), etc. In early 1917 the book was printed under the title
Imperialism, tbe Latest Stage of Capitalism, by the Parus Publishers in Petrograd.
After returning to Russia, Lenin wrote a preface to the book, which finally saw the light of day in September
1917.
On the significance of the book Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, see the History of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course, Eng. ed., Moscow, 1950, pp. 207-09. p. 1
2. See pp. 146-48 of this book. p. 2
3. This preface was first published under the title “Imperialism and Capitalism” in Communist International, No. 18,
48
dated October 1921. p. 3
4. The Manifesto is omtted in the present edition. p 7
5. A Centrist party set up in April 1917. The bulk of the party consisted of the Kautskyite Labour Commonwealth. The
Independents preached “unity” with the open social-chauvinists, justified and defended them and demanded the rejection
of the class struggle.
In October 1920, a split took place at the congress of the I.S.D.P.G in Halle. In December a considerable part of
the party merged with the Communist Party of Germany. The Right-wing elements formed a separate party and took the
old name of I.S.D.P.G., which existed until 1922. p. 8
6. The Spartacists–members of the Spartacus League, a revolutionary organization of German Left-Wing
Social-Democrats, formed in the early period of World War I under the leadership of Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg,
Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin and others. It was also known as the Internationale group. The Spartacists conducted
revolutionary propaganda among the masses against the imperialist war and exposed the predatory policy of German
imperialism and the treachery of the opportunist Social-Democratic leaders. But the Spartacists failed to free themselves
from semi-Menshevik fallacies on cardinal questions of theory and policy. They propagated a semi-Menshevik theory of
imperialism, rejected the Marxist interpretation of the principle of self-determination of nations (i.e., up to and including
secession and the formation of independent states), denied the possibility of national liberation wars in the imperialist
epoch, underestimated the role of the revolutionary party and bowed to the spontaneity in the working-class movement
(see the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course, Eng. ed., Moscow, 1950, pp.
42-45). A criticism of the mistakes of the German Lefts is given in Lenin’s “The Junius Pamphlet” (Collected Works, 4th
Russ. ed., Vol. XXII, pp. 291-305), “A Caricature of Marxism and ‘Imperialist Economism'” (ibid., Vol. XXIII, pp.
16-64), and other works, and in Stalin’s letter “Some Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism” (Works, Eng. ed.,
Moscow, 1955, Vol. XIII, pp. 86-104). In 1917 the Spartacists joined the Centrist Independent Social-Democratic Party
of Germany, but remained organizationally independent. After the revolution in Germany in November 1918, they broke
with the Independents and in December of the same year founded the Communist Party of Germany. p. 9
7. In the present edition the author’s references and notes are given as footnotes. p. 12
8. Karl Marx, Capital, Ger. ea., Berlin, 1959, Vol. III, p. 655. p. 39
9. These occurred during the widespread establishment of joint-stock companies in the early seventies of the nineteenth
century, which was accompanied by all manner of fraudulent operations by bourgeois businessmen, who were making a
great deal of money, and by wild speculation in real estate and securities. p. 42
10. Frankfurtet Zeitung (Prankfort Gazette)–a daily published in Frankfort-on-Main by German petty-bourgeois
democrats from 1856 to 1943. p.44
11. Lenin meant G. V. Plekhanov. p. 55
12. Produgol–an abbreviation for the Russian Society for Trade in Mineral Fuel of the Donets Basin, founded in 1906.
Prodamet–the Society for Marketing Russian Metallurgical Goods, founded in 1901. p. 61
13. The exposure in France in 1892-93 of incredible abuses, corruption of politicians, officials and the press bribed by
the French Panama Canal Company. p. 67
14. See pp. 93-94 of this book. p.101
15. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Correspondence, Ger. ed., Berlin, 1913, pp.131-32. p. 129
16. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Correspondence, Ger. ea., Berlin, 1950, Vol. IV, pp. 608-09. p. 129
17. The Menshevik M. I. Nakhimson. p. 136
18. Karl Marx,
Capital, Ger. ed., Berlin, 1959, Vol. III, p.142.p.137
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IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM [1]

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IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST
STAGE OF CAPITALISM [1]
A Popular Outline
PREFACE
¶1 The pamphlet here presented to the reader was written in the spring of 1916, in Zurich. In the conditions in which I
was obliged to work there I naturally suffered somewhat from a shortage of French and English literature and from a
serious dearth of Russian literature. However, I made use of the principal English work on imperialism, the book by J. A.
Hobson, with all the care that, in my opinion, that work deserves.
¶2 This pamphlet was written with an eye to the tsarist censorship. Hence, I was not only forced to confine myself
strictly to an exclusively theoretical, particularly economic analysis of facts, but to formulate the few necessary
observations on politics with extreme caution, by hints, in an allegorical language–in that accursed Aesopian
language–to which tsarism compelled all revolutionaries to have recourse whenever they took up their pens to write a
“legal” work.
¶3 It is painful, in these days of liberty, to reread these passages of the pamphlet, which have been distorted,
cramped, compressed in an iron vise on account of the censor. About the fact that imperialism is the eve of the socialist
revolution; that social-chauvinism (Socialism in words, chauvinism in deeds) is the utter betrayal of Socialism, complete
desertion to the side of the bourgeoisie, that this split in the working-class movement is bound up with the objective
conditions of imperialism, etc., I had to speak in a “slavish” tongue, and I must refer the reader who is interested in the
subject to the articles I wrote abroad in 1914-17, a new edition of which is soon to appear. Special attention should be
drawn to a passage on pages 119-20.[2] In order to show the reader, in a guise acceptable to the censors, how
shamelessly the capitalists and the social-chauvinists who have deserted to their side (and whom Kautsky opposes with
so much inconsistency) lie on the question of annexations, in order to show how shamelessly they screen the annexations
of their capitalists, I was forced to quote as an example–Japan! The careful reader will easily substitute Russia for Japan,
and Finland, Poland, Courland, the Ukraine, Khiva, Bokhara, Estonia or other regions peopled by non-Great Russians,
for Korea.
¶4 I trust that this pamphlet will help the reader to understand the fundamental economic question, viz., the
question of the economic essence of imperialism, for unless this is studied, it will be impossible to understand and
appraise modern war and modern politics.
Author
Petrograd
April 26, 1917
PREFACE TO THE FRENCH AND GERMAN EDITIONS [3]
I
¶1 As was indicated in the preface to the Russian edition, this pamphlet was written in 1916, with an eye to the tsarist
censorship. I am unable to revise the whole text at the present time, nor, perhaps, would this be advisable, since the main
purpose of the book was and remains: to present, on the basis of the summarized returns of irrefutable bourgeois
statistics, and the admissions of bourgeois scholars of all countries, a composite picture of the world capitalist system in
its international relationships at the beginning of the twentieth century–on the eve of the first world imperialist war.
¶2 To a certain extent it will even be useful for many Communists in advanced capitalist countries to convince
themselves by the example of this pamphlet, legal from the standpoint of the tsarist censor, of the possibility–and
necessity–of making use of even the slight remnants of legality which still remain at the disposal of the Communists,
say, in contemporary America or France, after the recent almost wholesale arrests of Communists, in order to explain the
utter falsity of social-pacifist views and hopes for “world democracy.” The most essential of what should be added to this
censored pamphlet I shall try to present in this preface.
II
¶1 It is proved in the pamphlet that the war of 1914-18 was imperialistic (that is, an annexationist, predatory, plunderous
war) on the part of both sides; it was a war for the division of the world, for the partition and repartition of colonies,
“spheres of influence” of finance capital, etc. Proof of what was the true social, or rather, the true class character of the
war is naturally to be found, not in the diplomatic history of the war, but in an analysis of the objective position of the
ruling classes in all the belligerent countries. In order to depict this objective position one must not take examples or
1
isolated data (in view of the extreme complexity of the phenomena of social life it is always possible to select any
number of examples or separate data to prove any proposition), but the whole of the data concerning the basis of
economic life in all the belligerent countries and the whole world.
¶2 It is precisely irrefutable summarized data of this kind that I quoted in describing the partition of the world in
1876 and 1914 (in Chapter VI) and the distribution of the railways all over the world in 1890 and 1913 (in Chapter VII).
Railways are a summation of the basic capitalist industries: coal, iron and steel; a summation and the most striking
indices of the development of world trade and bourgeois-democratic civilization. How the railways are linked up with
large-scale industry, with monopolies, syndicates, cartels, trusts, banks and the financial oligarchy is shown in the
preceding chapters of the book. The uneven distribution of the railways, their uneven development–sums up, as it were,
modern monopolist capitalism on a world-wide scale. And this summary proves that imperialist wars are absolutely
inevitable under such an economic system, as long as private property in the means of production exists.
¶3 The building of railways seems to be a simple, natural, democratic, cultural and civilizing enterprise; that is
what it is in the opinion of bourgeois professors, who are paid to depict capitalist slavery in bright colors, and in the
opinion of petty-bourgeois Philistines. But as a matter of fact the capitalist threads, which in thousands of different
intercrossings bind these enterprises with private property in means of production in general, have converted this railway
construction into an instrument for oppressing a thousand million people (in the colonies and semicolonies), that is, more
than half the population of the globe inhabiting the dependent countries, as well as the wage slaves of capital in the
“civilized” countries.
¶4 Private property based on the labor of the small proprietor, free competition, democracy, all the catchwords
with which the capitalists and their press deceive the workers and the peasants–are things of the distant past. Capitalism
has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and of the financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of
the population of the world by a handful of “advanced” countries. And this “booty” is shared between two or three
powerful world marauders armed to the teeth (America, Great Britain, Japan), who involve the whole world in their war
over the sharing of their booty.
III
¶1 The Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty dictated by monarchist Germany, and the subsequent much more brutal and
despicable Versailles Treaty dictated by the “democratic” republics of America and France and also by “free” England,
have rendered a most useful service to humanity by exposing both the hired coolies of the pen of imperialism and the
petty-bourgeois reactionaries, although they call themselves pacifists and Socialists, who sang praises to “Wilsonism,”
and who insisted that peace and reforms were possible under imperialism.
¶2 The tens of millions of dead and maimed left by the war–a war to decide whether the British or German group
of financial marauders is to receive the most booty–and those two “peace treaties,” are with unprecedented rapidity
opening the eyes of the millions and tens of millions of people who are downtrodden, oppressed, deceived and duped by
the bourgeoisie. Thus, out of the universal ruin caused by the war a world-wide revolutionary crisis is arising which,
however prolonged and arduous its stages may be, cannot end otherwise than in a proletarian revolution and in its
victory.
¶3 The Basle Manifesto of the Second International, which in 1912 gave an appraisal of the very war that broke out
in 1914 and not of war in general (there are different kinds of wars, including revolutionary wars), this Manifesto is now
a monument exposing the utter shameful bankruptcy and treachery of the heroes of the Second International.
¶4 That is why I reproduce this Manifesto as a supplement to the present edition,[4] and again and again I urge the
reader to note that the heroes of the Second International are as assiduously avoiding the passages of this Manifesto
which speak precisely, clearly and definitely of the connection between that impending war and the proletarian
revolution, as a thief avoids the place where he has committed a theft.
IV
¶1 Special attention has been devoted in this pamphlet to a criticism of “Kautskyism,” the international ideological trend
represented in all countries of the world by the “most prominent theoreticians” and leaders of the Second International
(Otto Bauer and Co. in Austria, Ramsay MacDonald and others in England, Albert Thomas in France, etc., etc.) and a
multitude of Socialists, reformists, pacifists, bourgeois-democrats and parsons.
¶2 This ideological trend is, on the one hand, a product of the disintegration and decay of the Second International,
and, on the other hand, the inevitable fruit of the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie, who, by the whole of their conditions
of life, are held captive to bourgeois and democratic prejudices.
2
¶3 The views held by Kautsky and his like are a complete renunciation of the very revolutionary principles of
Marxism which that writer has championed for decades, especially, by the way, in his struggle against socialist
opportunism (of Bernstein, Millerand, Hyndman, Gompers, etc.). It is not a mere accident, therefore, that the
“Kautskyans” all over the world have now united in practical politics with the extreme opportunists (through the Second,
or the Yellow International) and with the bourgeois governments (through bourgeois coalition governments in which
Socialists take part).
¶4 The growing world proletarian revolutionary movement in general, and the Communist movement in particular,
cannot dispense with an analysis and exposure of the theoretical errors of “Kautskyism.” The more so since pacifism and
“democracy” in general, which lay no claim to Marxism whatever, but which, like Kautsky and Co., are obscuring the
profundity of the contradictions of imperialism and the inevitable revolutionary crisis to which it gives rise, are still very
widespread all over the world. To combat these tendencies is the bounden duty of the Party of the proletariat, which must
win away from the bourgeoisie the small proprietors who are duped by them, and the millions of toilers who have been
placed under more or less petty-bourgeois conditions of life.
V
¶1 A few words must be said about Chapter VIII entitled: “The Parasitism and Decay of Capitalism.” As already
pointed out in the text, Hilferding, ex-“Marxist,” and now a comrade-in-arms of Kautsky and one of the chief exponents
of bourgeois, reformist policy in the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany,[5] has taken a step backward on
this question compared with the frankly pacifist and reformist Englishman, Hobson. The international split of the whole
working- class movement is now quite evident (the Second and the Third Internationals). The fact that armed struggle
and civil war is now raging between the two trends is also evident: the support given to Kolchak and Denikin in Russia
by the Mensheviks and “Socialist-Revolutionaries” against the Bolsheviks; the fight the Scheidemanns, Noskes and Co.
have conducted in conjunction with the bourgeoisie against the Spartacists [6] in Germany; the same thing in Finland,
Poland, Hungary, etc. What is the economic basis of this world-historic phenomenon?
¶2 Precisely the parasitism and decay of capitalism which are characteristic of its highest historical stage of
development, i.e., imperialism. As is proved in this pamphlet, capitalism has now singled out a handful (less than
one-tenth of the inhabitants of the globe; less than one-fifth at a most “generous” and liberal calculation) of exceptionally
rich and powerful states which plunder the whole world simply by “clipping coupons.” Capital exports yield an income
of eight to ten billion francs per annum, at prewar prices and according to prewar bourgeois statistics. Now, of course,
they yield much more.
¶3 Obviously, out of such enormous superprofits (since they are obtained over and above the profits which
capitalists squeeze out of the workers of their “own” country) it is possible to bribe the labor leaders and the upper
stratum of the labor aristocracy. And the capitalists of the “advanced” countries are bribing them; they bribe them in a
thousand different ways, direct and indirect, overt and covert.
¶4 This stratum of bourgeoisified workers, or the “labor aristocracy,” who are quite philistine in their mode of life,
in the size of their earnings and in their entire outlook, is the principal prop of the Second International, and, in our days,
the principal social (not military) prop of the bourgeoisie. For they are the real agents of the bourgeoisie in the
working-class movement, the labor lieutenants of the capitalist class, real channels of reformism and chauvinism. In the
civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie they inevitably, and in no small numbers, take the side of the
bourgeoisie, the “Versaillese” against the “Communards.”
¶5 Unless the economic roots of this phenomenon are understood and its political and social significance is
appreciated, not a step can be taken toward the solution of the practical problems of the Communist movement and of the
impending social revolution.
¶6 Imperialism is the eve of the social revolution of the proletariat. This has been confirmed since 1917 on a
worldwide scale.
July 6, 1920
N. Lenin
¶1 DURING the last fifteen to twenty years, especially since the Spanish-American War (1898), and the Anglo-Boer
War (1899-1902), the economic and also the political literature of the two hemispheres has more and more often adopted
the term “imperialism” in order to describe the present era. In 1902, a book by the English economist J. A. Hobson,
Imperialism, was published in London and New York. This author, whose point of view is that of bourgeois social
reformism and pacifism which, in essence, is identical with the present point of view of the ex-Marxist, K. Kautsky,
gives a very good and comprehensive description of the principal specific economic and political features of
imperialism. In 1910, there appeared in Vienna the work of the Austrian Marxist, Rudolf Hilferding, Finance Capital
(Russian edition: Moscow, 1912). In spite of the mistake the author commits on the theory of money, and in spite of a
certain inclination on his part to reconcile Marxism with opportunism, this work gives a very valuable theoretical
analysis of “the latest phase of capitalist development,” the subtitle of the book. Indeed, what has been said of
imperialism during the last few years, especially in an enormous number of magazine and newspaper articles, and also in
the resolutions, for example, of the Chemnitz and Basle congresses which took place in the autumn of 1912, has scarcely
gone beyond the ideas expounded, or, more exactly, summed up by the two writers mentioned above….
¶2 Later on, we shall try to show briefly, and as simply as possible, the connection and relationships between the
principal economic features of imperialism. We shall not be able to deal with non- economic aspects of the question,
3
however much they deserve to be dealt with. We have put references to literature and other notes which, perhaps, would
not interest all readers, at the end of this pamphlet.[7]
I. CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION AND MONOPOLIES
¶1 The enormous growth of industry and the remarkably rapid process of concentration of production in ever-larger
enterprises are one of the most characteristic features of capitalism. Modern censuses of production give most complete
and most exact data on this process.
¶2 In Germany, for example, out of every 1,000 industrial enterprises, large enterprises, i.e., those employing more
than 50 workers, numbered three in 1882, six in 1895 and nine in 1907; and out of every 100 workers employed, this
group of enterprises employed 22, 30 and 37, respectively. Concentration of production, however, is much more intense
than the concentration of workers, since labor in the large enterprises is much more productive. This is shown by the
figures on steam engines and electric motors. If we take what in Germany is called industry in the broad sense of the
term, that is, including commerce, transport, etc., we get the following picture. Large-scale enterprises 30,588 out of a
total of 3,265,623, that is to say, 0.9 per cent. These enterprises employ 5,700,000 workers out of a total of 14,400,000,
i.e., 39.4 per cent; they use 6,600,000 steam horsepower out of a total of 8,800,000, i.e., 75.3 per cent, and 1,200,000
kilowatts of electricity out of a total of 1,500,000, i.e., 77.2 per cent.
¶3 Less than one-hundredth of the total enterprises utilize more than three-fourths of the total steam and electric
power! Two million nine hundred and seventy thousand small enterprises (employing up to five workers), constituting
91 per cent of the total, utilize only 7 per cent of the total steam and electric power! Tens of thousands of huge
enterprises are everything; millions of small ones are nothing.
¶4 In 1907, there were in Germany 586 establishments employing one thousand and more workers, nearly
one-tenth (1,380,000) of the total number of workers employed in industry, and they utilized almost one-third (32 per
cent) of the total steam and electric power.* [Figures taken from Annalen des Deutschen Reichs, 1911, Zahn.] As we
shall see, money capital and the banks make this superiority of a handful of the largest enterprises still more
overwhelming, in the most literal sense of the word, i.e., millions of small, medium and even some big “masters” are in
fact in complete subjection to some hundreds of millionaire financiers.
¶5 In another advanced country of modern capitalism, the United States of America, the growth of the
concentration of production is still greater. Here statistics single out industry in the narrow sense of the word and group
enterprises according to the value of their annual output. In 1904 large-scale enterprises with an output of one million
dollars and over numbered 1,900 (out of 216,180, i.e., 0.9 per cent). These employed 1,400,000 workers (out of
5,500,000, i.e., 25.6 per cent) and their output amounted to $5,600,000,000 (out of $14,800,000,000, i.e., 38 per cent).
Five years later, in 1909, the corresponding figures were: 3,060 enterprises (out of 268,491, i.e., 1.1 per cent) employing
2,000,000 workers (out of 6,600,000, i.e., 30.5 per cent) with an output of $9,000,000 (out of $20,700,000,000, i.e., 43.8
per cent).* [Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1912, p. 202.]
¶6 Almost half the total production of all the enterprises of the country was carried on by one- hundredth part of
these enterprises! These 3,000 giant enterprises embrace 25 branches of industry. From this it can be seen that, at a
certain stage of its development, concentration itself, as it were, leads right up to monopoly; for a score or so of giant
enterprises can easily arrive at an agreement, while on the other hand, the hindrance to competition, the tendency
towards monopoly, arises from the very dimensions of the enterprises. This transformation of competition into monopoly
is one of the most important–if not the most important–phenomena of modern capitalist economy, and we must deal
with it in greater detail. But first we must clear up one possible misunderstanding.
¶7 American statistics say: 3,000 giant enterprises in 250 branches of industry, as if there were only a dozen
enterprises of the largest scale for each branch of industry.
¶8 But this is not the case. Not in every branch of industry; are there large-scale enterprises; and moreover, a very
important feature of capitalism in its highest stage of development is so-called combination of production, that is to say,
the grouping in a single enterprise of different branches of industry, which either represent the consecutive stages in the
processing of raw materials (for example, the smelting of iron ore into pig iron, the conversion of pig iron into steel, and
then, perhaps, the manufacture of steel goods)– or are auxiliary to one another (for example, the utilization of scrap, or
of by-products, the manufacture of packing materials, etc.).
¶9 “Combination,” writes Hilferding, “levels out the fluctuations of trade and therefore assures to the combined
enterprises a more stable rate of profit. Secondly, combination has the effect of eliminating trade. Thirdly, it has the
effect of rendering possible technical improvements, and, consequently, the acquisition of superprofits over and above
those obtained by the ‘pure’ (i.e., non-combined) enterprises. Fourthly, it strengthens the position of the combined
4
enterprises compared with that of ‘pure’ enterprises, strengthens them in the competitive struggle in periods of serious
depression, when the fall in prices of raw materials does not keep pace with the fall in prices of manufactured
goods.”*[Finance Capital, Russ. ed., pp. 286-87.]
¶10 The German bourgeois economist, Heymann, who has written a book especially on “mixed,” that is, combined,
enterprises in the German iron industry, says: “Pure enterprises perish, they are crushed between the high price of raw
material and the low price of the finished product.” Thus we get the following picture: “There remain, on the one hand,
the big coal companies, producing millions of tons yearly, strongly organized in their coal syndicate, and on the other,
the big steel plants, closely allied to the coal mines, having their own steel syndicate. These giant enterprises, producing
400,000 tons of steel per annum, with a tremendous output of ore and coal and producing finished steel goods,
employing 10,000 workers quartered in company houses, and sometimes owning their own railways and ports, are the
typical representatives of the German iron and steel industry. And concentration goes on further and further. Individual
enterprises are becoming larger and larger. An ever-increasing number of enterprises in one, or in several different
industries, join together in giant enterprises, backed up and directed by half a dozen big Berlin banks. In relation to the
German mining industry, the truth of the teachings of Karl Marx on concentration is definitely proved, true, this applies
to a country where industry is protected by tariffs and freight rates. The German mining industry is ripe for
expropriation.”*[Hans Gideon Heymann, Die gernischten Werke im deutschen Grosseisengewerbe (Combined Plants in
the German Big Iron Industry–Tr.), Stuttgart, 1904, (SS. 256, 278).]
¶11 Such is the conclusion which a conscientious bourgeois economist, and such are the exception, had to arrive at.
It must be noted that he seems to place Germany in a special category because her industries are protected by high tariffs.
But this circumstance could only accelerate concentration and the formation of monopolist manufacturers’ combines,
cartels, syndicates, etc. It is extremely important to note that in free-trade England, concentration also leads to monopoly,
although somewhat later and perhaps in another form. Professor Hermann Levy, in his special work of research entitled
Monopolies, Cartels and Trusts, based on data on British economic development, writes as follows:
¶12 “In Great Britain it is the size of the enterprise and its high technical level which harbor a monopolist tendency.
This, for one thing, is due to the great investment of capital per enterprise, which gives rise to increasing demands for
new capital for the new enterprises and thereby renders their launching more difficult. Moreover (and this seems to us to
be the more important point) every new enterprise that wants to keep pace with the gigantic enterprises that have been
formed by concentration would here produce such an enormous quantity of surplus goods that it could dispose of them
only by being able to sell them profitably as a result of an enormous increase in demand; otherwise, this surplus would
force prices down to a level that would be unprofitable both for the new enterprise and for the monopoly combines.” In
England–unlike other countries where protective tariffs facilitate the formation of cartels–monopolist alliances of
entrepreneurs, cartels and trusts arise in the majority of cases only when the number of the chief competing enterprises is
reduced to “a couple of dozen or so.” “Here the influence of the concentration movement on the formation of large
industrial monopolies in a whole sphere of industry stands out with crystal clarity.”*[Hermann Levy, Monopole, Kartelle
und Trusts, Jena, 1909, SS. 286,290, 298.]
¶13 Half a century ago, when Marx was writing Capital, free competition appeared to the overwhelming majority of
economists to be a “natural law.” Official science tried, by a conspiracy of silence, to kill the works of Marx, who by a
theoretical and historical analysis of capitalism proved that free competition gives rise to the concentration of production,
which, in turn, at a certain stage of development, leads to monopoly. Today, monopoly has become a fact. The
economists are writing mountains of books in which they describe the diverse manifestations of monopoly, and continue
to declare in chorus that “Marxism is refuted.” But facts are stubborn things, as the English proverb says, and they have
to be reckoned with, whether we like it or not. The facts show that differences between capitalist countries, e.g., in the
matter of protection or free trade, only give rise to insignificant variations in the form of monopolies or in the moment of
their appearance; and that the rise of monopolies, as the result of the concentration of production, is a general and
fundamental law of the present stage of development of capitalism.
¶14 For Europe, the time when the new capitalism definitely superseded the old can be established with fair
precision: it was the beginning of the twentieth century. In one of the latest compilations on the history of the “formation
of monopolies,” we read:
¶15 “Isolated examples of capitalist monopoly could be cited from the period preceding 1860; in these could be
discerned the embryo of the forms that are so common today; but all this undoubtedly represents the prehistory of the
cartels. The real beginning of modern monopoly goes back, at the earliest, to the ‘sixties. The first important period of
development of monopoly commenced with the international industrial depression of the ‘seventies and lasted until the
beginning of the ‘nineties.” “If we examine the question on a European scale, we will find that the development of free
competition reached its apex in the ‘sixties and ‘seventies. Then it was that England completed the construction of its
old-style capitalist organization. In Germany, this organization had entered into a fierce struggle with handicraft and
domestic industry, and had begun to create for itself its own forms of existence.”
¶16 “The great revolution commenced with the crash of 1873, or rather, the depression which followed it and which,
5
with hardly discernible interruptions in the early ‘eighties, and the unusually violent, but short-lived boom about 1889,
marks twenty-two years of European economic history.” “During the short boom of 1889-90, the system of cartels was
widely resorted to in order to take advantage of the favorable business conditions. An ill-considered policy drove prices
up still more rapidly and still higher than would have been the case if there were no cartels, and nearly all these cartels
perished ingloriously in the smash. Another five-year period of bad trade and low prices followed, but a new spirit
reigned in industry; the depression was no longer regarded as something to be taken for granted: it was regarded as
nothing more than a pause before another boom.
¶17 “The cartel movement entered its second epoch: instead of being a transitory phenomenon, the cartels became
one of the foundations of economic life. They are winning one held of industry after another, primarily, the raw materials
industry. At the beginning of the ‘nineties the cartel system had already acquired–in the organization of the coke
syndicate on the model of which the coal syndicate was later formed–a cartel technique which could hardly be
improved. For the first time the great boom at the close of the nineteenth century and the crisis of 1900-03 occurred
entirely–in the mining and iron industries at least–under the aegis of the cartels. And while at that time it appeared to be
something novel, now the general public takes it for granted that large spheres of economic life have been, as a general
rule, removed from the realm of free competition.”* [Th. Vogelstein, Die finanzielle Organisation der kapitalistischen
Industrie und die Monopolbildungen (Financial Organization of the Capitalist Industry and the Formation of
Monopolies–Tr.J in Grundriss der Sozialökonomik (Outline of Social Economics–Tr.), VI Abt., Tübingen, 1914. Cf.,
also by the same author: Organisationsformen der Eisenindustrie und Textilindustrie in England und Amerika (The
Organizational Forms of the Iron and Textile Industry of England and America–Tr.), Bd. I, Lpz., 1910.]
¶18 Thus, the principal stages in the history of monopolies are the following: 1) 1860-70, the highest stage, the apex
of development of free competition; monopoly is in the barely discernible, embryonic stage. 2) After the crisis of 1873, a
lengthy period of development of cartels; but they are still the exception. They are not yet durable. They are still a
transitory phenomenon. 3) The boom at the end of the nineteenth century and the crisis of 1900-03. Cartels become one
of the foundations of the whole of economic life. Capitalism has been transformed into imperialism.
¶19 Cartels come to an agreement on the conditions of sale, terms of payment, etc. They divide the markets among
themselves. They fix the quantity of goods to be produced. They fix prices. They divide the profits among the various
enterprises, etc.
¶20 The number of cartels in Germany was estimated at about 250 in 1896 and at 385 in 1905, with about 12,000
firms participating.* [Dr. Riesser, Die deutschen Grossbanken und ihre Konzentration im Zusammenhange mit der
Entwicklung der Gesamtwirtschaft in Deutschland (The German Big Banks and Their Concentration in Connection with
the Development of the General Economy in Germany–Tr.), 4. Aufl., 1912, S. 149; Robert Liefmann, Kartelle und
Trusts und die Weiterbildung der volkswirtschaftlichen Organisation (Cartels and Trusts and the Further Development
of Economic Organization–Tr.), 2. Aufl., 1910, S. 25] But it is generally recognized that these figures are
underestimations. From the statistics of German industry for 1907 we quoted above, it is evident that even these 12,000
very big enterprises concentrate certainly more than half the steam and electric power used in the country. In the United
States of America, the number of trusts in 1900 was 185 and in 1907, 250. American statistics divide all industrial
enterprises into those belonging to individuals, to private firms or to corporations. The latter in 1904 comprised 23.6 per
cent, and in 1909, 25.9 per cent, i.e., more than one-fourth of the total industrial enterprises in the country. These
employed in 1904, 70.6 per cent, and in 1909 75.6 per cent, i.e., more than three-fourths of the total wage earners. Their
output amounted at these two dates to $10,900,000,000 and to $16,300,000,000, i.e., to 73.7 per cent and 79.0 per cent of
the total, respectively.
6
¶21 Not infrequently cartels and trusts concentrate in their hands seven- or eight-tenths of the total output of a given
branch of industry. The Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, at its foundation in 1893, concentrated 86.7 per cent of the
total coal output of the area, and in 1910 it already concentrated 95.4 per cent.** [Dr. Fritz Kestner, Der
Organisationstwang. Eine Untersuchung über die Kampfe zwischen Kartellen und Aussenseitern (Compulsory
Organization An Investigation of the Struggle Between Cartels and Outsiders –Tr.), Berlin, 1912, p. 11.] The monopoly
so created assures enormous profits, and leads to the formation of technical productive units of formidable magnitude.
The famous Standard Oil Company in the United States was founded in 1900: “It has an authorized capital of
$150,000,000. It issued $100,000,000 common and $106,000,000 preferred stock. From 1900 to 1907 the following
dividends were paid on the latter: 48, 48, 45, 44, 36, 40, 40, 40 per cent in the respective years, i.e., in all, $367,000,000.
From 1882 to 1907, out of total net profits amounting to $889,000,000, $606,000,000 were distributed in dividends, and
the rest went to reserve capital.”* [R. Liefmann, Beteiligungs- und Finanzierungsgesellschaften. Bine Studze über den
modernen Kapitalismus und das Eflektenwesen (Holding and Finance Companies–A Study in Modern Capitalism and
Securities–Tr.), I. Aufl., Jena, 1909, p. 212.] “In 1907 the various works of the United States Steel Corporation
employed no less than 210,180 workers and other employees. The largest enterprise in the German mining industry, the
Gelsenkirchen Mining Company (Gelsenkirchener Bergwerksgesellschaf t) in 1908 had a staff of 46,048 workers and
office employees.”**[Ibid., p. 218.] In 1902, the United States Steel Corporation already produced 9,000,000 tons of
steel.*** [Dr. S. Tschierschky, Kartell und Trust, Göttingen, 1903, p 13.] Its output constituted in 1901 66.3 per cent,
and in 1908, 56.I per cent of the total output of steel in the United States.**** [Th. Vogelstein, Organisationsformen, p.
275.] The output of ore was 43.9 per cent and 46.3 per cent, respectively.
¶22 The report of the American Government Commission on Trusts states: “Their superiority over competitors is
due to the magnitude of its enterprises and their excellent technical equipment. Since its inception, the Tobacco Trust has
devoted all its efforts to the substitution of mechanical for manual labor on an extensive scale. With this end in view it
bought up all patents that had anything to do with the manufacture of tobacco and spent enormous sums for this purpose.
Many of these patents at first proved to be of no use, and had to be modified by the engineers employed by the trust. At
the end of 1906, two subsidiary companies were formed solely to acquire patents. With the same object in view, the trust
built its own foundries, machine shops and repair shops. One of these establishments, that in Brooklyn, employs on the
average 300 workers; here experiments are carried out on inventions concerning the manufacture of cigarettes, cheroots,
snuff, tinfoil for packing, boxes, etc. Here, also, inventions are perfected.* [Report of the Commissioner of Corporations
on the Tobacco Industry, Washington, 1909, p. 266, cited according to Dr. Paul Tafel, Die nordamerikanischen Trusts
und ibre Wirkungen auf den Fortschritt der Technik (North American Trusts and Their Effect on Technical
Progress–Tr.), Stuttgart, 1913, p. 48.] “Other trusts also employ so-called developing engineers whose business it is to
devise new methods of production and to test technical improvements. The United States Steel Corporation grants big
bonuses to its workers and engineers for all inventions suitable for raising technical efficiency, or for reducing cost of
production.”** [Dr. P. Tafel, ibid., p. 49.]
¶23 In German large-scale industry, e.g., in the chemical industry, which has developed so enormously during these
last few decades, the promotion of technical improvement is organized in the same way. By 1908 the process of
concentration of production had already given rise to two main “groups” which, in their way, were also in the nature of
monopolies. First these groups constituted “dual alliances” of two pairs of big factories, each having a capital of from
twenty to twenty-one million marks: on the one hand, the former Meister Factory at Höchst and the Cassella Factory at
Frankfurt am Main; and on the other hand, the aniline and soda factory at Ludwigshafen and the former Bayer factory at
Elberfeld. Then, in 1905, one of these groups, and in 1908 the other group, each concluded an agreement with yet
another big factory. The result was the formation of two “triple alliances,” each with a capital of from forty to fifty
million marks. And these “alliances” have already begun to come “close” to one another, to reach “an understanding”
about prices, etc.* [Riesser, op. Cit., third edition, p. 547 et seq. The newspapers (June 1916) report the formation of a
new gigantic trust which combines the chemical industry of Germany.]
¶24 Competition becomes transformed into monopoly. The result is immense progress in the socialization of
production. In particular, the process of technical invention and improvement becomes socialized.
¶25 This is something quite different from the old free competition between manufacturers, scattered and out of
touch with one another, and producing for an unknown market. Concentration has reached the point at which it is
possible to make an approximate estimate of all sources of raw materials (for example, the iron ore deposits) of a country
and even, as we shall see, of several countries, or of the whole world. Not only are such estimates made, but these
sources are captured by gigantic monopolist combines. An approximate estimate of the capacity of markets is also made,
and the combines “divide” them up amongst themselves by agreement. Skilled labor is monopolized, the best engineers
are engaged; the means of transport are captured: railways in America, shipping companies in Europe and America.
Capitalism in its imperialist stage leads right up to the most comprehensive socialization of production; it, so to speak,
drags the capitalists, against their will and consciousness, into some sort of a new social order, a transitional one from
complete free competition to complete socialization.
¶26 Production becomes social, but appropriation remains private. The social means of production remain the
private property of a few. The general framework of formally recognized free competition remains, but the yoke of a few
monopolists on the rest of the population becomes a hundred times heavier, more burdensome and intolerable.
¶27 The German economist, Kestner, has written a book especially devoted to “the struggle between the cartels and
outsiders,” i.e., the capitalists outside the cartels. He entitled his work Compulsory Organization, although, in order to
present capitalism in its true light, he should, of course, have written about compulsory submission to monopolist
combines. It is instructive to glance at least at the list of the methods the monopolist combines resort to in the present
day, the latest, the civilized struggle for “organization”: 1) stopping supplies of raw materials (. . . “one of the most
important methods of compelling adherence to the cartel”); 2) stopping the supply of labor by means of “alliances” (i.e.,
of agreements between the capitalists and the trade unions by which the latter permit their members to work only in
cartelized enterprises); 3) stopping deliveries; 4) closing of trade outlets; 5) agreements with the buyers, by which the
latter undertakes to trade only with the cartels; 6) systematic price cutting (to ruin “outside” firms, i.e., those which
refuse to submit to the monopolists. Millions are spent in order to sell goods for a certain time below their cost price;
there were instances when the price of benzine was thus reduced from 40 to 22 marks, i.e., almost by half!); 7) stopping
credits; 8) boycott.
¶28 Here we no longer have competition between small and large, technically developed and backward enterprises.
We see here the monopolists throttling those which do not submit to them, to their yoke, to their dictation. This is how
7
this process is reflected in the mind of a bourgeois economist:
¶29
“Even in the purely economic sphere,” writes Kestner, “a certain change is taking place from commercial
activity in the old sense of the word towards organizational speculative activity. The greatest success no longer goes to
the merchant whose technical and commercial experience enables him best of all to estimate the needs of the buyer and
who is able to discover and, so to speak, ‘awaken’ a latent demand; it goes to the speculative genius” (?!) “who knows
how to estimate, or even only to sense in advance the organizational development and the possibilities of certain
connections between individual enterprises and the banks….”
¶30 Translated into ordinary human language this means that the development of capitalism has arrived at a stage
when, although commodity production still “reigns” and continues to be regarded as the basis of economic life, it has in
reality been undermined and the bulk of the profits go to the “geniuses” of financial manipulation. At the basis of these
manipulations and swindles lies socialized production; but the immense progress of mankind which achieved this
socialization, goes to benefit . . . the speculators. We shall see later how “on these grounds” reactionary, petty-bourgeois
critics of capitalist imperialism dream of going back to “free,” “peaceful,” and “honest” competition.
¶31 “The prolonged raising of prices which results from the formation of cartels,” says Kestner, “has hitherto been
observed only in relation to the most important means of production, particularly coal, iron and potassium, but has never
been observed in relation to manufactured goods. Similarly, the increase in profits resulting from this raising of prices
has been limited only to the industries which produce means of production. To this observation we must add that the
industries which process raw materials (and not semimanufactures) not only secure advantages from the cartel formation
in the shape of high profits, to the detriment of the finished goods industry, but secured also a dominating position over
the latter, which did not exist under free competition.”* [Kestner, op. cit., p. 254. ]
¶32 The words which we have italicized reveal the essence of the case which the bourgeois economists admit so
reluctantly and so rarely, and which the present-day defenders of opportunism, led by K. Kautsky, so zealously try to
evade and brush aside. Domination, and violence that is associated with it, such are the relationships that are typical of
the “latest phase of capitalist development”; this is what inevitably had to result, and has resulted, from the formation of
all-powerful economic monopolies.
¶33 We will give one more example of the methods employed by the cartels. Where it is possible to capture all or
the chief sources of raw materials, the rise of cartels and formation of monopolies is exceptionally easy. It would be
wrong, however, to assume that monopolies do not arise in other industries in which it is impossible to corner the
sources of raw materials. The cement industry, for instance, can find its raw materials everywhere. Yet in Germany this
industry too is strongly cartelized. The cement manufacturers have formed regional syndicates: South German,
Rhine-Westphalian, etc. The prices fixed are monopoly prices: 230 to 280 marks a carload, when the cost price is 180
marks! The enterprises pay a dividend of from 12 per cent to 16 per cent–and it must not be forgotten that the “geniuses”
of modern speculation know how to pocket big profits besides what they draw in dividends. In order to prevent
competition in such a profitable industry, the monopolists even resort to sundry stratagems: they spread false rumors
about the bad situation in their industry; anonymous warnings are published in the newspapers, like the following:
“Capitalists, don’t invest your capital in the cement industry!”; lastly, they buy up “outsiders” (those outside the
syndicates) and pay them “compensation” of 60,000, 80,000 and even 150,000 marks.* [L. Eschwege, “Zement” in Die
Bank, 1909, Vol. 1, p. 15 et seq.] Monopoly hews a path for itself everywhere without scruple as to the means, from
paying a “modest” sum to buy off competitors to the American device of “employing” dynamite against them.
¶34 The statement that cartels can abolish crises is a fable spread by bourgeois economists who at all costs desire to
place capitalism in a favorable light. On the contrary, monopoly which is created in certain branches of industry,
increases and intensifies the anarchy inherent in capitalist production as a whole. The disparity between the development
of agriculture and that of industry, which is characteristic of capitalism in general, is increased. The privileged position
of the most highly cartelized, so-called heavy industry, especially coal and iron, causes “a still greater lack of
coordination” in other branches of industry–as Jeidels, the author of one of the best works on “the relationship of the
German big banks to industry,” admits.* [O. Jeidels, Das Verhaltnis der deutschen Gtossbanken zur Industrie mit
besonderer Berucksichtigung der Eisenindustrie (The Relationship of the German Big Banks to Industry, With Special
Reference to the Iron Industry–Tr.), Leipzig, 1905, p. 271.]
¶35 “The more developed an economic system is,” writes Liefmann, an unblushing apologist of capitalism, “the
more it resorts to risky enterprises, or enterprises abroad, to those which need a great deal of time to develop, or finally,
to those which are only of local importance.”** [R. Liefmann, Beteiligungs- und FinanzierungsgeseUschaften, p. 434]
The increased risk is connected in the long run with the prodigious increase of capital, which overflows the brim, as it
were, flows abroad, etc. At the same time the extremely rapid rate of technical progress gives rise to increasing elements
of disparity between the various spheres of national economy, to anarchy and crises. Liefmann is obliged to admit that:
“In all probability mankind will see further important technical revolutions in the near future which will also affect the
organization of the economic system” … electricity and aviation…. “As a general rule, in such periods of radical
8
economic change, speculation develops on a large scale.” …*** [Ibid., pp. 465-66.]
¶36 Crises of every kind–economic crises most frequently, but not only these–in their turn increase very
considerably the tendency towards concentration and towards monopoly. In this connection, the following reflections of
Jeidels on the significance of the crisis of 1900, which, as we have already seen, marked the turning point in the history
of modern monopoly, are exceedingly instructive:
¶37 “Side by side with the gigantic plants in the basic industries, the crisis of 1900 still found many plants organized
on lines that today would be considered obsolete, the ‘pure’ ” (non-combined) “plants, which had arisen on the crest of
the industrial boom. The fall in prices and the falling off in demand put these ‘pure’ enterprises into a precarious position,
which did not affect the gigantic combined enterprises at all or only affected them for a very short time. As a
consequence of this the crisis of 1900 resulted in a far greater concentration of industry than the crisis of 1873: the latter
crisis also produced a sort of selection of the best equipped enterprises, but owing to the level of technical development
at that time, this selection could not place the firms which successfully emerged from the crisis in a position of
monopoly. Such a durable monopoly exists to a high degree in the gigantic enterprises in the modern iron and steel and
electrical industries owing to their very complicated technique far-reaching organization and magnitude of capital, and,
to a lesser degree, in the engineering industry, certain branches of the metallurgical industry, transport, etc.”* [Jeidels,
op. cit., p. 108.]
¶38 Monopoly! This is the last word in the “latest phase of capitalist development.” But we shall only have a very
insufficient, incomplete, and poor notion of the real power and the significance of modern monopolies if we do not take
into consideration the part played by the banks.
II. THE BANKS AND THEIR NEW ROLE
¶1 The principal and original function of banks is to serve as middlemen in the making of payments. In doing so they
transform inactive money capital into active, that is, into capital yielding a profit; they collect all kinds of money
revenues and place them at the disposal of the capitalist class.
¶2 As banking develops and becomes concentrated in a small number of establishments, the banks grow from
humble middlemen into powerful monopolies having at their command almost the whole of the money capital of all the
capitalists and small businessmen and also the larger part of the means of production and of the sources of raw materials
of the given country and in a number of countries. This transformation of numerous humble middlemen into a handful of
monopolists represents one of the fundamental processes in the growth of capitalism into capitalist imperialism; for this
reason we must first of all deal with the concentration of banking.
¶3 In 1907-08, the combined deposits of the German joint stock banks, each having a capital of more than a
million marks, amounted to 7,000,000,000 marks; in 1912-13, these deposits already amounted to 9,800,000,000 marks.
An increase of 40 per cent in five years; and of the 2,800,000,000 increase, 2,750,000,000 was divided amongst 57
banks, each having a capital of more than 10,000,000 marks. The distribution of the deposits between big and small
banks was as follows :*[ Alfred Lansburgh, “Funf Jahre deutsches Bankwesen” (Five Years of German Banking–Tr.), in
Die Bank, 1913, No. 8, p. 728.]
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DEPOSITS
In 9 Big Berlin
Banks
In the other 48 banks with a
capital of more than 10
million marks
In 115 banks with a
capital of 1-10
million marks
In the small banks (with a
capital of less than 1 million
marks)
1907-08 47 32.5 16.5 4
1912-13 48 36 12 3
¶4 The small banks are being ousted by the big banks, of which nine concentrate in their hands almost half the total
deposits. But we have left out of account many important details, for instance, the transformation of numerous small
banks practically into branches of the big banks, etc. Of this we shall speak later on.
¶5 At the end of 1913, Schulze-Gaevernitz estimated the deposits in the nine big Berlin banks at 5,100,000,000
marks, out of a total of about 10,000,000,000 marks. Taking into account not only the deposits, but the total bank capital,
this author wrote: “At the end of 1909, the nine big Berlin banks, together with their affiliated banks, controlled
11,300,000,000 marks, that is, about 83 per cent of the total German bank capital. The Deutsche Bank, which together
9
with its affiliated banks controls nearly 3,000,000,000 marks, represents, parallel with the Prussian State Railway
Administration, the biggest and also the most decentralized accumulation of capital in the old world.”* [
Schulze-Gaevernitz, “Die deutsche Kreditbank” in Grundriss der Sozialökonomik (The German Credit Bank in Outline
of Social economics–Tr.), Tübingen, 1915, pp. 12 and 137.]
¶6 We have emphasized the reference to the “affiliated” banks because this is one of the most important
distinguishing features of modern capitalist concentration. The big enterprises and the banks in particular, not only
completely absorb the small ones, but also “annex” them, subordinate them, bring them into their “own” group or
“concern” (to use the technical term) by acquiring “holdings” in their capital, by purchasing or exchanging shares, by a
system of credits, etc., etc. Professor Liefmann has written a voluminous “work” of about 500 pages describing modern
“holding and finance companies,”* [R. Liefmann, Beteiligungs- und Finanzierungsgesellschaften. Eine Studie über den
modernen Kapitalismus und das Effektenwesen, I. Aufl., Jena, 1909, p. 212.] unfortunately adding “theoretical”
reflections of a very poor quality to what is frequently undigested raw material. To what results this “holding” system
leads as regards concentration is best illustrated in the book written on the big German banks by Riesser, himself a
“banker.” But before examining his data, we will quote a concrete example of the “holding” system.
¶7 The Deutsche Bank “group” is one of the biggest, if not the biggest, of the big banking groups. In order to trace
the main threads which connect all the banks in this group, it is necessary to distinguish between “holdings” of the first,
second and third degree, or what amounts to the same thing, between dependence (of the lesser banks on the Deutsche
Bank) in the first, second and third degree. We then obtain the following picture:** [Alfred Lansburgh, “Das
Beteiligungssystem im deutschen Bankwesen” (The Holding System in German Banking — Tr.) in Die Bank, 1910, 1,
p.500.]
The Deutsche Bank
has holdings:
Dependence, 1st
Degree
Dependence, 2nd
Degree
Dependence, 3rd
Degree
Permanently in 17 banks of which 9 in 34 of which 4 in 7
For an indefinite
period
” 5 ” — —
Occasionally ” 8 ” ” 5 ” 14 ” ” 2 ” 2
Total in 30 banks of which 14 in 48 of which 6 in 9
¶8 Included in the eight banks dependent on the Deutsche Bank in the “first degree,” “occasionally,” are three
foreign banks: one Austrian (the Wiener Bankverein) and two Russian (the Siberian Commercial Bank and the Russian
Bank for Foreign Trade). Altogether, the Deutsche Bank group comprises, directly and indirectly, partially and totally,
87 banks; and the total capital–its own and others which it controls–is estimated at between two and three billion marks.
¶9 It is obvious that a bank which stands at the head of such a group, and which enters into agreement with half a
dozen other banks only slightly smaller than itself for the purpose of conducting exceptionally big and profitable
financial operations like floating state loans, has already outgrown the part of “middleman” and has become a combine
of a handful of monopolists.
¶10 The rapidity with which the concentration of banking proceeded in Germany at the end of the nineteenth and the
beginning of the twentieth centuries is shown by the following data which we quote in an abbreviated form from Riesser:
SIX BIG BERLIN BANKS
Year Branches in Germany Deposit banks and
exchange offices
Constant holdings in
German joint-stock
banks
Total establishments
1895 16 14 1 42
1900 21 40 8 80
1911 104 276 63 450
10
¶11 We see the rapid expansion of a close network of canals which cover the whole country, centralizing all capital
and all revenues, transforming thousands and thousands of scattered economic enterprises into a single national
capitalist, and then into a world capitalist economy. The “decentralization” that Schulze-Gaevernitz, as an exponent of
present-day bourgeois political economy, speaks of in the passage previously quoted, really means the subordination of
an increasing number of formerly relatively “independent,” or rather, strictly local economic units, to a single center. In
reality it is centralization, the enhancement of the role, the importance and the power of monopolist giants.
¶12 In the older capitalist countries this “banking network” is still more close. In Great Britain and Ireland, in 1910,
there were in all 7,151 branches of banks. Four big banks had more than 400 branches each (from 447 to 689); four had
more than 200 branches each, and eleven more than 100 each.
¶13 In France, three very big banks, Credit Lyonnais, the Comptoir National and the Societe Generale, extended
their operations and their network of branches in the following manner.* [Eugen Kaufmann, Das frantösische
BankaDesen, Tübingen, 1911, pp. 356.]
Number of branches and offices Capital in million francs
In the provinces In Paris Total Own capital Borrowed capital
1870 47 17 64 200 427
1890 192 66 258 265 1245
1909 1033 196 1229 887 4363
¶14 In order to show the “connections” of a big modern bank, Riesser gives the following figures of the number of
letters dispatched and received by the Disconto-Gesellschaft, one of the biggest banks in Germany and in the world (its
capital in 1914 amounted to 300,000,000 marks):
Letters received Letters dispatched
1852… 6,135 6,292
1870… 85,800 87,513
1900… 533,102 626,043
¶15 The accounts of the big Paris bank, the Credit Lyonnais, increased from 28,535 in 1875 to 633,539 in 1912.*
[Jean Lescure, L’epargne en France (Savings in France–Tr.), Paris, 1914, p. 52.]
¶16 These simple figures show perhaps better than lengthy disquisitions how the concentration of capital and the
growth of bank turnover are radically changing the significance of the banks. Scattered capitalists are transformed into a
single collective capitalist. When carrying the current accounts of a few capitalists, a bank, as it were, transacts a purely
technical and exclusively auxiliary operation. When, however, this operation grows to enormous dimensions we find that
a handful of monopolists subordinate to their will all the operations, both commercial and industrial, of the whole of
capitalist society; for they obtain the opportunity– by means of their banking connections, their current accounts and
other financial operations–first, to ascertain exactly the financial position of the various capitalists, then to control them,
to influence them by restricting or enlarging, facilitating or hindering credits, and finally entirely determine their fate,
determine their income, deprive them of capital, or permit them to increase their capital rapidly and to enormous
dimensions, etc.
¶17 We have just mentioned the 300,000,000 marks capital of the Disconto-Gesellschaft of Berlin. This increase of
the capital of the bank was one of the incidents in the struggle for hegemony between two of the biggest Berlin banks–
the Deutsche Bank and the Disconto. In 1870, the first was still a novice and had a capital of only 15,000,000 marks,
while the second a capital of 30,000,000 marks. In 1908, the first had a capital of 200,000,000, while the second had
170,000,000. In 1914 the first increased its capital to 250,000,000 and the second, by merging with another first-class big
bank, the Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein, increased its capital to 300,000,000. And of course, this struggle for
hegemony went hand in hand with the more and more frequent conclusion of “agreements” of an increasingly durable
character between the two banks. The following are the conclusions that this development of banking forces upon
specialists in banking who regard economic questions from a standpoint which does not in the least exceed the bounds of
the most moderate and cautious bourgeois reformism:
11
¶18 Commenting on the increase of the capital of the Disconto-Gesellschaft to 300,000,000 marks, the German
review, Die Bank, wrote: “Other banks will follow this same path and in time the three hundred men, who today govern
Germany economically, will gradually be reduced to fifty, twenty-five or still fewer. It cannot be expected that this latest
move towards concentration will be confined to banking. The close relations that exist between individual banks
naturally lead to the bringing together of the industrial syndicates which these banks favor…. One fine morning we shall
wake up in surprise to see nothing but trusts before our eyes, and to kind ourselves faced with the necessity of
substituting state monopolies for private monopolies. However, we have nothing to reproach ourselves with, except for
having allowed things to follow their own course, slightly accelerated by the manipulation of stocks.”* [A. Lansburgh,
“Die Bank mit den 300 Millionen” in Die Bank, 1914, , p. 426.]
¶19 This is an example of the impotence of bourgeois journalism which differs from bourgeois science only in that
the latter is less sincere and strives to obscure the essence of the matter, to conceal the wood by trees. To be “surprised ”
at the results of concentration, to “reproach” the government of capitalist Germany, or capitalist “society” (“ourselves”),
to fear that the introduction of stocks and shares might “accelerate” concentration in the same way as the German “cartel”
specialist Tschierschky fears the American trusts and “prefers” the German cartels on the grounds that they “may not,
like the trusts, excessively accelerate technical and economic progress”* [ S. Tschierschky, op.cit., p.128.]–is not this
impotence?
¶20 But facts remain facts. There are no trusts in Germany; there are “only” cartels–but Germany is governed by not
more than three hundred magnates of capital, and the number of these is constantly diminishing. At all events, in all
capitalist countries, notwithstanding all the differences in their banking laws, banks greatly intensify and accelerate the
process of concentration of capital and the formation of monopolies.
¶21 The banking system presents indeed the form of common bookkeeping and of the distribution of means of
production on a social scale, but only the form,” wrote Marx in Capital half a century ago (Russ. trans. Vol. III, part II, p.
144). [8] The figures we have quoted on the growth of bank capital, on the increase in the number of the branches and
offices of the biggest banks, the increase in the number of their accounts, etc., present a concrete picture of this “common
bookkeeping” of the whole capitalist class; and not only of the capitalists, for the banks collect, even though temporarily,
all kinds of money revenues–of small businessmen, office clerks, and of a tiny upper stratum of the working class. It is
“common distribution of means of production” that, from the formal aspect, grows out of the modern banks, numbering
some three to six of the biggest in France, and six to eight in Germany, control billions and billions. In substance,
however, the distribution of means of production is by no means “common,” but private, i.e., it conforms to the interests
of big capital, and primarily, of huge, monopoly capital, which operates under conditions in which the masses of the
population live in want, in which the whole development of agriculture hopelessly lags behind the development of
industry, while-within industry itself the “heavy industries” exact tribute from all other branches of industry.
¶22 In the matter of socializing capitalist economy the savings banks and post offices are beginning to compete with
the banks; they are more “decentralized,” i.e., their influence extends to a greater number of localities, to more remote
places, to wider sections of the population. Here is the data collected by an American commission on the comparative
growth of deposits in banks and savings banks:* [Statistics of the National Monetary Commission, quoted in Die Bank,
1910, I, p.1200.]
DEPOSITS (IN BILLIONS OF MARKS)
England France Germany
Banks Saving Banks Banks Savings
Banks
Banks Credit
Societies
Savings
Banks
1880 . . . 8.4 1.6 ? 0.9 0.5 0.4 2.6
1888 . . . 12.4 2.0 1.5 2.1 1.1 0.4 4.5
1908 . . . 23.2 4.2 3.7 4.2 7.1 2.2 13.9
¶23 As they pay interest at the rate of 4 per cent and 4.25 per cent on deposits, the savings banks must seek
“profitable” investments for their capital, they must deal in bills, mortgages, etc. The boundaries between the banks and
the savings banks “become more and more obliterated.” The Chambers of Commerce of Bochum and Erfurt, for
example, demand that savings banks be “prohibited” from engaging in “purely” banking business, such as discounting
bills; they demand the limitation of the “banking” operations of the post office.* [Die Bank, 1913, pp. 811, 1022; 1914,
p. 713.] The banking magnates seem to be afraid that state monopoly will steal upon them from an unexpected quarter. It
goes without saying, however, that this fear is no more than the expression of the rivalry, so to speak, between two
12
department managers in the same office; for, on the one hand, the billions entrusted to the savings banks are in the final
analysis actually controlled by these very same bank capital magnates, while, on the other hand, state monopoly in
capitalist society is merely a means of increasing and guaranteeing the income of millionaires in one branch of industry
or another who are on the verge of bankruptcy.
¶24 The change from the old type of capitalism, in which free competition predominated, to the new capitalism, in
which monopoly reigns, is expressed, among other things, by a decline in the importance of the Stock Exchange. The
review, Die Bank, writes: “The Stock Exchange has long ceased to be the indispensable medium of circulation that it was
formerly when the banks were not yet able to place the bulk of new issues with their clients.”** [Die Bank, 1914, p.316.
]
¶25 “‘Every bank is a Stock Exchange,’ and the bigger the bank, and the more successful the concentration of
banking, the truer does this modern aphorism become.”*[Dr. Oscar Stillich, Geid- und Bankroesen, Berlin, 1907, p. 169]
“While formerly, in the ‘seventies, the Stock Exchange, flushed with the exuberance of youth” (a “subtle” allusion to the
Stock Exchange crash of 1873, to the company promotion scandals, [9] etc.), “opened the era of the industrialization of
Germany, nowadays the banks and industry are able to ‘do it alone.’ The domination of our big banks over the Stock
Exchange… is nothing else than the expression of the completely organized German industrial state. If the domain of the
automatically functioning economic laws is thus restricted, and if the domain of conscious regulation by the banks is
considerably enlarged, the national economic responsibility of a few guiding heads is immensely increased,” so writes
the German Professor Schulze-Gaevernitz,**[Schulze-Gaevernit2, Die deutsche Kreditbank in Grundriss der
sozialökonomik, Tübingen, 1915, p. 101.] an apologist of German imperialism, who is regarded as an authority by the
imperialists of all countries, and who tries to gloss over a “detail,” viz., that the “conscious regulation” of economic life
by the banks consists in the fleecing of the public by a handful of “completely organized” monopolists. The task of a
bourgeois professor is not to lay bare the entire mechanism, or to expose all the machinations of the bank monopolists,
but rather to present them in a favorable light.
¶26 In the same way, Riesser, a still more authoritative economist and himself “a banker,” makes shift with
meaningless phrases in order to explain away undeniable facts:
“… the Stock Exchange is steadily losing the feature which is absolutely essential for national economy as a
whole and for the circulation of securities in particular–that of being not only a most exact measuring-rod, but
also an almost automatic regulator of the economic movements which converge on it.”* [Riesser, op. cit., 4th
ed, p. 629.]
¶27 In other words, the old capitalism, the capitalism of free competition with its indispensable regulator, the Stock
Exchange, is passing away. A new capitalism has come to take its place, bearing obvious features of something transient,
a mixture of free competition and monopoly. The question naturally arises: to what is this new capitalism “passing”? But
the bourgeois scholars are afraid to raise this question.
¶28 “Thirty years ago, businessmen, freely competing against one another, performed nine-tenths of the work
connected with their business other than manual labor. At the present time, nine-tenths of this “brain work” is performed
by officials. Banking is in the forefront of this evolution.”** [Schulze-Gaevernit2, “Die deutsche Kreditbank” in
Grundriss der Socialekonomik, Tübingen, 1915, p. 151.] This admission by Schulze-Gaevernitz brings us once again to
the question: to what is this new capitalism, capitalism in its imperialist stage, passing?
¶29 Among the few banks which remain at the head of all capitalist economy as a result of the process of
concentration, there is naturally to be observed an increasingly marked tendency towards monopolist agreements,
towards a bank trust. In America, not nine, but two very big banks, those of the billionaires Rockefeller and Morgan,
control a capital of eleven billion marks.* [Die Bank, 1912, 1, p. 435.] In Germany the absorption of the
Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein by the Disconto-Gesellschaft to which we referred above, was commented on in the
following terms by the Frankfurter Zeitung,[10] an organ of the Stock Exchange interests:
¶30 “The concentration movement of the banks is narrowing the circle of establishments from which it is possible to
obtain credits, and is consequently increasing the dependence of big industry upon a small number of banking groups. In
view of the close connection between industry and the financial world, the freedom of movement of industrial companies
which need banking capital is restricted. For this reason, big industry is watching the growing trustification of the banks
with mixed feelings. Indeed, we have repeatedly seen the beginnings of certain agreements between the individual big
banking concerns, which aim at restricting competition.”**[Quoted by Schulze-Gaevernitz, ibid.. p. 155.]
¶31 Again and again, the final word in the development of banking is monopoly.
¶32 As regards the close connection between the banks and industry, it is precisely in this sphere that the new role
of the banks is, perhaps, most strikingly felt. When a bank discounts a bill for a firm, opens a current account for it, etc.,
these operations, taken separately, do not in the least diminish its independence, and the bank plays no other part than
that of a humble middleman. But when such operations are multiplied and become an established practice, when the
bank “collects” in its own hands enormous amounts of capital, when the running of a current account for a given firm
13
enables the bank–and this is what happens–to obtain fuller and more detailed information about the economic position
of its client, the result is that the industrial capitalist becomes more completely dependent on the bank.
¶33 At the same time a personal union, so to speak, is established between the banks and the biggest industrial and
commercial enterprises, the merging of one with another through the acquisition of shares, through the appointment of
bank directors to the Supervisory Boards (or Boards of Directors) of industrial and commercial enterprises, and vice
versa. The German economist, Jeidels, has compiled most detailed data on this form of concentration of capital and of
enterprises. Six of the biggest Berlin banks were represented by their directors in 344 industrial companies; and by their
board members in 407 others, making a total of 751 companies. In 289 of these companies they either had two of their
representatives on each of the respective Supervisory Boards, or held the posts of chairmen. We find these industrial and
commercial companies in the most diverse branches of industry: insurance, transport, restaurants, theaters, art industry,
etc. On the other hand, on the Supervisory Boards of these six banks (in 1910) were fifty-one of the biggest industrialists,
including the director of Krupp, of the powerful “Hapag” (Hamburg-American Line), etc., etc. From 1895 to 1910, each
of these six banks participated in the share and bond issues of many hundreds of industrial companies (the number
ranging from 281 to 419).* [Jeidels, op. cit.; Riesser, op. cit.]
¶34 The “personal union” between the banks and industry is supplemented by the “personal union” between both
and the government. “Seats on Supervisory Boards,” writes Jeidels, “are freely offered to persons of title, also to ex-civil
servants, who are able to do a great deal to facilitate”relations with the authorities.”…”Usually, on the Supervisory Board
of a big bank, there is a member of parliament or a Berlin city councillor.”
¶35 The building, so to speak, of the big capitalist monopolies is therefore going on full steam ahead in all “natural”
and “supernatural” ways. A sort of division of labor is being systematically developed amongst some hundreds of kings
of finance who reign over modern capitalist society:
¶36 “Simultaneously with this widening of the sphere of activity of certain big industrialists” (joining the boards of
banks, etc.) “and with the allocation of provincial bank managers to definite industrial regions, there is a growth of
specialization among the directors of the big banks. Generally speaking, this specialization is only conceivable when
banking is conducted on a large scale, and particularly when it has widespread connections with industry. This division
of labor proceeds along two lines: on the one hand, relations with industry as a whole are entrusted to one director, as his
special function; on the other, each director assumes the supervision of several separate enterprises, or of a group of
enterprises in the same branch of industry or having similar interests.” … (Capitalism has already reached the stage of
organized supervision of individual enterprises.) … “One specializes in German industry, sometimes even in
West-German industry alone” (the West is the most industrialized part of Germany), “others specialize in relations with
foreign states and foreign industry, in information about the personality of industrialists and others, in Stock Exchange
questions, etc. Besides, each bank director is often assigned a special locality or a special branch of industry; one works
chiefly on Supervisory Boards of electric companies, another chemical, brewing, or beet-sugar plants, a third in a few
isolated industrial enterprises, but at the same time works on the Supervisory Boards of insurance companies…. In short,
there can be no doubt that the growth in the dimensions and diversity of the big banks’ operations is accompanied by an
increase in the division of labor among their directors with the object (and result) of, so to speak, lifting them somewhat
out of pure banking and making them better experts, better judges of the general problems of industry and the special
problems of each branch of industry, thus making them more capable of acting within the respective bank’s industrial
sphere of influence. This system is supplemented by the banks’ endeavors to elect to their Supervisory Boards men who
are experts in industrial affairs, such as industrialists, former officials, especially those formerly in the railway service or
in mining,” etc.* [Jeidels, op. cit., p. 57.]
¶37 We find the same system only in a slightly different form in French banking. For instance, one of the three
biggest French banks, the Credit Lyonnais, has organized a financial research service (service des etudes financieres),
which permanently employs over fifty engineers, statisticians, economists, lawyers, etc. This costs from six to seven
hundred thousand francs annually. The service is in turn divided into eight departments: one specializes in collecting
information concerning industrial establishments, another studies general statistics, a third with railway and steamship
companies, a fourth, securities, a fifth, financial reports, etc.* [An article by Eug. Kaufmann on French banks in Die
Bank, 1909, p. 851 et seq.]
¶38 The result is, on the one hand, the ever growing merger, or, as N. I. Bukharin aptly calls it, coalescence, of bank
and industrial capital and, on the other hand, the growth of the banks into institutions of a truly “universal character.” On
this question we think it necessary to quote the exact terms used by Jeidels, who has best studied the subject:
¶39 “An examination of the sum total of industrial relationships reveals the universal character of the financial
establishments working on behalf of industry. Unlike other kinds of banks, and contrary to the demand sometimes
expressed in literature that banks should specialize in one kind of business or in one branch of industry in order to
prevent the ground from slipping from under their feet– the big banks are striving to make their connections with
industrial enterprises as varied as possible regarding locality and branch of industry and are striving to eliminate the
unevenness in the distribution of capital among localities and branches of industry resulting from the historical
14
development of individual enterprises.” “One tendency is to make the connections with industry general; another
tendency is to make them durable and close. In the six big banks both these tendencies are realized, not in full, but to a
considerable extent and to an equal degree.”
¶40 Quite often industrial and commercial circles complain of the “terrorism” of the banks. And it is not surprising
that such complaints are heard, for the big banks “command,” as will be seen from the following example. On November
19, 1901, one of the big, so-called Berlin “D” banks (the names of the four biggest banks begin with the letter D) wrote
to the Board of Directors of the German Central Northwest Cement Syndicate in the following terms: “As we learn from
the notice you published in a certain newspaper of the 18th inst., we must reckon with the possibility that the next
general meeting of your syndicate, to be held on the 30th of this month, may decide on measures which are likely to
effect changes in your undertaking which are unacceptable to us. We deeply regret that, for these reasons, we are obliged
henceforth to withdraw the credit which had been hitherto allowed you…. But if the said next general meeting does not
decide upon measures which are unacceptable to us, and if we receive suitable guarantees on this matter for the future,
we shall be quite willing to open negotiations with you on the grant of a new credit.”* [Dr. Oscar Stillich, Geld- und
Bankwesen, Berlin, 1907, p. 148.]
¶41 As a matter of fact, this is small capital’s old complaint about being oppressed by big capital, but in this case it
was a whole syndicate that fell into the category of “small” capital! The old struggle between small and big capital is
being resumed at a new and immeasurably higher stage of development. It stands to reason that the big banks’
enterprises, worth billions, can accelerate technical progress with means that cannot possibly be compared with those of
the past. The banks, for example, set up special technical research societies, and, of course, only “friendly” industrial
enterprises benefit from their work. To this category belong the Electric Railway Research Association, the Central
Bureau of Scientific and Technical Research, etc.
¶42 The directors of the big banks themselves cannot fail to see that new conditions of national economy are being
created; but they are powerless in the face of these phenomena.
¶43 “Anyone who has watched, in recent years,” writes Jeidels, “the changes of incumbents of directorships and
seats on the Supervisory Boards of the big banks, cannot fail to have noticed that power is gradually passing into the
hands of men who consider the active intervention of the big banks in the general development of industry to be
necessary and of increasing importance. Between these new men and the old bank directors, disagreements of a business
and often of a personal nature are growing on this subject. The issue is whether or not the banks, as credit institutions,
will suffer from this intervention in industry, whether they are sacrificing tried principles and an assured profit to engage
in a field of activity which has nothing in common with their role as middlemen in providing credit, and which is leading
the banks into a field where they are more than ever before exposed to the blind forces of trade fluctuations. This is the
opinion of many of the older bank directors, while most of the young men consider active intervention in industry to be a
necessity as great as that which gave rise, simultaneously with big modern industry, to the big banks and modern
industrial banking. The two parties are agreed only on one point: that there are neither firm principles nor a concrete aim
in the new activities of the big banks.”* [Jeidels, op. cit., pp. 83-84]
¶44 The old capitalism has had its day. The new capitalism represents a transition towards something. It is hopeless,
of course, to seek for “firm principles and a concrete aim” for the purpose of “reconciling” monopoly with free
competition. The admission of the practical men has quite a different ring from the official praises of the charms of
“organized” capitalism sung by its apologists, Schulze-Gaevernitz, Liefmann and similar “theoreticians.”
¶45 At precisely what period were the “new activities” of the big banks finally established? Jeidels gives us a fairly
exact answer to this important question:
¶46 “The connections between the banks and industrial enterprises, with their new content, their new forms and
their new organs, namely, the big banks which are organized on both a centralized and a decentralized basis, were
scarcely a characteristic economic phenomenon before the nineties; in one sense, indeed this initial date may be
advanced to the year 1897, when the important ‘mergers’ took place and when, for the first time, the new form of
decentralized organization was introduced to suit the industrial policy of the banks. This starting point could perhaps be
placed at an even later date, for it was the crisis of 1900 that enormously accelerated and intensified the process of
concentration of industry and of banking, consolidated that process, for the first time transformed the connection with
industry into the actual monopoly of the big banks, and made this connection much closer and more active.”** [lbid., p.
181. ]
¶47 Thus, the twentieth century marks the turning point from the old capitalism to the new, from the domination of
capital in general to the domination of finance capital.
III. FINANCE CAPITAL AND THE FINANCIAL OLIGARCHY
15
¶1 “A steadily increasing proportion of capital in industry,” writes Hilferding, “ceases to belong to the industrialists who
employ it. They obtain the use of it only through the medium of the banks which, in relation to them, represent the
owners of the capital. On the other hand, the bank is forced to sink an increasing share of its funds in industry. Thus, to
an ever-increasing degree the banker is being transformed into an industrial capitalist. This bank capital, i.e., capital in
money form, which is thus actually transformed into industrial capital, I call ‘finance capital.’ ” “Finance capital is capital
controlled by banks and employed by industrialists.”* [R. Hilferding, Finance Capital, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1912, pp.
338-39.]
¶2 This definition is incomplete in so far as it is silent on one extremely important fact: the increase of
concentration of production and of capital to such an extent that concentration leads, and has led, to monopoly. But
throughout the whole of his work, and particularly in the two chapters which precede the one from which this definition
is taken Hilferding stresses the part played by capitalist monopolies.
¶3 The concentration of production; the monopolies arising therefrom; the merging or coalescence of the banks
with industry–such is the history of the rise of finance capital and such is the content of this term.
¶4 We now have to describe how, under the general conditions of commodity production and private property, the
“business operations” of capitalist monopolies inevitably become the domination of a financial oligarchy. It should be
noted that the representatives of bourgeois German– and not only German–science, like Riesser, Schulze-Gaevernitz,
Liefmann and others, are all apologists of imperialism and of finance capital. Instead of revealing the “mechanics” of the
formation of an oligarchy, its methods, the size of its revenues “innocent and sinful,” its connections with parliaments,
etc., etc., they obscure and embellish them. They evade these “vexed questions” by pompous and vague phrases, appeals
to the “sense of responsibility” of bank directors, by praising “the sense of duty” of Prussian officials, giving serious
study to the petty details of absolutely ridiculous parliamentary bills for the “supervision” and “regulation” of
monopolies, playing spillikins with theories, like, for example, the following “scientific” definition, arrived at by
Professor Liefmann: “Commerce is an occupation having for its object: collecting goods, storing them and making them
available.”* [R. Liefmann, op. cit., p. 476.] (The Professor’s italics.) . . . From this it would follow that commerce existed
in the time of primitive man, who knew nothing about exchange, and that it will exist under Socialism!
¶5 But the monstrous facts concerning the monstrous rule of the financial oligarchy are so glaring that in all
capitalist countries, in America, France and Germany, a whole literature has sprung up, written from the bourgeois point
of view, but which, nevertheless, gives a fairly truthful picture and criticism–petty-bourgeois, naturally–of this
oligarchy.
¶6 The “holding system,” to which we have already briefly referred above, should be made the cornerstone. The
German economist, Heymann, probably the first to call attention to this matter, describes the essence of it in this way:
¶7 “The head of the concern controls the principal company” (literally: the “mother company”); “the latter reigns
over the subsidiary companies” (“daughter companies”) “which in their turn control still other subsidiaries” [“grandchild
companies”], “etc. In this way, it is possible with a comparatively small capital to dominate immense spheres of
production. Indeed, if holding 50 per cent of the capital is always sufficient to control a company, the head of the
concern needs only one million to control eight million in the second subsidiaries. And if this ‘interlocking’ is extended,
it is possible with one million to control sixteen million, thirty-two million, etc.”* [Hans Gideon Heymann, Die
gemischten Werke im deutschen Grosseisengewerbe, Stuttgart, 1904, pp. 268-69.]
¶8 As a matter of fact, experience shows that it is sufficient to own 40 per cent of the shares of a company in order
to direct its affairs,** [Liefmann, Beteiligungsgesellschaften, etc., 1st ed., p. 258.] since a certain number of small,
scattered shareholders find it impossible, in practice, to attend general meetings, etc. The “democratization” of the
ownership of shares, from which the bourgeois sophists and opportunist so-called “Social-Democrats” expect (or say that
they expect) the ”democratization of capital,” the strengthening of the role and significance of small-scale production,
etc., is, in fact, one of the ways of increasing the power of the financial oligarchy. Incidentally, this is why, in the more
advanced, or in the older and more “experienced” capitalist countries, the law allows the issue of shares of smaller
denomination. In Germany, the law does not permit the issue of shares of less than one thousand marks denomination,
and the magnates of German finance look with an envious eye at England, where the issue of one-pound shares (= 20
marks, about 10 rubles) is permitted. Siemens, one of the biggest industrialists and “financial kings” in Germany, told the
Reichstag on June 7, 1900, that “the one pound share is the basis of British imperialism.”* [Schulze-Gaevernitz in
Grundriss da Sozialökonomie, V, 2, p. 110.] This merchant has a much deeper and more “Marxian” understanding of
imperialism than a certain disreputable writer who is held to be one of the founders of Russian Marxism [11] and
believes that imperialism is a bad habit of a certain nation….
¶9 But the “holding system” not only serves enormously to increase the power of the monopolists; it also enables
them to resort with impunity to all sorts of shady and dirty tricks to cheat the public, for the directors of the “mother
company” are not legally responsible for the “daughter company,” which is supposed to be “independent,” and through
the medium of which they can “pull off” anything. Here is an example taken from the German review, Die Bank, for May
16
1914:
¶10 “The Spring Steel Company of Kassel was regarded some years ago as being one of the most profitable
enterprises in Germany. Through bad management its dividends fell from 15 per cent to nil. It appears that the Board,
without consulting the shareholders, had loaned six million marks to one of its ‘daughter companies,’ the Hassia, Ltd.,
which had a nominal capital of only some hundreds of thousands of marks. This commitment, amounting to nearly treble
the capital of the ‘mother company,’ was never mentioned in its balance sheets. This omission was quite legal and could
be hushed up for two whole years because it did not violate any point of company law. The chairman of the Supervisory
Board, who as the responsible head had signed the false balance sheets, was, and still is, the president of the Kassel
Chamber of Commerce. The shareholders only heard of the loan to the Hassia, Ltd. long afterwards, when it had been
proved to have been a mistake”. . . (the writer should put this word in quotation marks) . . . “and when Spring Steel
shares dropped nearly 100 per cent, because those in the know were getting rid of them….
¶11 “This typical example of balance-sheet jugglery, quite common in joint-stock companies, explains why their
Boards of Directors are willing with a far lighter heart to undertake risky transactions than individual businessmen.
Modern methods of drawing up balance sheets not only make it possible to conceal doubtful undertakings from the
ordinary shareholder, but also allow the people most concerned to escape the consequence of unsuccessful speculation
by selling their shares in time while the individual businessman risks his own skin in everything he does….
¶12 “The balance sheets of many joint-stock companies put us in mind of the palimpsests of the Middle Ages from
which the visible inscription had first to be erased in order to discover beneath it another inscription giving the real
meaning of the document.” (Palimpsests are parchment documents from which the original inscription has been
obliterated and another inscription imposed.)
¶13 “The simplest and, therefore, most common procedure for making balance sheets indecipherable is to divide a
single business into several parts by setting up ‘daughter companies’–or by annexing such. The advantages of this system
for various objects–legal and illegal–are so evident that big companies which do not employ it are quite the exception.”*
[L. Eschwege, “Tochtergesellschaften” (Subsidiary companies — Tr.) in Die Bank, 1914, I, p.545.]
¶14 As an example of a huge monopolist company that extensively employs this system, the author quotes the
famous General Electric Company (to which we shall refer again later on). In 1912, it was calculated that this company
held shares in 175 to 200 other companies, dominating them, of course, and thus controlling a total capital of about
1,500,000,000 marks.** [Kurt Heinig, “Der Weg des Elektrotrusts” (The Path of the Electric Trust- Tr.) in Neue Zeit,
1912, 30 Jahrg., 2, p. 484. ]
¶15 All rules of control, the publication of balance sheets, the drawing up of balance sheets according to a definite
form, the public auditing of accounts, etc., the things about which well-intentioned professors and officials–that is, those
imbued with the good intention of defending and embellishing capitalism–discourse to the public, are of no avail. For
private property is sacred, and no one can be prohibited from buying, selling, exchanging or mortgaging shares, etc.
¶16 The extent to which this “holding system” has developed in the big Russian banks may be judged by the figures
given by E. Agahd, who for fifteen years was an official of the Russo-Chinese Bank and who, in May 1914 published a
book, not altogether correctly entitled Big Banks and the World Market.* [E. Agahd, Grossbanken und Weltmark. Die
wirtschaftliche und politische Bedeutung der Grossbanken im Weltmarkt unter Berücksichtigung ibres Einflusses auf
Russlands Volkswirtschaft und die deutschrussischen Beziehungen (Big Banks and the World Market. The economic and
political significance of the big hanks on the world market, with reference to their influence on Russia’s national
economy and GermanRussian relations.–Tr.), Berlin, 1914.] The author divides the big Russian banks into two main
categories: a) banks that come under the “holding system,” and b) “independent” banks–“independence,” however, being
arbitrarily taken to mean independence of foreign banks. The author divides the first group into three sub-groups: 1)
German holdings, 2) British holdings, and 3) French holdings, having in view the “holdings” and domination of the big
foreign banks of the particular country mentioned. The author divides the capital of the banks into “productively”
invested capital (in industrial and commercial undertakings), and “speculatively” invested capital (in Stock Exchange
and financial operations), assuming, from his petty-bourgeois reformist point of view, that it is possible, under
capitalism, to separate the first form of investment from the second and to abolish the second form.
¶17 Here are the figures he supplies:
BANK ASSETS
(According to Reports for October-November, 1913)
in millions of rubles
Groups of Russian Banks Capital invested
Productively Speculatively Total
17
a 1) Four banks: Siberian Commercial, Russian, International, and
Discount Bank
413.7 859.1 1,272.8
a 2) Two banks: Commercial and Industrial, and Russo-British 239.3 169.1 408.4
a 3) Five banks: Russian-Asiatic, St. Petersburg Private, Azov-Don,
Union Moscow, Russo-French Commercial
711.8 661.2 1.373.0
(11 banks) Total: a) = 1,364.8 1,689.4 3.054.2
b) Eight banks: Moscow Merchants, Volga-Kama, Junker and Co., St.
Petersburg Commercial (formerly Wawelberg), Bank of Moscow
(formerly Ryabushinsky), Moscow Discount, Moscow Commercial,
Moscow Private
504.2 391.1 895.3
(19 banks) Total: 1,869.0 2,080.5 3.949.5
¶18 According to these figures, of the approximately four billion rubles making up the “working” capital of the big
banks, more than three-fourths, more than three billion, belonged to banks which in reality were only “daughter
companies” of foreign banks, and chiefly of the Paris banks (the famous trio: Union Parisienne, Paris et Pays-Bas and
Societe Generale), and of the Berlin banks (particularly the Deutsche Bank and Disconto-Gesellschaft). Two of the
biggest Russian banks, the Russian (Russian Bank for Foreign Trade) and the International (St. Petersburg International
Commercial Bank), between 1906 and 1912 increased their capital from 44,000,000 to 98,000,000 rubles, and their
reserves from 15,000,000 to 39,000,000 “employing three-fourths German capital.” The first bank belongs to the Berlin
Deutsche Bank “concern” and the second to the Berlin Disconto-Gesellschaft. The worthy Agahd is deeply indignant at
the fact that the majority of the shares are held by the Berlin banks, and that, therefore, the Russian shareholders are
powerless. Naturally, the country which exports capital skims the cream: for example, the Berlin Deutsche Bank, in
placing the shares of the Siberian Commercial Bank on the Berlin market, kept them in its portfolio for a whole year, and
then sold them at the rate of 193 for 100, that is, at nearly twice their nominal value, “earning” a profit of nearly
6,000,000 rubles, which Hilferding calls “promoter’s profits.”
¶19 Our author puts the total “capacity” of the principal St. Petersburg banks at 8,235,000,000 rubles, about 8.25
billions, and the “holdings,” or rather, the extent to which foreign banks dominated them, he estimates as follows French
banks, 55 per cent; English, 10 per cent; German 35 per cent. The author calculates that of the total of 8,235,000,000
rubles of functioning capital, 3,687,000,000 rubles, or over 40 per cent, fall to the share of the syndicates Produgol and
Prodamet [12]–and the syndicates in the oil, metallurgical and cement industries. Thus, owing to the formation of
capitalist monopolies, the merging of bank and industrial capital has also made enormous strides in Russia.
¶20 Finance capital, concentrated in a few hands and exercising a virtual monopoly, exacts enormous and
ever-increasing profits from the floating of companies, issue of stock, state loans, etc., strengthens the domination of the
financial oligarchy and levies tribute upon the whole of society for the benefit of monopolists. Here is an example, taken
from a multitude of others, of the “business” methods of the American trusts, quoted by Hilferding: in 1887, Havemeyer
founded the Sugar Trust by amalgamating fifteen small firms, whose total capital amounted to 6,500,000 dollars.
Suitably “watered,” as the Americans say, the capital of the trust was declared to be 50,000,000 dollars. This
“over-capitalization” anticipated the monopoly profits, in the same way as the United States Steel Corporation anticipates
its future monopoly profits in buying up as many iron ore fields as possible. In fact, the Sugar Trust set up monopoly
prices, which secured it such profits that it could pay 10 per cent dividend on capital “watered” sevenfold, or about 70
per cent on the capital actually invested at the time the trust was formed! In 1909, the capital of the Sugar Trust
amounted to 90,000,000 dollars. In twenty-two years, it had increased its capital more than tenfold.
18
¶21 In France the domination of the “financial oligarchy” (Against the Financial Oligarchy in France, the title of
the well-known book by Lysis, the fifth edition of which was published in 1908) assumed a form that was only slightly
different. Four of the most powerful banks enjoy, not a relative, but an “absolute monopoly” in the issue of bonds. In
reality, this is a “trust of big banks.” And monopoly ensures monopolist profits from bond issues. Usually a borrowing
country does not get more than 90 per cent of the sum of the loan, the remaining 10 per cent goes to the banks and other
middlemen. The profit made by the banks out of the Russo-Chinese loan of 400,000,000 francs amounted to 8 per cent;
out of the Russian (1904) loan of 800,000,000 francs the profit amounted to 10 per cent; and out of the Moroccan (1904)
loan of 62,500,000 francs it amounted to 18.75 per cent. Capitalism, which began its development with petty usury
capital, is ending its development with gigantic usury capital. “The French,” says Lysis, “are the usurers of Europe.” All
the conditions of economic life are being profoundly modified by this transformation of capitalism. With a stationary
population, and stagnant industry, commerce and shipping, the “country” can grow rich by usury. “Fifty persons,
representing a capital of 8,000,000 francs, can control 2,000,000,000 francs deposited in four banks.” The “holding
system,” with which we are already familiar, leads to the same result. One of the biggest banks, the Societe Generale, for
instance, issues 64,000 bonds for its “daughter company,” the Egyptian Sugar Refineries. The bonds are issued at 150 per
cent, i.e., the bank gains 50 centimes on the franc. The dividends of the new company were found to be fictitious the
“public” lost from go to 100 million francs. “One of the directors of the Societe Generale was a member of the board of
directors of the Sugar Refineries.” It is not surprising that the author is driven to the conclusion that “the French Republic
is a financial monarchy”; “it is the complete domination of the financial oligarchy; the latter dominates over the press
and the government.”* [Lysis, Contre l’oligarchie financiere en France (Against the Financial Oligarchy in
France–Tr.), 5 ed., Paris, 1908, pp. 11, 12, 26, 39, 40, 48.]
¶22 The extraordinary high rate of profit obtained from the issue of securities, which is one of the principal
functions of finance capital, plays a very important part in the development and consolidation of the financial oligarchy.
“There is not a single business of this type within the country that brings in profits even approximately equal to those
obtained from the flotation of foreign loans,” says the German magazine, Die Bank.** [Die Bank, 1913, No. 7, p. 630. ]
¶23 “No banking operation brings in profits comparable with those obtained from the issue of securities!” According
to the German Economist, the average annual profits made on the issue of industrial stock were as follows:
Per cent Per cent
1895 38.6 1898 67.7
1896 36.1 1899 66.9
1897 66.7 1900 55.2
¶24 “In the ten years from 1891 to 1900 more than a billion marks were ‘earned’ by issuing German industrial
stock.”*** [Stillich, op. cit., p. 143, also W. Sombart, Die deutscbe Volleswirtschaft im 19. Jahrhundert (German
National Economy in the Nineteenth Century–Tr.), 2. Aufl., 1909, S. 526, Anlage 8.]
¶25 During periods of industrial boom, the profits of finance capital are immense, but during periods of depression,
small and unsound businesses go out of existence; the big banks acquire “holdings” in them by buying them up for a
mere song, or participate in profitable schemes for their “reconstruction” and “reorganization.” In the “reconstruction” of
undertakings which have been running at a loss, “the share capital is written down, that is, profits are distributed on a
smaller capital and continue to be calculated on this smaller basis. Or, if the income has fallen to zero new capital is
called in, which, combined with the old and less remunerative capital, will bring in an adequate return. Incidentally,”
adds Hilferding, “all these reorganizations and reconstructions have a twofold significance for the banks: first, as
profitable transactions; and secondly, as opportunities for securing control of the companies in difficulties.”* [Finance
Capital, p. 172.]
¶26 Here is an instance. The Union Mining Company of Dortmund was founded in 1872. Share capital was issued
to the amount of nearly 40,000,000 marks and the market price of the shares rose to 170 after it had paid a 12 per cent
dividend for its first year. Finance capital skimmed the cream and earned a trifle of something like 28,000,000 marks.
The principal sponsor of this company was that very big German Disconto-Gesellschaft which so successfully attained a
capital of 300,000,000 marks. Later, the dividends of the Union declined to nil: the shareholders had to consent to a
“writing down” of capital, that is, to losing some of it in order not to lose it all. By a series of “reconstructions,” more
than 73,000,000 marks were written off the books of the Union in the course of thirty years. “At the present time, the
original shareholders of the company possess only 5 per cent of the nominal value of their shares,”* [Stillich, op. cit., p.
138, and Liefmann, p. 51.] but the banks “earned something” out of every “reconstruction.”
¶27 Speculation in land situated in the suburbs of rapidly growing big towns is a particularly profitable operation for
finance capital. The monopoly of the banks merges here with the monopoly of ground rent and with monopoly of the
means of communications, since the rise in the price of land and the possibility of selling it profitably in allotments, etc.,
is mainly dependent on good means of communication with the center of the town; and these means of communication
are in the hands of large companies which are connected, by means of the holding system and by the distribution of
positions on the directorates, with the interested banks. As a result we get what the German writer, L. Eschwege, a
contributor to Die Bank, who has made a special study of real estate business and mortgages, etc., calls a “bog.” Frantic
speculation in suburban building lots; collapse of building enterprises (like that of the Berlin firm of Boswau and
Knauer, which raked in as much as 100,000,000 marks with the help of the “sound and solid” Deutsche Bank– the latter,
of course, acting through the holding system, i.e., secretly, behind the scenes, and getting out of it with a loss of “only”
12,000,000 marks), then the ruin of small proprietors and of workers who get nothing from the fictitious building firms,
19
fraudulent deals with the “honest” Berlin police and administration for the purpose of gaining control of the issue of
building site tenders, building licenses, etc., etc.* [ In Die Bank, 1913, p. 952, L, Eschwege, Der Sumpf; ibid., 1912, 1, p.
223 et seq. ]
¶28 “American ethics,” which the European professors and well-meaning bourgeois so hypocritically deplore, have,
in the age of finance capital, become the ethics of literally every large city in every country.
¶29 At the beginning of 1914, there was talk in Berlin of the formation of a “transport trust,” i.e., of establishing
“community of interests” between the three Berlin transport undertakings: The city electric railway, the tramway
company and the omnibus company. “We have known,” wrote Die Bank, “that this plan is contemplated since it became
known that the majority of the shares in the bus company had been acquired by the other two transport companies…. We
may fully believe those who are pursuing this aim when they say that by uniting the transport services, they will secure
economies, part of which will in time benefit the public. But the question is complicated by the fact that behind the
transport trust that is being formed are the banks, which, if they desire, can subordinate the means of transportation,
which they have monopolized, to the interests of their real estate business. To be convinced of the reasonableness of such
a conjecture, we need only recall that the interests of the big bank that encouraged the formation of the Elevated Railway
Company were already involved in it at the time the company was formed. That is to say: the interests of this transport
undertaking were interlocked with the real estate interests. The point is that the eastern line of this railway was to run
through land which, when it became certain the line was to be laid down, this bank sold at an enormous profit for itself
and for several partners in the transactions.”…* [“Verkehrstrust” in Die Bank, 1914, I, p. 89. ]
¶30 A monopoly, once it is formed and controls thousands of millions, inevitably penetrates into every sphere of
public life. regardless of the form of government and all other “details.” In the economic literature of Germany one
usually comes across obsequious praise of the integrity of the Prussian bureaucracy, and allusions to the French Panama
scandal [13] and to political corruption in America. But the fact is that even the bourgeois literature devoted to German
banking matters constantly has to go far beyond the field of purely banking operations and to speak, for instance, about
“the attraction of the banks” in reference to the increasing frequency with which public officials take employment with
the banks, as follows: “How about the integrity of a state official who in his inmost heart is aspiring to a soft job in the
Behrenstrasse?”** [“Der Zug zur Bank” The Attraction of the Bank–Tr.) in Die Bank, 1909, I, p. 79. ] (the street in
Berlin in which the head office of the Deutsche Bank is situated). In 1909, the publisher of Die Bank, Alfred Lansburgh,
wrote an article entitled “The Economic Significance of Byzantinism,” in which he incidentally referred to Wilhelm II’s
tour of Palestine, and to “the im mediate result of this journey, the construction of the Baghdad railway, that fatal ‘great
product of German enterprise,’ which is more responsible for the ‘encirclement’ than all our political blunders put
together.”* [Ibid., p. 301. ] (By encirclement is meant the policy of Edward VII to isolate Germany and surround her
with an imperialist anti-German alliance.) In 1911, Eschwege, the contributor to this same magazine to whom we have
already referred, wrote an article entitled “Plutocracy and Bureaucracy,” in which he exposed, for example, the case of a
German official named Volker, who was a zealous member of the Cartel Committee and who, it turned out some time
later, obtained a lucrative post in the biggest cartel, i.e., the Steel Syndicate. Similar cases, by no means casual, forced
this bourgeois author to admit that “the economic liberty guaranteed by the German Constitution has become in many
departments of economic life, a meaningless phrase” and that under the existing rule of the plutocracy, “even the widest
political liberty cannot save us from being converted into a nation of unfree people.”** [Ibid 1911, 2, p. 825; 1913, 2, p.
962.]
¶31 As for Russia, we will limit ourselves to one example. Some years ago, all the newspapers announced that
Davydov, the director of the Credit Department of the Treasury, had resigned his post to take employment with a certain
big bank at a salary which, according to the contract, was to amount to over one million rubles in the course of several
years. The Credit Department is an institution, the function of which is to “coordinate the activities of all the credit
institutions of the country” and which grants subsidies to banks in St. Petersburg and Moscow amounting to between 800
and 1,000 million rubles.* [E. Agahd, op. cit., p. 202.]
¶32 It is characteristic of capitalism in general that the ownership of capital is separated from the application of
capital to production, that money capital is separated from industrial or productive capital, and that the rentier who lives
entirely on income obtained from money capital is separated from the entrepreneur and from all who are directly
concerned in the management of capital. Imperialism, or the domination of finance capital, is that highest stage of
capitalism at which this separation reaches vast proportions. The supremacy of finance capital over all other forms of
capital means the predominance of the rentier and of the financial oligarchy; it means the singling out of a small number
of financially “powerful” states from among all the rest. The extent to which this process is going on may be judged from
the statistics on emissions, i.e., the issue of all kinds of securities.
¶33 In the Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute, A. Neymarck** [Bulletin de l’institut international da
statistique, t. XIX, livr. II, La Haye, 1912. Data concerning small states. second column, are approximately calculated by
adding 20 per cent to the 1902 figures.] has published very comprehensive, complete and comparative figures covering
the issue of securities all over the world, which have been repeatedly quoted in part in economic literature. The following
20
are the totals he gives for decades:
TOTAL ISSUES IN BILLIONS OF FRANCS
(Decades)
1871-1880…………76.1
1881-1890…………64.5
1891-1900………..100.4
1901-1910………..197.8
¶34 In the 1870’s, the total amount of issues for the whole world was high, owing particularly to the loans floated in
connection with the Franco-Prussian War, and the company-promoting boom which set in in Germany after the war. On
the whole, the increase is relatively not very rapid during the three last decades of the nineteenth century, and only in the
first ten years of the twentieth century is an enormous increase observed of almost 100 per cent. Thus the beginning of
the twentieth century marks the turning point, not only in regard to the growth of monopolies (cartels, syndicates, trusts),
of which we have already spoken, but also in regard to the growth of finance capital.
¶35 Neymarck estimates the total amount of issued securities current in the world in 1910 at about 815,000,000,000
francs. Deducting from this sum amounts which might have been duplicated, he reduces the total to 575-600 billion,
which is distributed among the various countries as follows: (We will take 600,000,000,000.)
FINANCIAL SECURITIES CURRENT IN 1910
(In billions of francs)
Great Britain 142 Total 479
United States 132 ”
France 110 ”
Germany 95 ”
Russia 31
Austria-Hungary 24
Italy 14
Japan 12
Holland 12.5
Belgium 7.5
Spain 7.5
Switzerland 6.25
Denmark 3.75
Sweden, Norway, Rumania,
etc.
2.5
Total 600
¶36 From these figures we at once see standing out in sharp relief four of the richest capitalist countries, each of
which holds securities to amounts ranging approximately from 100 to 150 billion francs. Of these four countries, two,
England and France, are the oldest capitalist countries, and, as we shall see, possess the most colonies; the other two, the
United States and Germany, are leading capitalist countries as regards rapidity of development and the degree of
extension of capitalist monopolies in industry. Together, these four countries own 479,000,000,000 francs, that is, nearly
80 per cent of the world’s finance capital. In one way or another, nearly the whole of the rest of the world is more or less
21
the debtor to and tributary of these international banker countries, these four “pillars” of world finance capital.
¶37 It is particularly important to examine the part which the export of capital plays in creating the international
network of dependence and connections of finance capital.
IV. THE EXPORT OF CAPITAL
¶1 Typical of the old capitalism, when free competition had undivided sway, was the export of goods. Typical of the
latest stage of capitalism, when monopolies rule, is the export of capital.
¶2 Capitalism is commodity production at its highest stage of development, when labor power itself becomes a
commodity. The growth of internal exchange, and particularly of international exchange, is the characteristic
distinguishing feature of capitalism. Uneven and spasmodic development of individual enterprises, of individual
branches of industry and individual countries, is inevitable under the capitalist system. England became a capitalist
country before any other, and by the middle of the nineteenth century, having adopted free trade, claimed to be the
“workshop of the world,” the purveyor of manufactured goods to all countries, which in exchange were to keep her
supplied with raw materials. But in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, this monopoly was already undermined; for
other countries, sheltering themselves by “protective” tariffs, developed into independent capitalist states. On the
threshold of the twentieth century we see the formation of a new type of monopoly: firstly, monopolist capitalist
combines in all capitalistically developed countries; secondly, the monopolist position of a few very rich countries, in
which the accumulation of capital has reached gigantic proportions. An enormous “superabundance of capital” has arisen
in the advanced countries.
¶3 It goes without saying that if capitalism could develop agriculture, which today frightfully lags behind industry
everywhere, if it could raise the standard of living of the masses, who are everywhere still half-starved and
poverty-stricken, in spite of the amazing technical progress, there could be no talk of a superabundance of capital. This
“argument” is very often advanced by the petty-bourgeois critics of capitalism. But if capitalism did these things it would
not be capitalism; for both uneven development and a semi-starvation level of existence of the masses are fundamental
and inevitable conditions and premises of this mode of production. As long as capitalism remains what it is, surplus
capital will be utilized not for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the masses in a given country, for this
would mean a decline in profits for the capitalists, but for the purpose of increasing profits by exporting capital abroad to
the backward countries. In these backward countries profits are usually high, for capital is scarce, the price of land is
relatively low, wages are low, raw materials are cheap. The possibility of exporting capital is created by the fact that a
number of backward countries have already been drawn into world capitalist intercourse; main railways have either been
or are being built there, the elementary conditions for industrial development have been created, etc. The necessity for
exporting capital arises from the fact that in a few countries capitalism has become “overripe” and (owing to the
backward stage of agriculture and the impoverished state of the masses) capital cannot find a field for “profitable”
investment.
¶4 Here are approximate figures showing the amount of capital invested abroad by the three principal countries:*
[Hobson. Imperialism, London, 1902, p. 58; Riesser, op. cit., pp. 395 and 404; P. Arndt in Weltwirtschaftlicbes Archiv,
Bd. 7, 1916, S. 35, Neymarck in Bulletin; Hilferding. Finance Capital, p. 492; Lloyd George, Speech in the House of
Commons, May 4, 1915, reported in the Daily Telegraph, May 5, 1915; B. Harms, Probleme der Weltwirtschaft, Jena,
1912, S. 235 et seq., Dr. Siegmund Schilder, Entwicklungstendenzen der Weltwirtschaft (Trends of Development of
World Economy–Tr.), Berlin, 1912, Band I, S. 150; George Paish, “Great Britain’s Capital Investments, etc.,” in Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. LXXIV, 1910-11, p. 67 et seq.; Georges Diouritch, L’expansion des barques
allemandes a l’etranger, ses rapports avec le developpement economique de 1’Allemagne (Expansion of German Banks
Abroad in Connection with the Economic Development of Germany–Tr.), Paris, 1909, p. 84.]
CAPITAL INVESTED ABROAD
(In billions of francs)
Year Great Britain France Germany
1862 3.6 — —
1872 15.0 10 (1869) —
1882 22.0 15 (1880) ?
22
1893 42.0 20 (1890) ?
1902 62.0 27-37 12.5
1914 75-100.0 60 44.0
¶5 This table shows that the export of capital reached formidable dimensions only in the beginning of the twentieth
century. Before the war the capital invested abroad by the three principal countries amounted to between
175,000,000,000 and 200,000,000,000 francs. At the modest rate of 5 per cent, the income from this sum should have
reached from 8 to 10 billion francs a year. A solid basis for imperialist oppression and the exploitation of most of the
countries and nations of the world, for the capitalist parasitism of a handful of wealthy states!
¶6 How is this capital invested abroad distributed among the various countries? Where is it invested? Only an
approximate answer can be given to this question, but one sufficient to throw light on certain general relations and
connections of modern imperialism.
APPROXIMATE DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN CAPITAL
(ABOUT 1910)
(In billions of marks)
Great Britain France Germany Total
Europe 4 23 18 45
America 37 4 10 51
Asia, Africa and
Australia
29 8 7 44
Total 70 35 35 140
¶7 The principal spheres of investment of British capital are the British colonies, which are very large also in
America (for example, Canada) not to mention Asia, etc. In this case, enormous exports of capital are bound up most
closely with vast colonies, of the importance of which for imperialism we shall speak later. In the case of France the
situation is different. French capital exports are invested mainly in Europe, primarily in Russia (at least ten billion
francs). This is mainly loan capital, government loans and not investments in industrial undertakings. Unlike British,
colonial imperialism, French imperialism might be termed usury imperialism. In the case of Germany, we have a third
type; colonies are inconsiderable, and German capital invested abroad is divided most evenly between Europe and
America.
¶8 The export of capital affects and greatly accelerates the development of capitalism in those countries to which it
is exported. While, therefore, the export of capital may tend to a certain extent to arrest development in the capital
exporting countries, it can only do so by expanding and deepening the further development of capitalism throughout the
world.
¶9 The countries which export capital are nearly always able to obtain certain “advantages,” the character of which
throws light on the peculiarity of the epoch of finance capital and monopoly. The following passage, for instance,
occurred in the Berlin review, Die Bank, for October 1913:
¶10 “A comedy worthy of the pen of Aristophanes is lately being played on the international capital market.
Numerous foreign countries, from Spain to the Balkan states, from Russia to Argentina, Brazil and China, are openly or
secretly coming into the big money market with demands, sometimes very persistent, for loans. The money market-is not
very bright at the moment and the political outlook is not promising. But not a single money market dares to refuse a
foreign loan for fear that its neighbor may forestall it, consent to grant a loan and so secure some reciprocal service. In
these international transactions the creditor nearly always manages to secure some extra benefit: a favorable clause in a
commercial treaty, a coaling station, a contract to construct a harbor, a fat concession, or an order for guns.”* [Die Bank,
1913, 2, p. 1024. ]
¶11 Finance capital has created the epoch of monopolies, and monopolies introduce everywhere monopolist
principles: the utilization of “connections” for profitable transactions takes the place of competition on the open market.
The most usual thing is to stipulate that part of the loan that is granted shall be spent on purchases in the creditor country,
23
particularly on orders for war materials, or for ships, etc. In the course of the last two decades (1890-1910), France has
very often resorted to this method. The export of capital abroad thus becomes a means for encouraging the export of
commodities. In this connection, transactions between particularly big firms assume a form which, as Schilder**
[Schilder, op. cit., pp. 346, 350 and 371.] “mildly” puts it, “borders on corruption.” Krupp in Germany, Schneider in
France, Armstrong in England are instances of firms which have close connections with powerful banks and
governments and cannot easily be “ignored” when a loan is being arranged.
¶12 France, when granting loans to Russia, “squeezed” her in concluding the commercial treaty of September 16,
1905, in which she stipulated for certain concessions to run till 1917. She did the same thing when the Franco-Japanese
commercial treaty was concluded on August 19, 1911. The tariff war between Austria and Serbia, which lasted with a
seven months’ interval, from 1906 to 1911, was partly caused by competition between Austria and France for supplying
Serbia with war materials. In January 1912, Paul Deschanel stated in the Chamber of Deputies that from 1908 to 1911
French firms had supplied war materials to Serbia to the value of 45,000,000 francs.
¶13 A report from the Austro-Hungarian Consul at Sao-Paulo (Brazil) states: “The construction of the Brazilian
railways is being carried out chiefly by French, Belgian, British and German capital. In the financial operations
connected with the construction of these railways the countries involved stipulate for orders for the necessary railway
materials.”
¶14 Thus finance capital, literally, one might say, spreads its net over all countries of the world. An important role
in this is played by banks founded in the colonies and by their branches. German imperialists look with envy at the “old”
colonizing countries which have been particularly “successful” in providing for themselves in this respect. In 1904 Great
Britain had 50 colonial banks with 2,279 branches (in 1910 there were 72 banks with 5,449 branches), France had 20
with 136 branches; Holland 16 with 68 branches; and Germany had “only” 13 with 70 branches.* [Riesser, op. cit., 4th
ea., p. 375; Diouritch, p. 283.] The American capitalists, in their turn, are jealous of the English and German: “In South
America,” they complained in 1915, “five German banks have forty branches and five English banks have seventy
branches…. England and Germany have invested in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in the last twenty-five years
approximately four thousand million dollars, and as a result enjoy together 46 per cent of the total trade of these three
countries.”** [ The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. LIX, May 1915, p. 301. In the
same volume on p. 331, we read that the well-known statistician Paish, in the last issue of the financial magazine The
Statist, estimated the amount of capital exported by England, Germany, France, Belgium and Holland at
$40,000,000,000, i.e., 200,000,000,000 francs. ]
¶15 The capital exporting countries have divided the world among themselves in the figurative sense of the term.
But finance capital has led to the actual division of the world.
V. THE DIVISION OF THE WORLD AMONG CAPITALIST
COMBINES
¶1 Monopolist capitalist combines, cartels, syndicates and trusts divide among themselves, first of all, the home market,
seize more or less complete possession of the industry of a country. But under capitalism the home market is inevitably
bound up with the foreign market. Capitalism long ago created a world market. As the export of capital increased, and as
the foreign and colonial connections and “spheres of influence” of the big monopolist combines expanded in all ways,
things “naturally” gravitated towards an international agreement among these combines, and towards the formation of
international cartels.
¶2 This is a new stage of world concentration of capital and production, incomparably higher than the preceding
stages. Let us see how this supermonopoly develops.
¶3 The electrical industry is the most typical of the latest technical achievements, most typical of capitalism at the
end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries.
¶4 This industry has developed most in the two most advanced of the new capitalist countries, the United States
and Germany. In Germany, the crisis of 1900 gave a particularly strong impetus to its concentration. During the crisis,
the banks, which by this time had become fairly well merged with industry, enormously accelerated and intensified the
ruin of relatively small firms and their absorption by the large ones. “The banks,” writes Jeidels, “in refusing a helping
hand to the very companies which are in greatest need of capital bring on first a frenzied boom and then the hopeless
failure of the companies which have not been attached to them closely enough.”* [Jeidels, op. Cit., p. 232]
¶5 As a result, after 1900, concentration in Germany progressed with giant strides. Up to 1900 there had been eight
24
or seven “groups” in the electrical industry. Each consisted of several companies (altogether there were 28) and each was
backed by from 2 to 11 banks. Between 1908 and 1912 all these groups were merged into two, or one. The diagram
below shows the process:
GROUPS IN THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY
Prior to
1900:
Felten &
Guillaume
Lahmeyer Union
A.E.G.
Siemens &
Halske
Schuckert &
Co.
Bergmann Kummer
Felten & Lahmeyer A.E.G (Gen. El.
Co.)
Siemens &
Halske-Schuckert
Bergmann Failed in
1900
By 1912: A.E.G. (General Electric Co.) Siemens & Halske-Schuckert
(In close “cooperation” since 1908)
¶6 The famous A.E.G. (General Electric Company), which grew up in this way, controls 175 to 200 companies
(through the “holding” system), and a total capital of approximately 1,500,000,000 marks. Of direct agencies abroad
alone, it has thirty-four, of which twelve are joint-stock companies, in more than ten countries. As early as 1904 the
amount of capital invested abroad by the German electrical industry was estimated at 233,000,000 marks. Of this sum,
62,000,000 were invested in Russia. Needless to say, the A.E.G. is a huge “combine”–its manufacturing companies
alone number no less than sixteen–producing the most diverse articles, from cables and insulators to motor cars and
flying machines.
¶7 But concentration in Europe was also a component part of the process of concentration in America, which
developed in the following way:
General Electric Company
United
States:
Thomson-Houston Co.
establishes a firm in Europe
Edison Co. establishes in Europe the French Edison Co. which
transfers its patents to the German firm
Germany: Union Electric Co. General Electric Co. (A.E.G.)
General Electric Co. (A. E. G.)
¶8 Thus, two electrical “Great Powers” were formed: “there are no other electric companies in the world
completely independent of them,” wrote Heinig in his article “The Path of the Electric Trust.” An idea, although far from
complete, of the turnover and the size of the enterprises of the two “trusts” can be obtained from the following figures:
Turnover
(Mill. marks)
No. of employees Net profits
(Mill. marks)
America: General Electric
Co. (G.E.C.)
1907: 252 28,000 35.4
1910: 298 32,000 45.6
Germany: General Electric
Co. (A. E. G.)
1907: 216 30,700 14.5
1911: 362 60,800 21.7
¶9 Well, in 1907, the German and American trusts concluded an agreement by which they divided the world
between themselves. Competition between them ceased. The American General Electric Company (G.E.C.) “got” the
United States and Canada. The German General Electric Company (A.E.G.) “got” Germany, Austria, Russia, Holland,
25
Denmark, Switzerland, Turkey and the Balkans. Special agreements, naturally secret, were concluded regarding the
penetration of “daughter companies” into new branches of industry, into “new” countries formally not yet allotted. The
two trusts were to exchange inventions and experiments.* [Riesser, op. cit.; Diouritch, op. cit., p. 239; Kurt Heinig, op.
cit.]
¶10 The difficulty of competing against this trust, which is practically world-wide, controls a capital of several
billion, and has its “branches,” agencies, representatives, connections, etc., in every corner of the world, is self-evident.
But the division of the world between two powerful trusts does not preclude redivision if the relation of forces changes
as a result of uneven development, war, bankruptcy, etc.
¶11 An instructive example of attempts at such a redivision, of the struggle for redivision, is provided by the oil
industry.
¶12 “The world oil market,” wrote Jeidels in 1905, “is even today still divided between two great financial
groups–Rockefeller’s American Standard Oil Co., and Rothschild and Nobel, the controlling interests of the Russian oil
fields in Baku. The two groups are closely connected. But for several years five enemies have been threatening their
monopoly”:* [Jeidels, op. cit., p. 193.] 1) The exhaustion of the American oil fields; 2) the competition of the firm of
Mantashev of Baku; 3) the Austrian oil fields; 4) the Rumanian oil fields; 5) the overseas oil fields, particularly in the
Dutch colonies (the extremely rich firms, Samuel, and Shell, also connected with British capital). The three last groups
are connected with the big German banks, headed by the huge Deutsche Bank. These banks independently and
systematically developed the oil industry in Rumania, for example, in order to have a foothold of their “own.” In 1907,
the foreign capital invested in the Rumanian oil industry was estimated at 185,000,000 francs, of which 74,000,000 was
German capital.** [Diouritch, op. cit., p. 245. ]
¶13 A struggle began for the “division of the world,” as, in fact, it is called in economic literature. On one side, the
Rockefeller “oil trust,” wishing to capture everything, formed a “daughter company” right in Holland, and bought up oil
fields in the Dutch Indies, in order to strike at its principal enemy, the Anglo-Dutch Shell trust. On the other side, the
Deutsche Bank and the other German banks aimed at “retaining” Rumania “for themselves” and at uniting it with Russia
against Rockefeller. The latter possessed far more capital and an excellent system of oil transportation and distribution.
The struggle had to end, and did end in 1907, with the utter defeat of the Deutsche Bank, which was confronted with the
alternative: either to liquidate its “oil interests” and lose millions, or submit. It chose to submit, and concluded a very
disadvantageous agreement with the “oil trust.” The Deutsche Bank agreed “not to attempt anything which might injure
American interests.” Provision was made however, for the annulment of the agreement in the event of Germany
establishing a state oil monopoly.
¶14 Then the “comedy of oil” began. One of the German finance kings, von Gwinner, a director of the Deutsche
Bank through his private secretary, Stauss, launched a campaign for a state oil monopoly. The gigantic machine of the
huge German bank and all its wide “connections” were set in motion. The press bubbled over with “patriotic” indignation
against the “yoke” of the American trust, and, on March 15, 1911 the Reichstag by an almost unanimous vote, adopted a
motion asking the government to introduce a bill for the establishment of an oil monopoly. The government seized upon
this “popular” idea, and the game of the Deutsche Bank, which hoped to cheat its American partner and improve its
business by a state monopoly, appeared to have been won. The German oil magnates already saw visions of enormous
profits, which would not be less than those of the Russian sugar refiners…. But, firstly, the big German banks quarreled
among themselves over the division of the spoils. The Disconto-Gesellschaft exposed the covetous aims of the Deutsche
Bank; secondly, the government took fright at the prospect of a struggle with Rockefeller, for it was very doubtful
whether Germany could be sure of obtaining oil from other sources (the Rumanian output was small); thirdly, just at that
time the 1913 credits of a billion marks were voted for Germany’s war preparations. The oil monopoly project was
postponed. The Rockefeller “oil trust” came out of the struggle, for the time being, victorious.
¶15 The Berlin review, Die Bank, wrote in this connection that Germany could fight the oil trust only by
establishing an electricity monopoly and by converting water power into cheap electricity. “But,” the author added, “the
electricity monopoly will come when the producers need it, that is to say when the next great crash in the electrical
industry will be standing at the door, and when the gigantic, expensive electric stations which are now being put up at
great cost everywhere by private electrical ‘concerns,’ which are already obtaining partial monopolies from towns, from
states, etc., can no longer work at a profit. Water power will then have to be used. But it will be impossible to convert it
into cheap electricity at state expense; it will also have to be handed over to a ‘private monopoly controlled by the state,’
because private industry has already concluded a number of contracts and has stipulated for heavy compensation…. So it
was with the nitrate monopoly, so it is with the oil monopoly; so it will be with the electric power monopoly. It is time
our state socialists, who allow themselves to be blinded by a beautiful principle, understood, at last, that in Germany the
monopolies have never pursued the aim, nor have they had the result, of benefiting the consumer, or even of handing
over to the state part of the promoter’s profits; they have served only to facilitate at the expense of the state, the recovery
of private industries which were on the verge of bankruptcy.”* [Die Bank, 1912, 1, p. 1036; 1912, 2, p. 629; 1913, 1, p.
388.]
26
¶16 Such are the valuable admissions which the German bourgeois economists are forced to make. We see plainly
here how private and state monopolies are interwoven in the age of finance capital; how both are but separate links in the
imperialist struggle between the big monopolists for the division of the world.
¶17 In mercantile shipping, the tremendous development of concentration has ended also in the division of the
world. In Germany two powerful companies have come to the front: the Hamburg-Amerika and the Norddeutscher
Lloyd, each having a capital of 200,000,000 marks (in stocks and bonds) and possessing shipping tonnage to the value of
185 to 189 million marks. On the other side, in America, on January 1, 1903, the so-called Morgan trust, the
International Mercantile Marine Co., was formed which united nine American and British steamship companies, and
which possessed a capital of 120,000,000 dollars (480,000,000 marks). As early as 1903, the German giants and this
American-British trust concluded an agreement to divide the world in connection with the division of profits. The
German companies undertook not to compete in the Anglo-American traffic. Which ports were to be “allotted” to each
was precisely stipulated; a joint committee of control was set up, etc. This agreement was concluded for twenty years,
with the prudent provision for its annulment in the event of war.* [Riesser, op. cit., p. 125. ]
¶18 Extremely instructive also is the story of the formation of the International Rail Cartel. The first attempt of the
British, Belgian and German rail manufacturers to form such a cartel was made as early as 1884, during a severe
industrial depression. The manufacturers agreed not to compete with one another in the home markets of the countries
involved, and they divided the foreign markets in the following quotas: Great Britain 66 per cent; Germany 27 per cent;
Belgium 7 per cent. India was reserved entirely for Great Britain. Joint war was declared against a British firm which
remained outside the cartel, the cost of which was met by a percentage levy on all sales. But in 1886 the cartel collapsed
when two British firms retired from it. It is characteristic that agreement could not be achieved during subsequent boom
periods.
¶19 At the beginning of 1904, the German steel syndicate was formed. In November 1904, the International Rail
Cartel was revived, with the following quotas: England 53.5 per cent; Germany 28.83 per cent; Belgium 17.67 per cent.
France came in later and received 4.8 per cent, 5.8 per cent and 6.4 per cent in the first, second and third years
respectively, over and above the 100 per cent limit, i.e., out of a total of 104.8 per cent, etc. In 1905, the United States
Steel Corporation entered the cartel; then Austria and Spain. “At the present time,” wrote Vogelstein in 1910, “the
division of the world is completed, and the big consumers, primarily the state railways–since the world has been
parceled out without consideration for their interests–can now dwell like the poet in the heaven of Jupiter.”* [Vogelstein,
Organisationsformen, p. 100. ]
¶20 We will mention also the International Zinc Syndicate which was established in 1909 and which precisely
apportioned output among five groups of factories: German, Belgian, French, Spanish and British; and also the
International Dynamite Trust, which, Liefmann says, is “quite a modern, close alliance of all the German explosives
manufacturers who, with the French and American dynamite manufacturers, organized in a similar manner, have divided
the whole world among themselves, so to speak.”** [Liefmann, Kartelle und Trusts, 2. A.., p. 161.]
¶21 Liefmann calculated that in 1897 there were altogether about forty international cartels in which Germany had a
share, while in 1910 there were about a hundred.
¶22 Certain bourgeois writers (whom K. Kautsky, who has completely abandoned the Marxist position he held, for
example, in 1909, has now joined) have expressed the opinion that international cartels, being one of the most striking
expressions of the internationalization of capital, give the hope of peace among nations under capitalism. Theoretically,
this opinion is absolutely absurd, while in practice it is sophistry and a dishonest defense of the worst opportunism.
International cartels show to what point capitalist monopolies have developed, and the object of the struggle between the
various capitalist combines. This last circumstance is the most important, it alone shows us the historico-economic
meaning of what is taking place; for the forms of the struggle may and do constantly change in accordance with varying,
relatively particular and temporary causes, but the substance of the struggle, its class content, positively cannot change
while classes exist. Naturally, it is in the interests of, for example, the German bourgeoisie, to whose side Kautsky has in
effect gone over in his theoretical arguments (we will deal with this later), to obscure the substance of the present
economic struggle (the division of the world) and to emphasize now this and now another form of the struggle. Kautsky
makes the same mistake. Of course, we have in mind not only the German bourgeoisie, but the bourgeoisie all over the
world. The capitalists divide the world, not out of any particular malice, but because the degree of concentration which
has been reached forces them to adopt this method in order to obtain profits. And they divide it “in proportion to capital,”
“in proportion to strength,” because there cannot be any other method of division under commodity production and
capitalism. But strength varies with the degree of economic and political development. In order to understand what is
taking place, it is necessary to know what questions are settled by the changes in strength. The question as to whether
these changes are “purely” economic or non-economic (e.g., military) is a secondary one, which cannot in the least affect
the fundamental views on the latest epoch of capitalism. To substitute the question of the form of the struggle and
agreements (today peaceful, tomorrow warlike, the next day warlike again) for the question of the substance of the
struggle and agreements between capitalist combines is to sink to the role of a sophist.
27
¶23 The epoch of the latest stage of capitalism shows us that certain relations between capitalist combines grow up,
based on the economic division of the world, while parallel and in connection with it, certain relations grow up between
political combines, between states, on the basis of the territorial division of the world, of the struggle for colonies, of the
“struggle for economic territory.”
VI. THE DIVISION OF THE WORLD AMONG THE GREAT POWERS
¶1 In his book, on “the territorial development of the European colonies,” A. Supan,* [A. Supan, Die territoriale
Entwicklung der europäischen Kolonien, 1906, p. 254.] the geographer, gives the following brief summary of this
development at the end of the nineteenth century:
PERCENTAGE OF TERRITORY BELONGING TO THE EUROPEAN COLONIAL POWERS (INCLUDING THE
UNITED STATES)
1876 1900 Increase or decrease
In Africa 10.8% 90.4%
0.796
” Polynesia 56.8% 98.9%
0.421
” Asia 51.5% 56.6%
0.051
” Australia 100.0% 100.0% —
” America 27.5% 27.2% – 0.3%
¶2 “The characteristic feature of this period,” he concludes, “is, therefore, the division of Africa and Polynesia.” As
there are no unoccupied territories–that is, territories that do not belong to any state–in Asia and America, it is necessary
to amplify Supan’s conclusion and say that the characteristic feature of the period under review is the final partition of
the globe–final, not in the sense that a repartition is impossible; on the contrary, repartitions are possible and
inevitable–but in the sense that the colonial policy of the capitalist countries has completed the seizure of the unoccupied
territories on our planet. For the first time the world is completely divided up, so that in the future only redivision is
possible, i.e., territories can only pass from one “owner” to another, instead of passing as ownerless territory to an
“owner.”
¶3 Hence, we are passing through a peculiar epoch of world colonial policy, which is most closely connected with
the “latest stage in the development of capitalism,” with finance capital. For this reason, it is essential first of all to deal
in greater detail with the facts, in order to ascertain as exactly as possible what distinguishes this epoch from those
preceding it, and what the present situation is. In the first place, two questions of fact arise here: is an intensification of
colonial policy, a sharpening of the struggle for colonies, observed precisely in this epoch of finance capital? And how,
in this respect, is the world divided at the present time?
¶4 The American writer, Morris, in his book on the history of colonization,* [Henry C. Morris, The History of
Colonization, New York, 1900, Vol. II, p. 88; Vol. I, p. 419; Vol. II, p. 304.] has made an attempt to sum up the data on
the colonial possessions of Great Britain, France and Germany during different periods of the nineteenth century. The
following is a brief summary of the results he has obtained:
COLONIAL POSSESSIONS
Year Great Britain France Germany
Area (mill. sq.m.) Pop.(mill.) Area (mill.
sq.m.)
Pop. (mill.) Area (mill.
sq.m.)
Pop. (mill.)
1815-30 ? 126.4 0.02 0.5 _ _
1860 2.5 145.1 0.2 3.4 _ _
28
1880 7.7 267.9 0.7 7.5 _ _
1899 9.3 309.0 3.7 56.4 1.0 14.7
¶5 For Great Britain, the period of the enormous expansion of colonial conquests is that between 1860 and 1880,
and it was also very considerable in the last twenty years of the nineteenth century. For France and Germany this period
falls precisely in these twenty years. We saw above that the development of premonopolist-capitalism, of capitalism in
which free competition was predominant, reached its limit in the 1860’s and 1870’s. We now see that it is precisely after
that period that the tremendous “boom” in colonial conquests begins, and that the struggle for the territorial division of
the world becomes extraordinarily keen. It is beyond doubt, therefore, that capitalism’s transition to the stage of
monopoly capitalism, to finance capital, is connected with the intensification of the struggle for the partition of the
world.
¶6 Hobson, in his work on imperialism, marks the years 1884-1900 as the epoch of intensified “expansion” of the
chief European states. According to his estimate, Great Britain during these years acquired 3,700,000 square miles of
territory with a population of 57,000,000; France acquired 3,600,000 square miles with a population of 36,500,000;
Germany 1,000,000 square miles with a population of 14,700,000; Belgium 900,000 square miles with 30,000,000
inhabitants
¶7 Portugal 800,000 square miles with 9,000,000 inhabitants. The pursuit of colonies by all the capitalist states at
the end of the nineteenth century and particularly since the 1880’s is a commonly known fact in the history of diplomacy
and of foreign politics.
¶8 In the most flourishing period of free competition in Great Britain, i.e., between 1840 and 1860, the leading
British bourgeois politicians were opposed to colonial policy and were of the opinion that the liberation of the colonies,
their complete separation from Britain was inevitable and desirable. M. Beer, in an article, “Modern British
Imperialism,”* [Die Neue Zeù, XVI, I, 1898, S. 302.] published in 1898, shows that in 1852, Disraeli, a statesman who
was generally inclined towards imperialism, declared: “The colonies are millstones round our necks.” But at the end of
the nineteenth century the heroes of the hour in England were Cecil Rhodes and Joseph Chamberlain, who openly
advocated imperialism and applied the imperialist policy in the most cynical manner!
¶9 It is not without interest to observe that already at that time these leading British bourgeois politicians saw the
connection between what might be called the purely economic and the politico-social roots of modern imperialism.
Chamberlain advocated imperialism as a “true, wise and economical policy,” and pointed particularly to the German,
American and Belgian competition which Great Britain was encountering in the world market. Salvation lies in
monopolies, said the capitalists as they formed cartels, syndicates and trusts. Salvation lies in monopolies, echoed the
political leaders of the bourgeoisie, hastening to appropriate the parts of the world not yet shared out. And Cecil Rhodes,
we are informed by his intimate friend, the journalist Stead, expressed his imperialist views to him in 1895 in the
following terms: “I was in the East End of London” (working-class quarter) “yesterday and attended a meeting of the
unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, which were just a cry for ‘bread,’ ‘bread!’ and on my way home I pondered
over the scene and I became more than ever convinced of the importance of imperialism…. My cherished idea is a
solution for the social problem, i.e., in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody
civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the
goods produced in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want
to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists.”* [lbid., S. 304. ]
¶10 This is what Cecil Rhodes, millionaire, a king of finance, the man who was mainly responsible for the
Anglo-Boer War, said in 1895. True, his defence of imperialism is crude and cynical, but in substance it does not differ
from the “theory” advocated by Messrs. Maslov, Südekum, Potressov, David and the founder of Russian Marxism, and
others. Cecil Rhodes was a somewhat more honest social-chauvinist….
¶11 To present as precise a picture as possible of the territorial division of the world and of the changes which have
occurred during the last decades in this respect, we will utilize the data furnished by Supan in the work already quoted on
the colonial possessions of all the powers of the world. Supan takes the years 1876 and 1900; we will take the year 1876
– a year very aptly selected, for it is precisely by that time that the premonopolist stage of development of
West-European capitalism can be said to have been completed, in the main–and the year 1914, and instead of Supan’s
figures we will quote the more recent statistics of Hübner’s Geographical and Statistical Tables. Supan gives figures
only for colonies; we think it useful, in order to present a complete picture of the division of the world, to add brief
figures on non-colonial and semicolonial countries, in which category we place Persia, China and Turkey: the first of
these countries is already almost completely a colony, the second and third are becoming such.
¶12 We thus get the following summary:
29
COLONIAL POSSESSIONS OP THE GREAT POWERS
(Million square kilometers and million inhabitants)
Colonies Metropolitan
countries
Total
1876 1914 1914 1914
Area Pop. Area Pop. Area Pop. Area Pop.
Great Britain 22.5 251.9 33.5 393.5 0.3 46.5 33.8 440.0
Russia 17.0 15.9 17.4 33.2 5.4 136.2 22.8 169.4
France 0.9 6.0 10.6 55.5 0.5 39.6 11.1 95.1
Germany — — 2.9 12.3 0.5 64.9 3.4 77.2
U.S.A. — — 0.3 9.7 9.4 97.0 9.7 106.7
Japan — — 0.3 19.2 0.4 53.0 0.7 72.2
Total for 6 Great
Powers
40.4 273.8 65.0 523.4 16.5 437.2 81.5 960.6
Colonies of other powers (Belgium, Holland, etc.) 9.9 45.3
Semicolonial countries (Persia, China, Turkey)
14.5 361.2
Other countries
28.0 289.9
Total for whole world 133.9 1,657.0
¶13 We clearly see from these figures how “complete” was the partition of the world on the border line between the
nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. After 1876 colonial possessions increased to enormous dimensions, more than
fifty per cent, from 40,000,000 to 25,000,000 square kilometers in area for the six biggest powers; the increase amounts
to 25,000,000 square kilometers, fifty per cent larger than the area of the metropolitan countries (16,500,000 square
kilometers). In 1876 three powers had no colonies, and a fourth, France, had scarcely any. By 1914 these four powers
had acquired colonies of an area of 14,100,000 square kilometers, i.e., about kitty per cent larger than that of Europe,
with a population of nearly 100,000,000. The unevenness in the rate of expansion of colonial possessions is very great.
If, for instance, we compare France, Germany and Japan, which do not differ very much in area and population, we will
see that the first has acquired almost three times as much colonial territory as the other two combined. In regard to
finance capital, France, at the beginning of the period we are considering, was also, perhaps, several times richer than
Germany and Japan put together. In addition to, and on the basis of, purely economic conditions, geographical and other
conditions also affect the dimensions of colonial possessions. However strong the process of leveling the world, of
leveling the economic and living conditions in different countries, may have been in the past decades as a result of the
pressure of large-scale industry, exchange and finance capital, considerable differences still remain; and among the six
powers mentioned we see, firstly, young capitalist countries (America, Germany, Japan) whose progress has been
extraordinarily rapid; secondly, countries with an old capitalist development (France and Great Britain), whose progress
lately has been much slower than that of the previously mentioned countries, and thirdly, a country which is
economically most backward (Russia), where modern capitalist imperialism is enmeshed, so to speak, in a particularly
close network of precapitalist relations.
¶14 Alongside the colonial possessions of the Great Powers, we have placed the small colonies of the small states,
which are, so to speak, the next objects of a possible and probable “redivision” of colonies. Most of these small states are
able to retain their colonies only because of the conflicting interests, friction, etc., among the big powers, which prevent
them from coming to an agreement in regard to the division of the spoils. The “semicolonial” states provide an example
of the transitional forms which are to be found in all spheres of nature and society. Finance capital is such a great, it may
be said, such a decisive force in all economic and in all international relations, that it is capable of subjecting, and
30
actually does subject to itself even states enjoying the fullest political independence; we shall shortly see examples of
this. Of course, finance capital finds most “convenient,” and is able to extract the greatest profit from such a subjection
as involves the loss of the political independence of the subjected countries and peoples. In this connection, the
semicolonial countries provide a typical example of the “middle stage.” It is natural that the struggle for these
semidependent countries should have become particularly bitter in the epoch of finance capital, when the rest of the
world has already been divided up.
¶15 Colonial policy and imperialism existed before this latest stage of capitalism, and even before capitalism. Rome,
founded on slavery, pursued a colonial policy and practiced imperialism. But “general” disquisitions on imperialism,
which ignore, or put into the background, the fundamental difference between social-economic systems, inevitably
degenerate into the most vapid banality or bragging, like the comparison: “Greater Rome and Greater Britain.”* [C. P.
Lucas, Greater Rome and Greater Britain, Oxford, 1912 or the Earl of Cromer’s Ancient and Modern Imperialism,
London, 1910.] Even the capitalist colonial policy of previous stages of capitalism is essentially different from the
colonial policy of finance capital.
¶16 The principal feature of the latest stage of capitalism is the domination of monopolist combines of the big
capitalists. These monopolies are most firmly established when all the sources of raw materials are captured by one
group, and we have seen with what zeal the international capitalist combines exert every effort to make it impossible for
their rivals to compete with them by buying up, for example, iron ore fields, oil fields, etc. Colonial possession alone
gives the monopolies complete guarantee against all contingencies in the struggle with competitors, including the
contingency that the latter will defend themselves by means of a law establishing a state monopoly. The more capitalism
is developed, the more strongly the shortage of raw materials is felt, the more intense the competition and the hunt for
sources of raw materials throughout the whole world, the more desperate is the struggle for the acquisition of colonies.
¶17 “It may be asserted,” writes Schilder, “although it may sound paradoxical to some, that in the more or less
discernible future the growth of the urban and industrial population is more likely to be hindered by a shortage of raw
materials for industry than by a shortage of food.” For example, there is a growing shortage of timber–the price of which
is steadily rising–of leather, and of raw materials for the textile industry.
¶18 “Associations of manufacturers are making efforts to create an equilibrium between agriculture and industry in
the whole of world economy; as an example of this we might mention the International Federation of Cotton Spinners’
Associations in several of the most important industrial countries, founded in 1904, and the European Federation of Flax
Spinners’ Associations, founded on the same model in 1910.”* [Schilder, op. cit., pp. 38-42.]
¶19 The bourgeois reformists, and among them particularly the present-day adherents of Kautsky, of course, try to
belittle the importance of facts of this kind by arguing that it “would be possible” to obtain raw materials in the open
market without a “costly and dangerous” colonial policy; and that it “would be possible” to increase the supply of raw
materials to an enormous extent “simply” by improving conditions in agriculture in general. But such arguments become
an apology for imperialism, an attempt to embellish it, because they ignore the principal feature of the latest stage of
capitalism: monopolies. Free markets are becoming more and more a thing of the past; monopolist syndicates and trusts
are restricting them more and more every day, and “simply” improving conditions in agriculture means improving the
conditions of the masses, raising wages and reducing profits. Where, except in the imagination of sentimental reformists,
are there any trusts capable of interesting themselves in the condition of the masses instead of the conquest of colonies?
¶20 Finance capital is interested not only in the already discovered sources of raw materials but also in potential
sources, because present-day technical development is extremely rapid, and land which is useless today may be made
fertile tomorrow if new methods are applied (to devise these new methods a big bank can equip a special expedition of
engineers, agricultural experts, etc.), and if large amounts of capital are invested. This also applies to prospecting for
minerals, to new methods of working up and utilizing raw materials, etc., etc. Hence, the inevitable striving of finance
capital to enlarge its economic territory and even its territory in general. In the same way that the trusts capitalize their
property at two or three times its value, taking into account its “potential” (and not present) profits, and the further results
of monopoly, so finance capital strives in general to seize the largest possible amount of land of all kinds in all places,
and by every means, taking into account potential sources of raw materials and fearing to be left behind in the fierce
struggle for the last scraps of undivided territory, or for the repartition of those that have been already divided.
¶21 The British capitalists are exerting every effort to develop cotton growing in their colony, Egypt (in 1904, out of
2,300,000 hectares of land under cultivation, 600,000, or more than one-fourth, were devoted to cotton growing); the
Russians are doing the same in their colony, Turkestan, because in this way they will be in a better position to defeat
their foreign competitors, to monopolize the sources of raw materials and form a more economical and profitable textile
trust in which all the processes of cotton production and manufacturing will be “combined” and concentrated in the
hands of one set of owners.
¶22 The interests pursued in exporting capital also give an impetus to the conquest of colonies, for in the colonial
market it is easier to employ monopolist methods (and sometimes they are the only methods that can be employed) to
31
eliminate competition, to make sure of contracts, to secure the necessary “connections,” etc.
¶23 The non-economic superstructure which grows up on the basis of finance capital, its politics and its ideology,
stimulates the striving for colonial conquest. “Finance capital does not want liberty, it wants domination,” as Hilferding
very truly says. And a French bourgeois writer, developing and supplementing, as it were, the ideas of Cecil Rhodes
quoted above, [14] writes that social causes should be added to the economic causes of modern colonial policy: “owing
to the growing complexities of life and the difficulties which weigh not only on the masses of the workers” but also on
the middle classes, ‘impatience, irritation and hatred are accumulating in all the countries of the old civilization and are
becoming a menace to public order; the energy which is being hurled out of the definite class channel must be given
employment abroad in order to avert an explosion at home.'”* [Wahl, La France aux colonies (France in the
Colonies–Tr.), quoted by Henri Russier, Le partage de l’Océanie (The Partition of Oceania–Tr.), Paris, 1905, p. 165]
¶24 Since we are speaking of colonial policy in the epoch of capitalist imperialism, it must be observed that finance
capital and its corresponding foreign policy, which reduces itself to the struggle of the Great Powers for the economic
and political division of the world, give rise to a number of transitional forms of state dependence. Typical of this epoch
is not only the two main groups of countries: those owning colonies, and colonies, but also the diverse forms of
dependent countries which, officially, are politically independent, but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and
diplomatic dependence. We have already referred to one form of dependence–the semicolony. An example of another is
provided by Argentina.
¶25 “South America, and especially Argentina,” writes Schulze-Gaevernitz in his work on British imperialism, “is
so dependent financially on London that it ought to be described as almost a British commercial colony.”*
[Schulze-Gaevernitz, Britischer Imperialismus und engliseber Freihandel zu Beginn des 20-ten Jabrhunderts (British
Imperialism and English Free Trade at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century–Tr.), Leipzig, 1906, p. ’18. Sartorius v.
Waltershausen says the same in Das volkswirtschaftiche System der Kapitalanlage im Auslande (The National Economic
System of Capital Investments Abroad–Tr.), Berlin, 1907, p. 46.] Basing himself on the report of the Austro-Hungarian
consul at Buenos Aires for 1909, Schilder estimates the amount of British capital invested in Argentina at 8,750,000
francs. It is not difficult to imagine what strong connections British finance capital (and its faithful “friend,” diplomacy)
thereby acquires with the Argentine bourgeoisie, with the circles that control the whole of that country’s economic and
political life.
¶26 A somewhat different form of financial and diplomatic dependence, accompanied by political independence, is
presented by Portugal. Portugal is an independent sovereign state, but actually, for more than two hundred years, since
the war of the Spanish Succession (1701-14), it has been a British protectorate. Great Britain has protected Portugal and
her colonies in order to fortify her own positions in the fight against her rivals, Spain and France. In return Great Britain
has received commercial privileges, preferential conditions for importing goods and especially capital into Portugal and
the Portuguese colonies, the right to use the ports and islands of Portugal, her telegraph cables, etc.** [Schilder, op. cit.,
Vol. 1, pp. 160-61.] Relations of this kind have always existed between big and little states, but in the epoch of capitalist
imperialism they become a general system, they form part of the sum total of “divide the world” relations, become links
in the chain of operations of world finance capital.
¶27 In order to finish with the question of the division of the world, we must make the following additional
observation. This question was raised quite openly and definitely not only in American literature after the
Spanish-American War, and in English literature after the Anglo-Boer War, at the very end of the nineteenth century and
the beginning of the twentieth; not only has German literature, which has “most jealously” watched “British
imperialism,” systematically given its appraisal of this fact; it has also been raised in French bourgeois literature in terms
as wide and definite as they can be made from the bourgeois point of view. We will quote Driault, the historian, who, in
his book, Political and Social Problems at the End of the Nineteenth Century, in the chapter “The Great Powers and the
Division of the World,” wrote the following: “During the past few years, all the free territory of the globe, with the
exception of China, has been occupied by the powers of Europe and North America. Several conflicts and displacements
of influence have already occurred over this matter, which foreshadow more terrible upheavals in the near future. For it
is necessary to make haste. The nations which have not yet made provision for themselves run the risk of never receiving
their share and never participating in the tremendous exploitation of the globe which will be one of the most essential
features of the next century” (i.e., the twentieth). “That is why all Europe and America have lately been afflicted with the
fever of colonial expansion, of ‘imperialism,’ that most noteworthy feature of the end of the nineteenth century.” And the
author added: “In this partition of the world, in this furious hunt for the treasures and the big markets of the globe, the
relative power of the empires founded in this nineteenth century is totally out of proportion to the place occupied in
Europe by the nations which founded them. The dominant powers in Europe, the arbiters of her destiny, are not equally
preponderant in the whole world. And, as colonial power, the hope of controlling as yet unassessed wealth, will evidently
react upon the relative strength of the European powers, the colonial question–‘imperialism,’ if you will– which has
already modified the political conditions of Europe itself, will modify them more and more.”* [J. I. Driault, Problèmes
politiques et sociaux, Paris, 1907 p. 299.]
32
VII. IMPERIALISM, AS A SPECIAL STAGE OF CAPITALISM
¶1 We must now try to sum up, put together, what has been said above on the subject of imperialism. Imperialism
emerged as the development and direct continuation of the fundamental characteristics of capitalism in general. But
capitalism only became capitalist imperialism at a definite and very high stage of its development, when certain of its
fundamental characteristics began to change into their opposites, when the features of the epoch of transition from
capitalism to a higher social and economic system had taken shape and revealed themselves all along the line.
Economically, the main thing in this process is the displacement of capitalist free competition by capitalist monopoly.
Free competition is the fundamental characteristic of capitalism, and of commodity production generally; monopoly is
the exact opposite of free competition, but we have seen the latter being transformed into monopoly before our eyes,
creating large-scale industry and forcing out small industry, replacing large-scale by still larger-scale industry, and
carrying concentration of production and capital to the point where out of it has grown and is growing monopoly: cartels,
syndicates and trusts, and merging with them, the capital of a dozen or so banks, which manipulate thousands of millions
At the same time the monopolies, which have grown out of free competition, do not eliminate the latter, but exist over it
and alongside of it, and thereby give rise to a number of very acute, intense antagonisms, frictions and conflicts.
Monopoly is the transition from capitalism to a higher system.
¶2 If it were necessary to give the briefest possible definition of imperialism we should have to say that
imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism. Such a definition would include what is most important, for, on the one
hand, finance capital is the bank capital of a few very big monopolist banks, merged with the capital of the monopolist
combines of industrialists; and, on the other hand, the division of the world is the transition from a colonial policy which
has extended without hindrance to territories unseized by any capitalist power, to a colonial policy of monopolistic
possession of the territory of the world which has been completely divided up.
¶3 But very brief definitions, although convenient, for they sum up the main points, are nevertheless inadequate,
since very important features of the phenomenon that has to be defined have to be especially deduced. And so, without
forgetting the conditional and relative value of all definitions in general, which can never embrace all the concatenations
of a phenomenon in its complete development, we must give a definition of imperialism that will include the following
five of its basic features: 1) the concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has
created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; 2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital,
and the creation, on the basis of this “finance capital,” of a financial oligarchy; 3) the export of capital as distinguished
from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance; 4) the formation of international monopolist capitalist
combines which share the world among themselves, and 5) the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest
capitalist powers is completed. Imperialism is capitalism in that stage of development in which the dominance of
monopolies and finance capital has established itself; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance;
in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun; in which the division of all territories of the
globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed.
¶4 We shall see later that imperialism can and must be defined differently if we bear in mind, not only the basic,
purely economic concepts–to which the above definition is limited–but also the historical place of this stage of
capitalism in relation to capitalism in general, or the relation between imperialism and the two main trends in the
working-class movement. The point to be noted just now is that imperialism, as interpreted above, undoubtedly
represents a special stage in the development of capitalism. To enable the reader to obtain the most well-grounded idea
of imperialism possible, we deliberately tried to quote as largely as possible bourgeois economists who are obliged to
admit the particularly incontrovertible facts concerning the latest stage of capitalist economy. With the same object in
view, we have quoted detailed statistics which enable one to see to what degree bank capital, etc., has grown, in what
precisely the transformation of quantity into quality, of developed capitalism into imperialism, was expressed. Needless
to say, of course, all boundaries in nature and in society are conditional and changeable, that it would be absurd to argue,
for example, about the particular year or decade in which imperialism “definitely” became established.
¶5 In the matter of defining imperialism, however, we have to enter into controversy, primarily, with K. Kautsky,
the principal Marxian theoretician of the epoch of the so-called Second International–that is, of the twenty-five years
between 1889 and 1914. The fundamental ideas expressed in our definition of imperialism were very resolutely attacked
by Kautsky in 1915, and even in November 1914, when he said that imperialism must not be regarded as a “phase” or
stage of economy, but as a policy, a definite policy “preferred” by finance capital; that imperialism must not be
“identified” with “present-day capitalism”; that if imperialism is to be understood to mean “all the phenomena of
present-day capitalism”–cartels, protection, the domination of the financiers, and colonial policy–then the question as to
whether imperialism is necessary to capitalism becomes reduced to the “flattest tautology,” because, in that case,
“imperialism is naturally a vital necessity for capitalism,” and so on. The best way to present Kautsky’s idea is to quote
33
his own definition of imperialism, which is diametrically opposed to the substance of the ideas which we have set forth
(for the objections coming from the camp of the German Marxists, who have been advocating similar ideas for many
years already, have been long known to Kautsky as the objections of a definite trend in Marxism).
¶6 Kautsky’s definition is as follows:
“Imperialism is a product of highly developed industrial capitalism. It consists in the striving of every industrial
capitalist nation to bring under its control or to annex larger and larger areas of agrarian” (Kautsky’s italics) “territory,
irrespective of what nations inhabit those regions.”* [Die Neue Zeit, 1914, 2 (Vol. 32), p. 909, Sept. 11, 1914; cf. 1915,
2, p. 107 et seq.]
¶7 This definition is utterly worthless because it one-sidedly, i.e., arbitrarily, singles out only the national question
(although the latter is extremely important in itself as well as in its relation to imperialism), it arbitrarily and inaccurately
connects this question only with industrial capital in the countries which annex other nations, and in an equally arbitrary
and inaccurate manner pushes into the forefront the annexation of agrarian regions.
¶8 Imperialism is a striving for annexations–this is what the political part of Kautsky’s definition amounts to. It is
correct, but very incomplete, for politically, imperialism is, in general, a striving towards violence and reaction. For the
moment, however, we are interested in the economic aspect of the question, which Kautsky himself introduced into his
definition. The inaccuracies in Kautsky’s definition are glaring. The characteristic feature of imperialism is not industrial
lout finance capital. It is not an accident that in France it was precisely the extraordinarily rapid development of finance
capital, and the weakening of industrial capital, that, from the ‘eighties onwards, gave rise to the extreme intensification
of annexationist (colonial) policy. The characteristic feature of imperialism is precisely that it strives to annex not only
agrarian territories, but even most highly industrialized regions (German appetite for Belgium; French appetite for
Lorraine), because I) the fact that the world is already divided up obliges those contemplating a redivision to reach out
for every kind of territory, and 2) an essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry between several Great Powers in the
striving for hegemony, i.e., for the conquest of territory, not so much directly for themselves as to weaken the adversary
and undermine his hegemony. (Belgium is particularly important for Germany as a base for operations against England;
England needs Baghdad as a base for operations against Germany, etc.)
¶9 Kautsky refers especially–and repeatedly–to Englishmen who, he alleges, have given a purely political
meaning to the word “imperialism” in the sense that he, Kautsky, understands it. We take up the work by the Englishman
Hobson, Imperialism, which appeared in 1902, and there we read:
¶10 “The new imperialism differs from the older, first, in substituting for the ambition of a single growing empire
the theory and the practice of competing empires, each motivated by similar lusts of political aggrandizement and
commercial gain; secondly, in the dominance of financial or investing over mercantile interests.”* [Hobson, Imperialism,
London, 1902, p. 324.]
¶11 We see that Kautsky is absolutely wrong in referring to Englishmen generally (unless he meant the vulgar
English imperialists, or the avowed apologists for imperialism). We see that Kautsky, while claiming that he continues to
advocate Marxism, as a matter of fact takes a step backward compared with the social-liberal Hobson, who more
correctly takes into account two “historically concrete” (Kautsky’s definition is a mockery of historical concreteness 1)
features of modern imperialism: I) the competition between several imperialisms, and 2) the predominance of the
financier over the merchant. If it is chiefly a question of the annexation of agrarian countries by industrial countries, then
the role of the merchant is put in the forefront.
¶12 Kautsky’s definition is not only wrong and un-Marxian. It serves as a basis for a whole system of views which
signify a rupture with Marxian theory and Marxian practice all along the line. We shall refer to this later. The argument
about words which Kautsky raises as to whether the latest stage of capitalism should be called “imperialism” or “the
stage of finance capital” is absolutely frivolous. Call it what you will, it makes no difference. The essence of the matter is
that Kautsky detaches the politics of imperialism from its economics, speaks of annexations as being a policy “preferred”
by finance capital, and opposes to it another bourgeois policy which, he alleges, is possible on this very same basis of
finance capital. It follows, then, that monopolies in economics are compatible with non-monopolistic, non-violent,
non-annexationist methods in politics. It follows, then, that the territorial division of the world, which was completed
precisely during the epoch of finance capital, and which constitutes the basis of the present peculiar forms of rivalry
between the biggest capitalist states, is compatible with a non-imperialist policy. The result is a slurring-over and a
blunting of the most profound contradictions of the latest stage of capitalism, instead of an exposure of their depth; the
result is bourgeois reformism instead of Marxism.
¶13 Kautsky enters into controversy with the German apologist of imperialism and annexations, Cunow, who
clumsily and cynically argues that imperialism is present-day capitalism; the development of capitalism is inevitable and
progressive; therefore imperialism is progressive; therefore, we should grovel before it and glorify it! This is something
like the caricature of the Russian Marxists which the Narodniks drew in 1894-95. They argued: if the Marxists believe
that capitalism is inevitable in Russia, that it is progressive, then they ought to open a tavern and begin to implant
34
capitalism! Kautsky’s reply to Cunow is as follows: imperialism is not present-day capitalism; it is only one of the forms
of the policy of present-day capitalism. This policy we can and should fight, fight imperialism, annexations, etc.
¶14 The reply seems quite plausible, but in effect it is a more subtle and more disguised (and therefore more
dangerous) advocacy of conciliation with imperialism, because a “fight” against the policy of the trusts and banks that
does not affect the basis of the economics of the trusts and banks is nothing more than bourgeois reformism and
pacifism, the benevolent and innocent expression of pious wishes. Evasion of existing contradictions, forgetting the most
important of them, instead of revealing their full depth–such is Kautsky’s theory, which has nothing in common with
Marxism. Naturally, such a “theory” can only serve the purpose of advocating unity with the Cunows!
¶15 “From the purely economic point of view,” writes Kautsky, “it is not impossible that capitalism will yet go
through a new phase, that of the extension of the policy of the cartels to foreign policy, the phase of ultra-imperialism,”*
[Die Neue Zeit, 1914, 2 (Vol. 32), p. 921, Sept. 11, 1914. Cf. 1915, p. 107 et seq.] i.e., of a superimperialism, of a union
of the imperialisms of the whole world and not struggles among them, a phase when wars shall cease under capitalism, a
phase of “the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital.”** [Die Neue Zeit, 1915 I, p. 144,
April 30. 1915]
¶16 We shall have to deal with this “theory of ultra-imperialism” later on in order to show in detail how definitely
and utterly it breaks with Marxism. At present, in keeping with the general plan of the present work, we must examine
the exact economic data on this question. “From the purely economic point of view,” is “ultra-imperialism” possible, or
is it ultra-nonsense?
¶17 If by purely economic point of view a “pure” abstraction is meant, then all that can be said reduces itself to the
following proposition: development is proceeding towards monopolies, hence, towards a single world monopoly,
towards a single world trust. This is indisputable, but it is also as completely meaningless as is the statement that
“development is proceeding” towards the manufacture of foodstuffs in laboratories. In this sense the “theory” of
ultra-imperialism is no less absurd than a “theory of ultra-agriculture” would be.
¶18 If, however, we are discussing the “purely economic” conditions of the epoch of finance capital as a historically
concrete epoch which opened at the beginning of the twentieth century, then the best reply that one can make to the
lifeless abstractions of “ultra-imperialism” (which serve exclusively a most reactionary aim: that of diverting attention
from the depth of existing antagonisms) is to contrast them with the concrete economic realities of present-day world
economy. Kautsky’s utterly meaningless talk about ultra-imperialism encourages, among other things, that profoundly
mistaken idea which only brings grist to the mill of the apologists of imperialism, viz., that the rule of finance capital
lessens the unevenness and contradictions inherent in world economy, whereas in reality it increases them.
¶19 R. Calwer, in his little book, An Introduction to World Economics,* [R. Calwer, Einfûhrung in die
Weltwirtschaft, Berlin, 1906.] made an attempt to summarize the main, purely economic, data that enable one to obtain a
concrete picture of the internal relations of world economy on the border line between the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. He divides the world into five “main economic areas,” as follows: 1) Central Europe (the whole of Europe
with the exception of Russia and Great Britain); 2) Great Britain; 3) Russia; 4) Eastern Asia; 5) America, he includes the
colonies in the “areas” of the states to which they belong and “leaves aside” a few countries not distributed according to
areas, such as Persia, Afghanistan, and Arabia in Asia, Morocco and Abyssinia in Africa, etc.
¶20 Here is a brief summary of the economic data he quotes on these regions:
Principal
economic
areas
Area Pop. Transport Trade Industry
Million
sq. Km.
Millions Railways
(thous.
Km.)
Mercantile
fleet (million
tons)
Imports &
exports
(billion
marks)
Output
Cotton
spindles
(millions)
of coal
(million
tons)
of pig iron
(million
tons)
1) Central
Europe
27.6
(23.6)*
388
(146)
204 8 41 251 15 26
35
2) British 28.9
(28.6)*
398
(355)
140 11 25 249 9 51
3) Russian 22 131 63 1 3 16 3 7
4) East
Asian
12 389 8 1 2 8 0.02 2
5)
American
30 148 379 6 14 245 14 19
* The figures in parentheses show the area and population of the colonies.
¶21 We see three areas of highly developed capitalism (high development of means of transport, of trade and of
industry): the Central European, the British and the American areas. Among these are three states which dominate the
world: Germany, Great Britain, the United States. Imperialist rivalry and the struggle between these countries have
become extremely keen because Germany has only an insignificant area and few colonies; the creation of “Central
Europe” is still a matter for the future, it is being born in the midst of a desperate struggle. For the moment the distinctive
feature of the whole of Europe is political incohesion. In the British and American areas, on the other hand, political
concentration is very highly developed, but there is a vast disparity between the immense colonies of the one and the
insignificant colonies of the other. In the colonies, however, capitalism is only beginning to develop. The struggle for
South America is becoming more and more acute.
¶22 There are two areas where capitalism is little developed: Russia and Eastern Asia. In the former, the density of
population is extremely low, in the latter it is extremely high; in the former political concentration is high, in the latter it
does not exist. The partition of China is only just beginning, and the struggle between Japan, U.S.A., etc. for it is
continually gaining in intensity.
¶23 Compare this reality–the vast diversity of economic and political conditions, the extreme disparity in the rate of
development of the various countries, etc., and the violent struggles among the imperialist states–with Kautsky’s silly
little fable about “peaceful” ultra-imperialism. Is this not the reactionary attempt of a frightened philistine to hide from
stern reality? Are not the international cartels which Kautsky imagines are the embryos of “ultra-imperialism” (in the
same way as one “can” describe the manufacture of tabloids in a laboratory as ultra-agriculture in embryo) an example of
the division and the redivision of the world, the transition from peaceful division to non-peaceful division and vice
versa? Is not American and other finance capital, which divided the whole world peacefully with Germany’s participation
in, for example, the international rail syndicate, or in the international mercantile shipping trust, now engaged in
redividing the world on the basis of a new relation of forces, which is being changed by methods altogether
non-peaceful?
¶24 Finance capital and the trusts do not diminish but increase the differences in the rate of growth of the various
parts of the world economy. Once the relation of forces is changed, what other solution of the contradictions can be
found under capitalism than that of force? Railway statistics* [Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich, 1915;
Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen, 1892 (Statistical Yearbook for the German Empire; Railroad Archive–Tr.). Minor details
for the distribution of railways among the colonies of the various countries in 1890 had to be estimated approximately.]
provide remarkably exact data on the different rates of growth of capitalism and finance capital in world economy. In the
last decades of imperialist development, the total length of railways has changed as follows:
RAILWAYS
(Thousand kilometers)
1890 1913
Europe 224 346 +122
U.S.A. 268 411 +143
All colonies 82 Tot. 125 210 Tot. 347 +128 Tot. +222
Independent and
semiindependent states of Asia
and America
43 137 +94
36
Total 617 1,104
¶25 Thus, the development of railways has been most rapid in the colonies and in the independent (and
semi-independent) states of Asia and America. Here, as we know, the finance capital of the four or five biggest capitalist
states reigns undisputed. Two hundred thousand kilometers of new railways in the colonies and in the other countries of
Asia and America represent more than 40,000,000,000 marks in capital, newly invested on particularly advantageous
terms, with special guarantees of a good return and with profitable orders for steel works, etc., etc.
¶26 Capitalism is growing with the greatest rapidity in the colonies and in overseas countries. Among the latter, new
imperialist powers are emerging (e.g., Japan). The struggle among the world imperialisms is becoming more acute. The
tribute levied by finance capital on the most profitable colonial and overseas enterprises is increasing. In the division of
this “booty,” an exceptionally large part goes to countries which do not always stand at the top of the list as far as
rapidity of development of productive forces is concerned. In the case of the biggest countries, considered with their
colonies, the total length of railways was as follows:
(Thousands of kilometers)
1890 1913
U.S.A. 268 413 +145
British Empire 107 208 +101
Russia 32 78 +46
Germany 43 68 +25
France 41 63 +22
Total f or 5 Powers 491 830 +339
¶27 Thus, about 80 per cent of the total existing railways are concentrated in the hands of the five biggest powers.
But the concentration of the ownership of these railways, the concentration of finance capital, is immeasurably greater,
for the French and English millionaires, for example, own an enormous amount of shares and bonds in American,
Russian and other railways.
¶28 Thanks to her colonies, Great Britain has increased the length of “her” railways by 100,000 kilometers, four
times as much as Germany. And yet, it is well known that the development of productive forces in Germany, and
especially the development of the coal and iron industries, has been incomparably more rapid during this period than in
England–not to speak of France and Russia. In 1892, Germany produced 4,900,000 tons of pig iron and Great Britain
produced 6,800,000 tons; in 1912, Germany produced 17,600,000 tons and Great Britain, 9,000,000 tons. Germany,
therefore, had an overwhelming superiority over England in this respect.* [Cf. also Edgar Crammond, “The Economic
Relations of the British and German Empires” in The Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, July 1914, p.777 et seq.]
The question is: what means other than war could there be under capitalism of removing the disparity between the
development of productive forces and the accumulation of capital on the one side, and the division of colonies and
“spheres of influence” for finance capital on the other?
VIII. THE PARASITISM AND DECAY OF CAPITALISM
¶1 We now have to examine yet another very important aspect of imperialism to which, usually, insufficient importance
is attached in most of the discussions on this subject. One of the shortcomings of the Marxist Hilferding is that he takes a
step backward compared with the non-Marxist Hobson. We refer to parasitism, which is characteristic of imperialism.
¶2 As we have seen, the deepest economic foundation of imperialism is monopoly. This is capitalist monopoly,
i.e., monopoly which has grown out of capitalism and exists in the general environment of capitalism, commodity
production and competition, in permanent and insoluble contradiction to this general environment. Nevertheless, like all
monopoly, it inevitably engenders a tendency to stagnation and decay. Since monopoly prices are established, even
temporarily, the motive cause of technical and, consequently, of all progress, disappears to a certain extent and, further,
the economic possibility arises of deliberately retarding technical progress. For instance, in America, a certain Owens
37
invented a machine which revolutionized the manufacture of bottles. The German bottle-manufacturing cartel purchased
Owens’ patent, but pigeonholed it, refrained from utilizing it. Certainly, monopoly under capitalism can never
completely, and for a very long period of time, eliminate competition in the world market (and this, by the by, is one of
the reasons why the theory of ultra-imperialism is so absurd). Certainly, the possibility of reducing cost of production
and increasing profits by introducing technical improvements operates in the direction of change. But the tendency to
stagnation and decay, which is characteristic of monopoly, continues to operate, and in certain branches of industry, in
certain countries, for certain periods of time, it gains the upper hand.
¶3 The monopoly ownership of very extensive, rich or well situated colonies, operates in the same direction.
¶4 Further, imperialism is an immense accumulation of money capital in a few countries, amounting, as we have
seen, to 100-150 billion francs in securities. Hence the extraordinary growth of a class, or rather, of a social stratum of
rentiers, i.e., people who live by “clipping coupons,” who take no part in any enterprise whatever, whose profession is
idleness. The export of capital, one of the most essential economic bases of imperialism, still more completely isolates
the rentiers from production and sets the seal of parasitism on the whole country that lives by exploiting the labor of
several overseas countries and colonies.
¶5 “In 1893,” writes Hobson, “the British capital invested abroad represented about 15 per cent of the total wealth
of the United Kingdom.”* [Hobson, op. cit., pp. 59, 60.] We will remind the reader that by 1915 this capital had
increased about two and a half times. “Aggressive imperialism,” says Hobson further on, “which costs the taxpayer so
dear, which is of so little value to the manufacturer and trader … is a source of great gain to the investor…. The annual
income Great Britain derives from commissions in her whole foreign and colonial trade, import and export, is estimated
by Sir R. Giffen at 18,000,000 for 1899, taken at 2.5 per cent, upon a turnover of 800,000,000.” Great as this sum is, it
cannot explain the aggressive imperialism of Great Britain. It is explained by the income of go to 100 million pounds
sterling from “invested” capital, the income of the rentiers.
¶6 The income of the rentiers is five times greater than the income obtained from the foreign trade of the biggest
“trading” country in the world. This is the essence of imperialism and imperialist parasitism.
¶7 For that reason the term, “rentier state” (Rentnerstaat) or usurer state, is coming into common use in the
economic literature that deals with imperialism. The world has become divided into a handful of usurer states and a vast
majority of debtor states. “At the top of the list of foreign investments,” says Schulze-Gaevernitz, “are those placed in
politically dependent or allied countries: Great Britain grants loans to Egypt, Japan, China and South America. Her navy
plays here the part of bailiff in case of necessity. Great Britain’s political power protects her from the indignation of her
debtors.”* [Schulze-Gaevernitz, Britischer Imperialismus, p.320 et seq.] Sartorius von Waltershausen in his book, The
National Economic System of Foreign Investments, cites Holland as the model “rentier state” and points out that Great
Britain and France are now becoming such.** [Sartorius von Waltershausen, Das volkswirtschaftliche System, etc.,
Berlin, 1907, Buch IV.] Schilder is of the opinion that five industrial states have become ”definitely pronounced creditor
countries”: Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland. He does not include Holland in this list simply
because she is “industrially little developed.”*** [Schilder, op. cit., p. 393.] The United States is a creditor only of the
American countries.
¶8 “Great Britain,” says Schulze-Gaevernitz, “is gradually becoming transformed from an industrial into a creditor
state. Notwithstanding the absolute increase in industrial output and the export of manufactured goods, the relative
importance of income from interest and dividends, issues of securities, commissions and speculation is on the increase in
the whole of the national economy. In my opinion it is precisely this that forms the economic basis of imperialist
ascendancy. The creditor is more firmly attached to the debtor than the seller is to the buyer.”* [Schulze-Gaevernitz,
Britischer Imperialismus, p. 122.] In regard to Germany, A. Lansburgh, the publisher of the Berlin Die Bank, in 1911, in
an article entitled “Germany–a Rentier State,” wrote the following: “People in Germany are ready to sneer at the
yearning to become rentiers that is observed among the people in France. But they forget that as far as the bourgeoisie is
concerned the situation in Germany is becoming more and more like that in France.”** [Die Bank, 1911, 1, pp. 10-11.]
¶9 The rentier state is a state of parasitic, decaying capitalism, and this circumstance cannot fail to influence all the
social-political conditions of the countries affected in general, and the two fundamental trends in the working-class
movement, in particular. To demonstrate this in the clearest possible manner we will quote Hobson, who is the most
“reliable” witness, since he cannot be suspected of leanings towards “Marxist orthodoxy”; on the other hand, he is an
Englishman who is very well acquainted with the situation in the country which is richest in colonies, in finance capital,
and in imperialist experience.
¶10 With the Anglo-Boer War fresh in his mind, Hobson describes the connection between imperialism and the
interests of the “financiers,” the growing profits from contracts, etc., and writes: “While the directors of this definitely
parasitic policy are capitalists, the same motives appeal to special classes of the workers. In many towns, most important
trades are dependent upon government employment or contracts; the imperialism of the metal and ship-building centers
is attributed in no small degree to this fact.” In this writer’s opinion there are two causes which have weakened the old
38
empires: 1) “economic parasitism,” and 2) the formation of armies composed of subject peoples. “There is first the habit
of economic parasitism, by which the ruling state has used its provinces, colonies, and dependencies in order to enrich its
ruling class and to bribe its lower classes into acquiescence.” And we would add that the economic possibility of such
bribery, whatever its form may be, requires high monopolist profits.
¶11 As for the second cause, Hobson writes: “One of the strangest symptoms of the blindness of imperialism is the
reckless indifference with which Great Britain, France and other imperial nations are embarking on this perilous
dependence. Great Britain has gone farthest. Most of the fighting by which we have won our Indian Empire has been
done by natives; in India, as more recently in Egypt, great standing armies are placed under British commanders; almost
all the fighting associated with our African dominions, except in the southern part, has been done for us by natives.”
¶12 Hobson gives the following economic appraisal of the prospect of the partition of China: “The greater part of
Western Europe might then assume the appearance and character already exhibited by tracts of country in the South of
England, in the Riviera, and in the tourist-ridden or residential parts of Italy and Switzerland, little clusters of wealthy
aristocrats drawing dividends and pensions from the Far East, with a somewhat larger group of professional retainers and
tradesmen and a large body of personal servants and workers in the transport trade and in the final stages of production
of the more perishable goods; all the main arterial industries would have disappeared, the staple foods and manufactures
flowing in as tribute from Asia and Africa.” “We have foreshadowed the possibility of even a larger alliance of Western
States, a European federation of great powers which, so far from forwarding the cause of world civilization, might
introduce the gigantic peril of a Western parasitism, a group of advanced industrial nations, whose upper classes drew
vast tribute from Asia and Africa, with which they supported great tame masses of retainers, no longer engaged in the
staple industries of agriculture and manufacture, but kept in the performance of personal or minor industrial services
under the control of a new financial aristocracy. Let those who would scout such a theory” (it would be better to say:
prospect) “as undeserving of consideration examine the economic and social condition of districts in Southern England
today which are already reduced to this condition, and reflect upon the vast extension of such a system which might be
rendered feasible by the subjection of China to the economic control of similar groups of financiers, investors, and
political and business officials, draining the greatest potential reservoir of profit the world has ever known, in order to
consume it in Europe. The situation is far too complex, the play of world-forces far too incalculable, to render this or any
other single interpretation of the future very probable; but the influences which govern the Imperialism of Western
Europe today are moving in this direction, and, unless counteracted or diverted, make towards some such
consummation.”* [Hobson, op. cit., pp. 103, 205, 144, 335, 186.]
¶13 The author is quite right: if the forces of imperialism had not been counteracted they would have led precisely to
what he has described. The significance of a “United States of Europe” in the present imperialist situation is correctly
appraised. He should have added, however, that, also within the working-class movement, the opportunists, who are for
the moment victorious in most countries, are “working” systematically and undeviatingly in this very direction.
Imperialism, which means the partition of the world, and the exploitation of other countries besides China, which means
high monopoly profits for a handful of very rich countries, creates the economic possibility of bribing the upper strata of
the proletariat, and thereby fosters, gives form to, and strengthens opportunism. We must not, however, lose sight of the
forces which counteract imperialism in general, and opportunism in particular, and which, naturally, the social-liberal
Hobson is unable to perceive.
¶14 The German opportunist, Gerhard Hildebrand, who was expelled from the Party for defending imperialism, and
who could today be a leader of the so-called “Social-Democratic” Party of Germany, supplements Hobson well by his
advocacy of a “United States of Western Europe” (without Russia) for the purpose of “joint” action… against the African
Negroes, against the “great Islamic movement,” for the maintenance of a “powerful army and navy,” against a “SinoJapanese
coalition,”* [Gerhard Hildebrand, Die Errschutterung der Industrieherrschaft und des Industriesozialismus
(The Shattering of the Rule of Industrialism and Industrial Socialism–Tr.), 1910, p. 229 et seq.] etc.
¶15 The description of “British imperialism” in Schulze-Gaevernitz’s book reveals the same parasitical traits. The
national income of Great Britain approximately doubled from 1865 to 1898, while the income “from abroad” increased
ninefold in the same period. While the “merit” of imperialism is that it “trains the Negro to habits of industry” (not
without coercion, of course …), the “danger” of imperialism lies in that “Europe will shift the burden of physical toil
–first agricultural and mining, then the rougher work in industry–on to the colored races, and itself be content with the
role of rentier, and in this way, perhaps, pave the way for the economic, and later, the political emancipation of the
colored races.”
¶16 An increasing proportion of land in Great Britain is being taken out of cultivation and used for sport, for the
diversion of the rich. About Scotland–the most aristocratic playground in the world–it is said that “it lives on its past and
on Mr. Carnegie.” On horse racing and fox hunting alone Britain annually spends 14,000,000. The number of rentiers in
England is about one million. The percentage of the productively-employed population to the total population is
declining:
39
Population No. of workers in basic industries Per cent of total population
(Millions)
1851 17.9 4.1 23%
1901 32.5 4.9 15%
¶17 And in speaking of the British working class the bourgeois student of “British imperialism at the beginning of
the twentieth century” is obliged to distinguish systematically between the “upper stratum” of the workers and the “lower
stratum of the proletariat proper.” The upper stratum furnishes the bulk of the membership of cooperatives, of trade
unions, of sporting clubs and of numerous religious sects. To this level is adapted the electoral system, which in Great
Britain is still “sufficiently restricted to exclude the lower stratum of the proletariat proper”!! In order to present the
condition of the British working class in a rosy light, only this upper stratum–which constitutes a minority of the
proletariat–is generally spoken of. For instance, “the problem of unemployment is mainly a London problem and that of
the lower proletarian stratum, to which the politicians attach little importance. …”* [Schulze-Gaevernitz, Britischer
Imperialismus, p. 301.] He should have said: to which the bourgeois politicians and the “Socialist” opportunists attach
little importance.
¶18 One of the special features of imperialism connected with the facts we are describing, is the decline in
emigration from imperialist countries and the increase in immigration into these countries from the more backward
countries where lower wages are paid. As Hobson observes, emigration from Great Britain has been declining since
1884. In that year the number of emigrants was 242,000, while in 1900, the number was 169,000. Emigration from
Germany reached the highest point between 1881 and 1890, with a total of 1,453,000 emigrants. In the course of the
following two decades, it fell to 544,000 and to 341,000. On the other hand, there was an increase in the number of
workers entering Germany from Austria, Italy, Russia and other countries. According to the 1907 census, these were
1,342,294 foreigners in Germany, of whom 440,800 were industrial workers and 257,329 agricultural workers.*
[Schulze-Gaevernitz, Britischer Imperialismus, p. 301.] In France, the workers employed in the mining industry are, “in
great part,” foreigners: Poles, Italians and Spaniards.** [Henger, Die Kapitalsanlage der Franzosen (French
Investments), Stuttgart, 1913.] In the United States, immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe are engaged in the
most poorly paid occupations, while American workers provide the highest percentage of overseers or of the better-paid
workers.*** [Hourwich, Immigration and Labour, New York, 1913.] Imperialism has the tendency to create privileged
sections also among the workers, and to detach them from the broad masses of the proletariat.
¶19 It must be observed that in Great Britain the tendency of imperialism to divide the workers, to strengthen
opportunism among them and to cause temporary decay in the working-class movement, revealed itself much earlier
than the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries; for two important distinguishing features of
imperialism were already observed in Great Britain in the middle of the nineteenth century, viz., vast colonial
possessions and a monopolist position in the world market. Marx and Engels traced this connection between
opportunism in the working-class movement and the imperialist features of British capitalism systematically, during the
course of several decades. For example, on October 7, 1858, Engels wrote to Marx: “The English proletariat is becoming
more and more bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all nations is apparently aiming ultimately at the possession of a
bourgeois aristocracy, and a bourgeois proletariat as well as a bourgeoisie. For a nation which exploits the whole world
this is, of course, to a certain extent justifiable.” [15] Almost a quarter of a century later, in a letter dated August 11,
1881, Engels speaks of “… the worst type of English trade unions which allow themselves to be led by men bought by, or
at least paid by, the bourgeoisie.” [16] In a letter to Kautsky, dated September 12, 1882, Engels wrote: “You ask me what
the English workers think about colonial policy? Well, exactly the same as they think about politics in general. There is
no workers’ party here, there are only Conservatives and Liberal Radicals, and the workers merrily share the feast of
England’s monopoly of the colonies and the world market”* [ Briefwechsel von Marx und Engels, Bd. II, S. 290; IV,
453–Karl Kautsky, Sozialismus und Kolonialpolitik, Berlin, 1907, p. 79; this pamphlet was written by Kautsky in those
infinitely distant days when he was still a Marxist.] (Engels expressed similar ideas in the press in his preface to the
second edition of The Condition of the Working Class in England, which appeared in 1892).
¶20 This clearly shows the causes and effects. The causes are: 1) exploitation of the whole world by this country; 2)
its monopolistic position in the world market; 3) its colonial monopoly. The effects are: 1) a section of the British
proletariat becomes bourgeois; 2) a section of the proletariat permits itself to be led by men bought by, or at least paid
by, the bourgeoisie. The imperialism of the beginning of the twentieth century completed the division of the world
among a handful of states, each of which today exploits (i.e., draws superprofits from) a part of the “whole world” only a
little smaller than that which England exploited in 1858; each of them occupies a monopoly position in the world market
thanks to trusts, cartels, finance capital and creditor and debtor relations; each of them enjoys to some degree a colonial
monopoly (we have seen that out of the total of 75,000,000 sq. km., which comprise the whole colonial world,
40
65,000,000 sq. km., or 86 per cent, belong to six powers; 61,000,000 sq. km., or 81 per cent, belong to three powers).
¶21 The distinctive feature of the present situation is the prevalence of such economic and political conditions as
could not but increase the irreconcilability between opportunism and the general and vital interests of the working-class
movement: imperialism has grown from the embryo into the predominant system; capitalist monopolies occupy first
place in economics and politics; the division of the world has been completed; on the other hand, instead of the
undivided monopoly of Great Britain, we see a few imperialist powers contending for the right to share in this monopoly,
and this struggle is characteristic of the whole period of the beginning of the twentieth century. Opportunism cannot now
be completely triumphant in the working-class movement of one country for decades as it was in England in the second
half of the nineteenth century; but in a number of countries it has grown ripe, overripe, and rotten, and has become
completely merged with bourgeois policy in the form of “social chauvinism.”* [Russian social-chauvinism in its avowed
form represented by Messrs. the Potressovs, Chkhenkelis, Maslovs, etc., as well as in its tacit form, as represented by
Messrs. Chkheidze, Skobelev, Axelrod, Martov, etc., also emerged from the Russian variety of opportunism, namely,
Liquidatorism.]
IX. THE CRITIQUE OF IMPERIALISM
¶1 By the critique of imperialism, in the broad sense of the term, we mean the attitude towards imperialist policy of the
different classes of society in connection with their general ideology.
¶2 The enormous dimensions of finance capital concentrated in a few hands and creating an extraordinarily
far-flung and close network of relationships and connections which subordinates not only the small and medium, but also
even the very small capitalists and small masters, on the one hand, and the increasingly intense struggle waged against
other national state groups of financiers for the division of the world and domination over other countries, on the other
hand, cause the possessing classes to go over entirely to the side of imperialism. “General” enthusiasm over the prospects
of imperialism, furious defense of it and painting it in the brightest colors–such are the signs of the times. The
imperialist ideology also penetrates the working class. No Chinese Wall separates it from the other classes. The leaders
of the present-day, so-called, “Social-Democratic” Party of Germany are justly called “social-imperialists,” that is,
Socialists in words and imperialists in deeds; but as early as 1902, Hobson noted the existence in England of “Fabian
imperialists” who belonged to the opportunist Fabian Society.
¶3 Bourgeois scholars and publicists usually come out in defense of imperialism in a somewhat veiled form; they
obscure its complete domination and its profound roots, strive to push into the forefront particular and secondary details
and do their very best to distract attention from essentials by means of absolutely ridiculous schemes for “reform,” such
as police supervision of the trusts or banks, etc. Less frequently, cynical and frank imperialists come forward who are
bold enough to admit the absurdity of the idea of reforming the fundamental characteristics of imperialism.
¶4 We will give an example. The German imperialists attempt, in the magazine Archives of World Economy to
follow the movements for national emancipation in the colonies, particularly, of course, in colonies other than those
belonging to Germany. They note the unrest and the protest movements in India, the movement in Natal (South Africa),
in the Dutch East Indies, etc. One of them, commenting on an English report of a conference held on June 28-30, 1910,
of representatives of various subject nations and races, of peoples of Asia, Africa and Europe who are subject to foreign
rule, writes as follows in appraising the speeches delivered at this conference: “We are told that we must fight
imperialism, that the ruling states should recognize the right of subject peoples to independence, that an international
tribunal should supervise the fulfilment of treaties concluded between the great powers and weak peoples. Further than
the expression of these pious wishes they do not go. We see no trace of understanding of the fact that imperialism is
inseparably bound up with capitalism in its present form and that, therefore (!!), an open struggle against imperialism
would be hopeless, unless, perhaps, the fight is confined to protests against certain of its especially abhorrent excesses.”*
[Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Bd. II, p. 193.] Since the reform of the basis of imperialism is a deception, a “pious wish,”
since the bourgeois representatives of the oppressed nations go no “further” forward, the bourgeois representative of an
oppressing nation goes “further” backward, to servility towards imperialism under cover of the claim to be “scientific.”
“Logic,” indeed!
¶5 The questions as to whether it is possible to reform the basis of imperialism, whether to go forward to the
further intensification and deepening of the antagonisms which it engenders, or backwards, towards allaying these
antagonisms, are fundamental questions in the critique of imperialism. Since the specific political features of imperialism
are reaction all along the line and increased national oppression resulting from the oppression of the financial oligarchy
and the elimination of free competition, a petty-bourgeois-democratic opposition to imperialism arose in the beginning of
the twentieth century in nearly all imperialist countries. And the desertion of Kautsky and of the broad international
Kautskyan trend from Marxism consists precisely in the fact that Kautsky not only did not trouble to oppose, was not
41
only unable to oppose this petty-bourgeois reformist opposition, which is really reactionary in its economic basis, but
became merged with it in practice.
¶6 In the United States, the imperialist war waged against Spain in 1898 stirred up the opposition of the
“anti-imperialists,” the last of the Mohicans of bourgeois democracy, who declared this war to be “criminal,” regarded
the annexation of foreign territories as a violation of the Constitution, declared that the treatment of Aguinaldo, leader of
the native Filipinos (the Americans promised him the independence of his country, but later they landed troops and
annexed it) as “Jingo treachery,” and quoted the words of Lincoln: “When the white man governs himself, that is
self-government; but when he governs himself and also governs others, it is no longer self-government; it is despotism.”*
[J. Patouillet, L’impérialisme américain, Dijon, 1904, p. 272.] But while all this criticism shrank from recognizing the
inseverable bond between imperialism and the trusts, and, therefore, between imperialism and the foundations of
capitalism, while it shrank from joining the forces engendered by large-scale capitalism and its development–it remained
a “pious wish.”
¶7 This is also the main attitude taken by Hobson in his critique of imperialism. Hobson anticipated Kautsky in
protesting against the “inevitability of imperialism” argument, and in urging the necessity of “increasing the consuming
capacity” of the people (under capitalism!). The petty-bourgeois point of view in the critique of imperialism, the
omnipotence of the banks, the financial oligarchy, etc., is adopted by the authors we have often quoted, such as Agahd,
A. Lansburgh, L. Eschwege, and among the French writers, Victor Bérard, author of a superficial book entitled England
and Imperialism which appeared in 1900. All these authors, who make no claim to be Marxists, contrast imperialism
with free competition and democracy, condemn the Baghdad railway scheme as leading to conflicts and war, utter “pious
wishes” for peace, etc. This applies also to the compiler of international stock and share issue statistics, A. Neymarck,
who, after calculating the hundreds of billions of francs representing “international” securities, exclaimed in 1912: “Is it
possible to believe that peace may be disturbed … that, in the face of these enormous figures, anyone would risk starting
a war?”* [Bulletin de l’lnstitut International de Statistique, t. XIX, livr. II p. 225.]
¶8 Such simple-mindedness on the part of the bourgeois economists is not surprising; moreover, it is in their
interest to pretend to be so naive and to talk “seriously” about peace under imperialism. But what remains of Kautsky’s
Marxism, when, in 1914, 1915 and 1916, he takes up the same bourgeois-reformist point of view and affirms that
“everybody is agreed” (imperialists, pseudo Socialists and social-pacifists) on the matter of peace? Instead of an analysis
of imperialism and an exposure of the depths of its contradictions, we have nothing but a reformist “pious wish” to wave
them aside, to evade them.
¶9 Here is a sample of Kautsky’s economic criticism of imperialism. He takes the statistics of the British export
and import trade with Egypt for 1872 and 1912; it transpires that this export and import trade has grown more slowly
than British foreign trade as a whole. From this Kautsky concludes that: “we have no reason to suppose that without
military occupation the growth of British trade with Egypt would have been less, simply as a result of the mere operation
of economic factors.” “The urge of capital to expand . . . can be best promoted, not by the violent methods of
imperialism, but by peaceful democracy.”* [Kautsky, Nationalstaat, imperialistischer Staat und Staatenbund (National
State, Imperialist State and Union of States–Tr.), Nürnberg, , pp. 72 and 70. ]
¶10 This argument of Kautsky’s which is repeated in every key by his Russian armor-bearer (and Russian shielder of
the social-chauvinists), Mr. Spectator, [17] constitutes the basis of Kautskyan critique of imperialism, and that is why we
must deal with it in greater detail. We will begin with a quotation from Hilferding, whose conclusions Kautsky on many
occasions, and notably in April 1915, has declared to have been “unanimously adopted by all socialist theoreticians.”
¶11 “It is not the business of the proletariat,” writes Hilferding, “to contrast the more progressive capitalist policy
with that of the now bygone era of free trade and of hostility towards the state. The reply of the proletariat to the
economic policy of finance capital, to imperialism, cannot be free trade, but Socialism. The aim of proletarian policy
cannot now be the ideal of restoring free competition–which has now become a reactionary ideal–but the complete
elimination of competition by the abolition of capitalism.”** [ Finance Capital, p. 567.]
¶12 Kautsky broke with Marxism by advocating in the epoch of finance capital a “reactionary ideal,” “peaceful
democracy,” “the mere operation of economic factors,” for objectively this ideal drags us back from monopoly to
non-monopolist capitalism, and is a reformist swindle.
¶13 Trade with Egypt (or with any other colony or semicolony) “would have grown more” without military
occupation, without imperialism, and without finance capital. What does this mean? That capitalism would have
developed more rapidly if free competition had not been restricted by monopolies in general, or by the “connections,”
yoke (i.e., also the monopoly) of finance capital, or by the monopolist possession of colonies by certain countries?
¶14 Kautsky’s argument can have no other meaning, and this “meaning” is meaningless. Let us assume that free
competition, without any sort of monopoly, would have developed capitalism and trade more rapidly. But the more
rapidly trade and capitalism develop, the greater is the concentration of production and capital which gives rise to
monopoly. And monopolies have already arisen–precisely out of free competition! Even if monopolies have now begun
42
to retard progress, it is not an argument in favour of free competition, which has become impossible after it has given
rise to monopoly.
¶15 Whichever way one turns Kautsky’s argument, one will kind nothing in it except reaction and bourgeois
reformism.
¶16 Even if we correct this argument and say, as Spectator says, that the trade of the British colonies with England
is now developing more slowly than their trade with other countries, it does not save Kautsky; for it is also monopoly,
also imperialism that is beating Great Britain, only it is the monopoly and imperialism of another country (America,
Germany). It is known that the cartels have given rise to a new and peculiar form of protective tariffs, i.e., goods suitable
for export are protected (Engels noted this in Vol. III of Capital). [18] It is known, too, that the cartels and finance
capital have a system peculiar to themselves, that of “exporting goods at cut-rate prices,” or “dumping,” as the English
call it: within a given country the cartel sells its goods at high monopoly prices, but sells them abroad at a much lower
price to undercut the competitor, to enlarge its own production to the utmost, etc. If Germany’s trade with the British
colonies is developing more rapidly than Great Britain’s, it only proves that German imperialism is younger, stronger and
better organized than British imperialism, is superior to it; but it by no means proves the “superiority” of free trade, for it
is not a fight between free trade and protection and colonial dependence, but between two rival imperialisms, two
monopolies, two groups of finance capital. The superiority of German imperialism over British imperialism is more
potent than the wall of colonial frontiers or of protective tariffs: to use this as an “argument” in favour of free trade and
“peaceful democracy” is banal, it means forgetting the essential features and characteristics of imperialism, substituting
petty-bourgeois reformism for Marxism.
¶17 It is interesting to note that even the bourgeois economist, A. Lansburgh, whose criticism of imperialism is as
pettybourgeois as Kautsky’s, nevertheless got closer to a more scientific study of trade statistics. He did not compare
only one country, chosen at random, and only a colony with the other countries; he examined the export trade of an
imperialist country: 1) with countries which are financially dependent upon it, which borrow money from it; and 2) with
countries which are financially independent. He obtained the following results:
EXPORT TRADE OF GERMANY
(Million marks)
1889 1908 Per cent increase
To Countries Financially Dependent
on Germany
Rumania 48.2 70.8 47%
Portugal 19.0 32.8 73%
Argentina 60.7 147.0 143%
Brazil 48.7 84.5 73%
Chile 28.3 52.4 85%
Turkey 29.9 64.0 114%
Total 234.8 451.5 92%
To Countries Financially Independent
of Germany
Great Britain 651.8 997.4 53%
France 210.2 437.9 108%
Belgium 137.2 322.8 135%
Switzerland 177.4 401.1 127%
Australia 21.2 64.5 205%
Dutch East Indies 8.8 40.7 363%
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Total 1,206.6 2,264.4 87%
¶18 Lansburgh did not draw conclusions and therefore, strangely enough, failed to observe that if the figures prove
anything at all, they prove that he is wrong for the exports to countries financially dependent on Germany have grown
more rapidly, if only slightly, than those to the countries which are financially independent. (We emphasize the “if,” for
Lansburgh’s figures are far from complete.)
¶19 Tracing the connection between exports and loans, Lansburgh writes:
“In 1890-91 a Rumanian loan was floated through the German banks, which had already in previous years made
advances on this loan. It was used chiefly to purchase railway materials in Germany. In 1891 German exports to
Rumania amounted to 55,000,000 marks. The following year they dropped to 39,400,000 marks and, with fluctuations,
to 25,400,000 in 1900. Only in very recent years have they regained the level of 1891 thanks to two new loans.
¶20 “German exports to Portugal rose, following the loans of 1888-89, to 21,100,000 (1890); then, in the two
following years, they dropped to 16,200,000 and 7,400,000, and regained their former level only in 1903.
¶21 “The figures of German trade with Argentina are still more striking. Following the loans floated in 1888 and
1890, German exports to Argentina reached, in 1889, 60,700,000 marks. Two years later they only reached 18,600,000
marks, less than one-third of the previous figure. It was not until 1901 that they regained and surpassed the level of 1889,
and then only as a result of new loans floated by the state and by municipalities, with advances to build power stations,
and with other credit operations.
¶22 “Exports to Chile, as a consequence of the loan of 1889, rose to 45,200,000 marks (in 1892) and a year later
dropped to 22,500,000 marks. A new Chilean loan floated by the German banks in 1906 was followed by a rise of
exports to 84,700,000 marks in 1907, only to fall again to 52,400,000 marks in 1908.* [Die Bank, 1909, 2 p.819 et seq.]
¶23 From these facts Lansburgh draws the amusing pettybourgeois moral of how unstable and irregular export trade
is when it is bound up with loans, how bad it is to invest capital abroad instead of “naturally” and “harmoniously”
developing home industry, how “costly” are the millions in backsheesh that Krupp has to pay in floating foreign loans;
etc. But the facts tell us clearly: the increase in exports is precisely connected with the swindling tricks of finance capital,
which is not concerned with bourgeois morality, but with skinning the ox twice–first, it pockets the profits from the
loan; then it pockets other profits from the same loan which the borrower uses to make purchases from Krupp, or to
purchase railway material from the Steel Syndicate, etc.
¶24 We repeat that we do not by any means consider Lansburgh’s figures to be perfect; but we had to quote them
because they are more scientific than Kautsky’s and Spectator’s, and because Lansburgh showed the correct way to
approach the question. In discussing the significance of finance capital in regard to exports, etc., one must be able to
single out the connection of exports especially and solely with the tricks of the financiers, especially and solely with the
sale of goods by cartels, etc. Simply to compare colonies with non-colonies, one imperialism with another imperialism,
one semicolony or colony (Egypt) with all other countries, is to evade and to obscure the very essence of the question.
¶25 Kautsky’s theoretical critique of imperialism has nothing in common with Marxism and serves only as a
preamble to propaganda for peace and unity with the opportunists and the social-chauvinists, precisely for the reason that
it evades and obscures the very profound and fundamental contradictions of imperialism: the contradictions between
monopoly and free competition which exists side by side with it, between the gigantic “operations” (and gigantic profits)
of finance capital and “honest” trade in the free market, the contradiction between cartels and trusts, on the one hand, and
non-cartelized industry, on the other, etc.
¶26 The notorious theory of “ultraimperialism,” invented by Kautsky, is just as reactionary. Compare his arguments
on this subject in 1915, with Hobson’s arguments in 1902.
¶27 Kautsky: “. . . Cannot the present imperialist policy be supplanted by a new, ultraimperialist policy, which will
introduce the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital in place of the mutual rivalries of
national finance capitals? Such a new phase of capitalism is at any rate conceivable. Can it be achieved? Sufficient
premises are still lacking to enable us to answer this question.”* [Die Neue Zeit, April 30, 1915, p. 144.]
¶28 Hobson: “Christendom thus laid out in a few great federal empires, each with a retinue of uncivilized
dependencies, seems to many the most legitimate development of present tendencies, and one which would offer the best
hope of permanent peace on an assured basis of inter-Imperialism.”
¶29 Kautsky called ultraimperialism or superimperialism what Hobson, thirteen years earlier, described as
interimperialism. Except for coining a new and clever catchword, replacing one Latin pretax by another, the only
progress Kautsky has made in the sphere of “scientific” thought is that he gave out as Marxism what Hobson, in effect,
described as the cant of English parsons. After the Anglo-Boer War it was quite natural for this highly honourable caste
to exert their main efforts to console the British middle class and the workers who had lost many of their relatives on the
44
battlefields of South Africa and who were obliged to pay higher taxes in order to guarantee still higher profits for the
British financiers. And what better consolation could there be than the theory that imperialism is not so bad; that it stands
close to inter- (or ultra-) imperialism, which can ensure permanent peace? No matter what the good intentions of the
English parsons, or of sentimental Kautsky, may have been, the only objective, i.e., real, social significance Kautsky’s
“theory” can have, is: a most reactionary method of consoling the masses with hopes of permanent peace being possible
under capitalism, by distracting their attention from the sharp antagonisms and acute problems of the present times, and
directing it towards illusory prospects of an imaginary “ultraimperialism” of the future. Deception of the masses–there is
nothing but this in Kautsky’s “Marxian” theory.
¶30 Indeed, it is enough to compare well-known and indisputable facts to become convinced of the utter falsity of
the prospects which Kautsky tries to conjure up before the German workers (and the workers of all lands). Let us
consider India, Indo-China and China. It is known that these three colonial and semicolonial countries, with a population
of six to seven hundred million, are subjected to the exploitation of the finance capital of several imperialist powers:
Great Britain, France, Japan, the U.S.A., etc. Let us assume that these imperialist countries form alliances against one
another in order to protect or enlarge their possessions, their interests and their “spheres of influence” in these Asiatic
states; these alliances will be “interimperialist,” or “ultraimperialist” alliances. Let us assume that all the imperialist
countries conclude an alliance for the “peaceful” division of these parts of Asia; this alliance would be an alliance of
“internationally united finance capital.” There are actual examples of alliances of this kind in the history of the twentieth
century, for instance, the attitude of the powers to China. We ask, is it “conceivable,” assuming that the capitalist system
remains intact–and this is precisely the assumption that Kautsky does make–that such alliances would be more than
temporary, that they would eliminate friction, conflicts and struggle in every possible form?
¶31 It is sufficient to state this question clearly to make it impossible for any reply to be given other than in the
negative; for any other basis under capitalism for the division of spheres of influence, of interests, of colonies, etc., than
a calculation of the strength of the participants in the division, their general economic, financial, military strength, etc., is
inconceivable. And the strength of these participants in the division does not change to an equal degree, for the even
development of different undertakings, trusts, branches of industry, or countries is impossible under capitalism. Half a
century ago Germany was a miserable, insignificant country, as far as her capitalist strength was concerned, compared
with the strength of England at that time; Japan was the same compared with Russia. Is it “conceivable” that in ten or
twenty years’ time the relative strength of the imperialist powers will have remained unchanged? Absolutely
inconceivable.
¶32 Therefore, in the realities of the capitalist system, and not in the banal Philistine fantasies of English parsons, or
of the German “Marxist,” Kautsky, “interimperialist” or “ultraimperialist” alliances, no matter what form they may
assume, whether of one imperialist coalition against another, or of a general alliance embracing all the imperialist
powers, are inevitably nothing more than a “truce” in periods between wars. Peaceful alliances prepare the ground for
wars, and in their turn grow out of wars; the one conditions the other, giving rise to alternating forms of peaceful and
non-peaceful struggle out of one and the same basis of imperialist connections and relations within world economics and
world politics. But in order to pacify the workers and to reconcile them with the social-chauvinists who have deserted to
the side of the bourgeoisie, wise Kautsky separates one link of a single chain from the other, separates the present
peaceful (and ultraimperialist, nay, ultra-ultraimperialist) alliance of all the powers for the “pacification” of China
(remember the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion) from the non-peaceful conflict of tomorrow, which will prepare the
ground for another “peaceful” general alliance for the partition, say, of Turkey, on the day after tomorrow, etc., etc.
Instead of showing the living connection between periods of imperialist peace and periods of imperialist war, Kautsky
presents the workers with a lifeless abstraction in order to reconcile them to their lifeless leaders.
¶33 An American writer, Hill, in his A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe notes in
his preface to the following periods in the recent history of diplomacy: 1) the era of revolution; 2) the constitutional
movement; 3) the present era of “commercial imperialism.”* [David Jayne Hill, A History of the Diplomacy in the
International Development of Europe, Vol. 1, p. x.] Another writer divides the history of Great Britain’s “world policy”
since 1870 into four periods: 1) the first Asiatic period (that of the struggle against Russian advance in Central Asia
towards India); 2) the African period (approximately 1885-1902): that of the struggle against France for the partition of
Africa (the “Fashoda incident” of 1898 which brought her within a hair’s breadth of war with France); 3) the second
Asiatic period (alliance with Japan against Russia), and 4) the “European” period, chiefly anti-German.* [Schilder, op.
cit., p. 178.] “The political skirmishes of outposts take place on the financial field,” wrote the “banker,” Riesser, in 1905,
in showing how French finance capital operating in Italy was preparing the way for a political alliance of these countries,
and how a conflict was developing between Germany and Great Britain over Persia, between all the European capitalists
over Chinese loans, etc. Behold, the living reality of peaceful “ultraimperialist” alliances in their inseverable connection
with ordinary imperialist conflicts!
45
¶34 Kautsky’s obscuring of the deepest contradictions of imperialism, which inevitably becomes the embellishment
of imperialism, leaves its traces in this writer’s criticism of the political features of imperialism. Imperialism is the epoch
of finance capital and of monopolies, which introduce everywhere the striving for domination, not for freedom. The
result of these tendencies is reaction all along the line, whatever the political system, and an extreme intensification of
existing antagonisms in this domain also. Particularly intensified become the yoke of national oppression and the striving
for annexations, i.e., the violation of national independence (for annexation is nothing but the violation of the right of
nations to self-determination). Hilferding rightly notes the connection between imperialism and the intensification of
national oppression. “In the newly opened up countries,” he writes, “the capital imported into them intensifies
antagonisms and excites against the intruders the constantly growing resistance of the peoples who are awakening to
national consciousness; this resistance can easily develop into dangerous measures against foreign capital. The old social
relations become completely revolutionized, the agelong agrarian isolation of ‘nations without history’ is destroyed and
they are drawn into the capitalist whirlpool. Capitalism itself gradually provides the subjugated with the means and
resources for their emancipation and they set out to achieve the goal which once seemed highest to the European nations:
the creation of a united national state as a means to economic and cultural freedom. This movement for national
independence threatens European capital in its most valuable and most promising fields of exploitation, and European
capital can maintain its domination only by continually increasing its military forces.”* [Finance Capital, p.487.]
¶35 To this must be added that it is not only in newly opened up countries, but also in the old, that imperialism is
leading to annexation, to increased national oppression, and, consequently, also to increasing resistance. While objecting
to the intensification of political reaction by imperialism, Kautsky leaves in the shade a question that has become
particularly urgent, viz., the impossibility of unity with the opportunists in the epoch of imperialism. While objecting to
annexations, he presents his objections in a form that is most acceptable and least offensive to the opportunists. He
addresses himself to a German audience, yet he obscures the most topical and important point, for instance, the
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany. In order to appraise this “mental aberration” of Kautsky’s we will take the
following example. Let us suppose that a Japanese is condemning the annexation of the Philippines by the Americans.
The question is: will many believe that he is doing so because he has a’ horror of annexations as such. and not because he
himself has a desire to annex the Philippines? And shall we not be constrained to admit that the “fight” the Japanese is
waging against annexations can be regarded as being sincere and politically honest only if he fights against the
annexation of Korea by Japan, and urges freedom for Korea to secede from Japan?
¶36 Kautsky’s theoretical analysis of imperialism, as well as his economic and political criticism of imperialism, are
permeated through and through, with a spirit, absolutely irreconcilable with Marxism, of obscuring and glossing over the
fundamental contradictions of imperialism and with a striving to preserve at all costs the crumbling unity with
opportunism in the European working-class movement.
X. THE PLACE OF IMPERIALISM IN HISTORY
¶1 We have seen that in its economic essence imperialism is monopoly capitalism. This in itself determines its place in
history, for monopoly that grows out of the soil of free competition, and precisely out of free competition, is the
transition from the capitalist system to a higher social-economic order. We must take special note of the four principal
types of monopoly, or principal manifestations of monopoly capitalism, which are characteristic of the epoch we are
examining.
¶2 Firstly, monopoly arose out of a very high stage of development of the concentration of production. This refers
to the monopolist capitalist combines, cartels, syndicates and trusts. We have seen the important part these play in
present-day economic life. At the beginning of the twentieth century, monopolies had acquired complete supremacy in
the advanced countries, and although the first steps towards the formation of the cartels were first taken by countries
enjoying the protection of high tariffs (Germany, America), Great Britain, with her system of free trade, revealed the
same basic phenomenon, only a little later, namely, the birth of monopoly out of the concentration of production.
¶3 Secondly, monopolies have stimulated the seizure of the most important sources of raw materials, especially for
the basic and most highly cartelized industries in capitalist society: the coal and iron industries. The monopoly of the
most important sources of raw materials has enormously increased the power of big capital, and has sharpened the
antagonism between cartelized and non-cartelized industry.
¶4 Thirdly, monopoly has sprung from the banks. The banks have developed from humble middlemen enterprises
into the monopolists of finance capital. Some three to five of the biggest banks in each of the foremost capitalist
countries have achieved the “personal union” of industrial and bank capital, and have concentrated in their hands the
control of thousands upon thousands of millions which form the greater part of the capital and income of entire countries.
A financial oligarchy, which throws a close network of dependence relationships over all the economic and political
institutions of present-day bourgeois society without exception–such is the most striking manifestation of this monopoly.
¶5 Fourthly, monopoly has grown out of colonial policy. To the numerous “old” motives of colonial policy,
finance capital has added the struggle for the sources of raw materials, for the export of capital, for “spheres of
46
influence,” i.e., for spheres for profitable deals, concessions, monopolist profits and so on, and finally, for economic
territory in general When the colonies of the European powers in Africa, for instance, comprised only one-tenth of that
territory (as was the case in 1876), colonial policy was able to develop by methods other than those of monopoly–by the
“free grabbing” of territories, so to speak. But when nine-tenths of Africa had been seized (by 1900), when the whole
world had been divided up, there was inevitably ushered in the era of monopoly ownership of colonies and,
consequently, of particularly intense struggle for the division and the redivision of the world.
¶6 The extent to which monopolist capital has intensified all the contradictions of capitalism is generally known. It
is sufficient to mention the high cost of living and the tyranny of the cartels. This intensification of contradictions
constitutes the most powerful driving force of the transitional period of history, which began from the time of the final
victory of world finance capital.
¶7 Monopolies, oligarchy, the striving for domination instead of striving for liberty, the exploitation of an
increasing number of small or weak nations by a handful of the richest or most powerful nations–all these have given
birth to those distinctive characteristics of imperialism which compel us to define it as parasitic or decaying capitalism.
More and more prominently there emerges, as one of the tendencies of imperialism, the creation of the “rentier state,” the
usurer state, in which the bourgeoisie to an ever increasing degree lives on the proceeds of capital exports and by
“clipping coupons.” It would be a mistake to believe that this tendency to decay precludes the rapid growth of capitalism.
It does not. In the epoch of imperialism, certain branches of industry, certain strata of the bourgeoisie and certain
countries betray, to a greater or lesser degree, now one and now another of these tendencies. On the whole, capitalism is
growing far more rapidly than before; but this growth is not only becoming more and more uneven in general, its
unevenness also manifests itself, in particular, in the decay of the countries which are richest in capital (England).
¶8 In regard to the rapidity of Germany’s economic development, Riesser, the author of the book on the big
German banks, states: “The progress of the preceding period (1848-70), which had not been exactly slow, stood in about
the same ratio to the rapidity with which the whole of Germany’s national economy, and with it German banking,
progressed during this period (1870-1905) as the speed of the mail coach in the good old days stood to the speed of the
present-day automobile . . . which is whizzing past so fast that it endangers not only innocent pedestrians in its path, but
also the occupants of the car.” In its turn, this finance capital which has grown with such extraordinary rapidity is not
unwilling, precisely because it has grown so quickly, to pass on to a more “tranquil” possession of colonies which have
to be seized–and not only by peaceful methods–from richer nations. In the United States, economic development in the
last decades has been even more rapid than in Germany, and for this very reason, the parasitic features of modern
American capitalism have stood out with particular prominence. On the other hand, a comparison of, say, the republican
American bourgeoisie with the monarchist Japanese or German bourgeoisie shows that the most pronounced political
distinction diminishes to an extreme degree in the epoch of imperialism–not because it is unimportant in general, but
because in all these cases we are discussing a bourgeoisie which has definite features of parasitism.
¶9 The receipt of high monopoly profits by the capitalists in one of the numerous branches of industry, in one of
the numerous countries, etc., makes it economically possible for them to bribe certain sections of the workers, and for a
time a fairly considerable minority of them, and win them to the side of the bourgeoisie of a given industry or given
nation against all the others. The intensification of antagonisms between imperialist nations for the division of the world
increases this striving. And so there is created that bond between imperialism and opportunism, which revealed itself
first and most clearly in England, owing to the fact that certain features of imperialist development were observable there
much earlier than in other countries. Some writers, L. Martov, for example, are prone to wave aside the connection
between imperialism and opportunism in the working-class movement–a particularly glaring fact at the present time–by
resorting to “official optimism” (à la Kautsky and Huysmans) like the following: the cause of the opponents of capitalism
would be hopeless if it were precisely progressive capitalism that led to the increase of opportunism, or, if it were
precisely the best paid workers who were inclined towards opportunism, etc. We must have no illusions about
“optimism” of this kind. It is optimism in regard to opportunism; it is optimism which serves to conceal opportunism. As
a matter of fact the extraordinary rapidity and the particularly revolting character of the development of opportunism is
by no means a guarantee that its victory will be durable: the rapid growth of a malignant abscess on a healthy body can
only cause it to burst more quickly and thus relieve the body of it. The most dangerous of all in this respect are those
who do not wish to understand that the fight against imperialism is a sham and humbug unless it is inseparably bound up
with the fight against opportunism.
¶10 From all that has been said in this book on the economic essence of imperialism, it follows that we must define
it as capitalism in transition, or, more precisely, as moribund capitalism. It is very instructive in this respect to note that
the bourgeois economists, in describing modern capitalism, frequently employ catchwords and phrases like
“interlocking,” “absence of isolation,” etc.; “in conformity with their functions and course of development,” banks are
“not purely private business enterprises; they are more and more outgrowing the sphere of purely private business
regulation.” And this very Riesser, who uttered the words just quoted, declares with all seriousness that the “prophecy”
of the Marxists concerning “socialization” has “not come true”!
47
¶11 What then does this catchword “interlocking” express? It merely expresses the most striking feature of the
process going on before our eyes. It shows that the observer counts the separate trees, but cannot see the wood. It
slayishly copies the superficial, the fortuitous, the chaotic. It reveals the observer as one who is overwhelmed by the
mass of raw material and is utterly incapable of appreciating its meaning and importance. Ownership of shares, the
relations between owners of private property “interlock in a haphazard way.” But underlying this interlocking, its very
base, is the changing social relations of production. When a big enterprise assumes gigantic proportions, and, on the
basis of an exact computation of mass data, organizes according to plan the supply of primary raw materials to the extent
of two-thirds, or three-fourths of all that is necessary for tens of millions of people; when the raw materials are
transported in a systematic and organized manner to the most suitable place of production, sometimes hundreds or
thousands of miles, when a single centre directs all the consecutive stages of work right up to the manufacture of
numerous varieties of finished articles; when these products are distributed according to a single plan among tens and
hundreds of millions of consumers (the distribution of oil in America and Germany by the American “oil trust”)– then it
becomes evident that we have socialization of production, and not mere “interlocking”; that private economic and private
property relations constitute a shell which no longer fits its contents, a shell which must inevitably decay if its removal
by artificial means be delayed; a shell which may continue in a state of decay for a fairly long period (if, at the worst, the
cure of the opportunist abscess is protracted), but which will inevitably be removed.
¶12 The enthusiastic admirer of German imperialism, Schulze-Gaevernitz exclaims:
“Once the supreme management of the German banks has been entrusted to the hands of a dozen persons, their
activity is even today more significant for the public good than that of the majority of the Ministers of State.” (The
“interlocking” of bankers, ministers, magnates of industry and rentiers is here conveniently forgotten.) . . . “If we
conceive of the development of those tendencies which we have noted carried to their logical conclusion we will have:
the money capital of the nation united in the banks; the banks themselves combined into cartels; the investment capital of
the nation cast in the shape of securities. Then the forecast of that genius Saint-Simon will be fulfilled; ‘The present
anarchy of production, which corresponds to the fact that economic relations are developing without uniform regulation,
must make way for organization in production. Production will no longer be directed by isolated manufacturers,
independent of each other and ignorant of man’s economic needs; that will be done by a certain public institution. A
central committee of management, being able to survey the large field of social economy from a more elevated point of
view, will regulate it for the benefit of the whole of society, will put the means of production into suitable hands, and
above all will take care that there be constant harmony between production and consumption. Institutions already exist
which have assumed as part of their functions a certain organization of economic labour: the banks.’ We are still a long
way from the fulfilment of Saint-Simon’s forecast, but we are on the way towards it: Marxism, different from what Marx
imagined, but different only in form.”* [Grundriss der Sozialôkonomik, p. 146. ]
¶13 A crushing “refutation” of Marx, indeed, which retreats a step from Marx’s precise, scientific analysis to
Saint-Simon’s guesswork, the guesswork of a genius, but guesswork all the same.
Written January-June 1916
Published in pamphlet form in Petrograd, April 1917
NOTES
1. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism was written in the first half of 1916. While Lenin was in Berne during
1915 he began to study various works on imperialism that had been published in many countries. He started work on this
book in January 1916 and at the end of the month he moved to Zurich, where he continued his work at the Zurich
Cantonal Library. From hundreds of books, periodicals, newspapers and statistical abstracts published in different
languages he made numerous extracts, summaries, notes and tables, which make up more than 40 printing sheets. These
materials were published as a separate pamphlet in 1939 under the title of Notebooks on Imperialism.
On June 19 (July 2) 1916 Lenin sent his completed manuscript on imperialism to the Parus Publishers.
Menshevik elements among the management deleted from the book parts sharply criticizing the opportunist theories of
Kautsky and the Russian Mensheviks (Martov and Co.). Lenin’s terms pererastaniye (capitalism growing into capitalist
imperialism) was altered to prevrashcheniye (transformation); reaktsionny kharakter (reactionary nature of the theory
of Ultraimperialism) to otstaly kharakter (backward character), etc. In early 1917 the book was printed under the title
Imperialism, tbe Latest Stage of Capitalism, by the Parus Publishers in Petrograd.
After returning to Russia, Lenin wrote a preface to the book, which finally saw the light of day in September
1917.
On the significance of the book Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, see the History of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course, Eng. ed., Moscow, 1950, pp. 207-09. p. 1
2. See pp. 146-48 of this book. p. 2
3. This preface was first published under the title “Imperialism and Capitalism” in Communist International, No. 18,
48
dated October 1921. p. 3
4. The Manifesto is omtted in the present edition. p 7
5. A Centrist party set up in April 1917. The bulk of the party consisted of the Kautskyite Labour Commonwealth. The
Independents preached “unity” with the open social-chauvinists, justified and defended them and demanded the rejection
of the class struggle.
In October 1920, a split took place at the congress of the I.S.D.P.G in Halle. In December a considerable part of
the party merged with the Communist Party of Germany. The Right-wing elements formed a separate party and took the
old name of I.S.D.P.G., which existed until 1922. p. 8
6. The Spartacists–members of the Spartacus League, a revolutionary organization of German Left-Wing
Social-Democrats, formed in the early period of World War I under the leadership of Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg,
Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin and others. It was also known as the Internationale group. The Spartacists conducted
revolutionary propaganda among the masses against the imperialist war and exposed the predatory policy of German
imperialism and the treachery of the opportunist Social-Democratic leaders. But the Spartacists failed to free themselves
from semi-Menshevik fallacies on cardinal questions of theory and policy. They propagated a semi-Menshevik theory of
imperialism, rejected the Marxist interpretation of the principle of self-determination of nations (i.e., up to and including
secession and the formation of independent states), denied the possibility of national liberation wars in the imperialist
epoch, underestimated the role of the revolutionary party and bowed to the spontaneity in the working-class movement
(see the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course, Eng. ed., Moscow, 1950, pp.
42-45). A criticism of the mistakes of the German Lefts is given in Lenin’s “The Junius Pamphlet” (Collected Works, 4th
Russ. ed., Vol. XXII, pp. 291-305), “A Caricature of Marxism and ‘Imperialist Economism'” (ibid., Vol. XXIII, pp.
16-64), and other works, and in Stalin’s letter “Some Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism” (Works, Eng. ed.,
Moscow, 1955, Vol. XIII, pp. 86-104). In 1917 the Spartacists joined the Centrist Independent Social-Democratic Party
of Germany, but remained organizationally independent. After the revolution in Germany in November 1918, they broke
with the Independents and in December of the same year founded the Communist Party of Germany. p. 9
7. In the present edition the author’s references and notes are given as footnotes. p. 12
8. Karl Marx, Capital, Ger. ea., Berlin, 1959, Vol. III, p. 655. p. 39
9. These occurred during the widespread establishment of joint-stock companies in the early seventies of the nineteenth
century, which was accompanied by all manner of fraudulent operations by bourgeois businessmen, who were making a
great deal of money, and by wild speculation in real estate and securities. p. 42
10. Frankfurtet Zeitung (Prankfort Gazette)–a daily published in Frankfort-on-Main by German petty-bourgeois
democrats from 1856 to 1943. p.44
11. Lenin meant G. V. Plekhanov. p. 55
12. Produgol–an abbreviation for the Russian Society for Trade in Mineral Fuel of the Donets Basin, founded in 1906.
Prodamet–the Society for Marketing Russian Metallurgical Goods, founded in 1901. p. 61
13. The exposure in France in 1892-93 of incredible abuses, corruption of politicians, officials and the press bribed by
the French Panama Canal Company. p. 67
14. See pp. 93-94 of this book. p.101
15. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Correspondence, Ger. ed., Berlin, 1913, pp.131-32. p. 129
16. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Correspondence, Ger. ea., Berlin, 1950, Vol. IV, pp. 608-09. p. 129
17. The Menshevik M. I. Nakhimson. p. 136
18. Karl Marx,
Capital, Ger. ed., Berlin, 1959, Vol. III, p.142.p.137
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