"Not the Same Old Way: Trends in Peace Operations Article by Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman (2017)

No citations nor quotes more than 3 words, double spaced, 12 point times new roman font, one inch margins, Does not require title nor a title page. I need an introductory paragraph which will be the overall summarized argument made by the author’s. it should be 1/2 of a page. Body paragraphs in which you will summarize the different parts of the arguments including the evidence that supports it. And lastly, a brief conclusion.
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Copyright © 2017 by the Brown Journal of World Affairs
Paul F. Diehl is Associate Provost, Ashbel Smith Professor of Political Science, and Director of the Center
for Teaching and Learning at the University of Texas-Dallas. He served as President of the International
Studies Association for the 2015-16 term. His areas of expertise include the causes of war, UN peacekeeping,
and international law.
Daniel Druckman is Professor Emeritus of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University in
Fairfax, Virginia, and an Honorary Professor at Macquarie University and at the University of Queensland
in Australia. He has published widely on such topics as international negotiation, nationalism, justice in
peace agreements, peacekeeping, electronic mediation, and research methodologies.
Not the Same Old Way:
Trends in Peace Operations
The first peacekeeping operation carried out by the United Nations is
generally considered to have been the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
(UNTSO), created in 1948 to monitor the ceasefire following the
first Arab-Israeli War. That operation, consisting of a small number of unarmed
observers, remains in place today. Nevertheless, peacekeeping has undergone
a tremendous metamorphosis in its frequency, scope, and management in the
last 70 years.
The history of peace operations can roughly be divided into four historical
eras.1
The so-called “golden age of peacekeeping” (1956–1978) commenced
with the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) after
the Suez Crisis, which ushered in a number of UN operations that supervised
ceasefires in some longstanding interstate conflicts. This was followed by the
so-called “Lost Decade” (1979–1988), during which no new peace operations
were authorized and many believed that peacekeeping had become passé. This
trend did not persist, as the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early
1990s marked the beginning of an era that involved a dramatic expansion in the
number of new operations, ones that took on a series of peacebuilding missions
in addition to traditional ceasefire monitoring roles. Operations in Somalia and
Haiti are indicative of this trend. The legacy of this era persists in the twenty-first
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century, with peacekeeping involving greater use of military force and deployment
in contexts of ongoing wars, as opposed to post-ceasefire environments.
In this essay, we explore some of the broader historical trends in peace operations,
focusing on their frequency over time, the kinds of conflicts to which
they have been deployed, the organizations carrying out the missions, and the
types of operational missions performed. These trends show that peacekeeping
operations have become more complex, largely due to a dramatic increase in
the number of failed states and civil wars since the end of the Cold War. With
these developments, the core peacekeeping functions of violence abatement,
containment, and settlement are insufficient for realizing durable peace. Managing
conflicts in this environment entails rebuilding post-conflict societies. These
tasks include election supervision, humanitarian assistance, contributing to the
rule of law and governance, and human rights protection. In this essay, we document
these trends, offer some explanations for them, and discuss implications
for future policy choices.
Trends in Authorizations
Although it is now standard practice to consider peacekeeping an item on the
menu of conflict management choices for international organizations, it was
hardly always that way. As Figure 1 demonstrates, few peace operations were
deployed during the Cold War period from 1948-1990. Following the Cold War
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there has been a marked increase in new operations, particularly in response to
the large number of civil wars during the 1990s and early 2000s. More recently
(since 2010), fewer new operations have been deployed.2
Only 28 peace operations began in the Cold War era (1945-1988). These
were—and in some cases, continue to be—largely UN operations that perform
traditional missions, such as supervising ceasefires with a relatively small number
of troops. Hot spots such as the Middle East have received the most attention.
The end of the 1980s also represented a major inflection point, as peace operations
increased dramatically
in number and in
geographic locus, with
172 operations starting
between 1989–2016.3
This is a rate of more
than six new operations
per year, although many are related to one another and are deployed to the same
conflict (e.g., a handful of operations were sent to Haiti, beginning in 1993). The
total number of operations, including those that are new, has remained steady at
about 60 per year from 2006 to 2015.4
As noted below, these operations extend
well beyond traditional missions and involve a variety of organizing agencies.
Trends in Conflict Types
Initially, peace operations were typically confined to conflicts between states.
Thus, the first observation missions were sent to the Arab-Israeli (United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization—UNTSO) and India-Pakistan (United Nations
Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan—UNMOGIP) conflicts.5
This
pattern continued through the 1970s, with internal issues drawing attention
only as they intersected with decolonization concerns, as was the case both in
Western New Guinea (United Nations Temporary Executive Authority—UNTEA/United
Nations Security Force in West New Guinea—UNSF) and in the
Congo (United Nations Operation in the Congo—ONUC).
In the 1990s, peace operations waded into conflicts that were exclusively
or significantly internal. Ever since, such operations have constituted almost
90 percent of new operations. Since 2000, the only operation sent to a purely
interstate conflict was the one deployed following the Ethiopian-Eritrean War
(United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea—UNMEE). Although this was
a war between two states, its origins are found in the internal secessionist conflict
The end of the 1980s represented a
major inflection point, as peace operations
increased dramatically in
number and in geographic locus.
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that occurred less than a decade earlier and resulted in Eritrean independence.
Trends in Peace Operation Agents
In the Cold War era, the United Nations was the primary, sometimes exclusive,
organization for carrying out peace operations. This was largely because regional
organizations were nonexistent, had underdeveloped intervention provisions in
their charters, or lacked the resources and structural capacity to organize and
carry out peace operations. The relatively small number of operations prior to
1989 made it possible for the United Nations and occasionally an agent such as
the Organization of American States (OAS) to carry the burden. Multinational
coalitions of states were structured within traditional alliances (e.g., NATO and
the Warsaw Pact) and focused on the conventional military strategies of deterrence
and defense rather than conflict management in the form of peacekeeping.
The United Nations is still the leading peacekeeping agent, but it accounts
for less than 40 percent of all operations in the 1948–2016 period. The European
Union (EU) is second, with roughly 16 percent of all operations. Beyond
that, there are 12 other regional organizations, such as the African Union (AU)
and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), that have been involved
in at least one peacekeeping operation. Almost 10 percent of operations were
formed through multinational or national groups outside of formal international
institutional structures.6
Some of these date to the 1980s, such as the
Multinational Force (MNF I and II) in Lebanon, but others are more recent,
such as the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) in Papua New Guinea, made up of
civilian and military personnel from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and Vanuatu.
In the minds of national elites and the general public, peace operations are
identified with the United Nations and the symbol of the blue helmets worn
by soldiers in its missions. Over time, however, peacekeeping (and peacebuilding—see
below) operations have been initiated under the purview of a wide
variety of different organizations and collections of states. In some cases, operations
deployed by different agents address the same conflict either sequentially
or simultaneously, as was the case with UN, EU, and AU efforts in Sudan.7
Trends in Mission Mandates
Originally, peace operations performed a single primary mission: supervising
ceasefires between disputants. More recently, however, peacekeeping has evolved
to include a wide variety of other missions and associated tasks. In the UN from
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1948–2015, for example, there were clear patterns and dramatic changes in
the nature of the 11 missions that took place, including ceasefire monitoring,
election supervision, and those that fall under the peacebuilding rubric (e.g.,
promoting the rule of law).8
Traditional peacekeeping missions involving observation and monitoring
of ceasefires remain the most common task, present in almost 80 percent of
peace operations. Nevertheless, and certainly the case with respect to recent
operations, more than half of all peacekeeping deployments entail humanitarian
assistance and the promotion of local security and law and order. Election
supervision and human rights protection are also common missions, such as in
the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). Indeed, only about 17 percent of peace
operations are confined to one mission.9
The mean number of missions per operation is 4.17, so peace operations
assume multiple roles in promoting international peace and security.10 In the
Cold War period (operations initially authorized before 1991), peace operations
had an average of 2.11 missions, whereas post–Cold War operations (authorized
in 1991 and thereafter) had a mean of 4.88 missions.11 The bottom line is that
peace operations are now asked to do far more in terms of goals and associated
tasks than ever before.
Accounting for Trends
As noted, peace operations have changed substantially over time. In recent decades,
they have become more numerous, confined primarily to civil conflicts,
and thus tasked with missions that go beyond ceasefire monitoring. They are
also more likely to be carried out by agents other than the United Nations. What
accounts for these dramatic changes, many of which have taken place following
the end of the Cold War?
Balas and colleagues explored a demand-side perspective that argues that
peace operations responded to a shift in the kinds of conflicts facing the global
community (specifically, a change from predominantly interstate conflicts to
internal ones), a general increase in conflicts of all varieties, and an increase
in the number of more comprehensive, negotiated agreements that terminate
those conflicts.12 Thus, one explanation is that the international community
has responded to a change in the environment and adapted peace operations
accordingly.
Evidence for the demand-side argument is checkered. The number of civil
conflicts has indeed increased since the Cold War, and there has been a decline in
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the number of interstate wars—at least during the 1990s. Nevertheless, the trend
toward an increase in armed conflict that was apparent in the immediate postCold
War period has dissipated and then reversed in the twenty-first century.13
Changes in conflict patterns do not explain the disproportionate increase
in the rate of intervention by the UN and regional organizations. That is, the
likelihood of a peace operation being sent to a given conflict is now greater, ceteris
paribus, than in previous eras. Even as armed conflict—the demand for intervention
in the form of
peace operations—has
been reduced in the last
decade or more, peace
operation creation has
maintained its high rate.
Particularly important is
the scope and intensity
of those wars, not merely their raw numbers. Civil conflicts increasingly have
negative externalities, or spillover effects, on neighboring states, threatening
international peace and security as well as providing impetuses for the international
community to act; such effects include refugee flows, cross-border
fighting, and even genocide.
A more substantial cause may lie within the increased prevalence of comprehensive,
negotiated agreements that terminated conflicts. These agreements
appeared far more frequently in the post-Cold War world.14 This suggests that
disputants may have requested more peacebuilding activities as a part of the peace
agreements. The expansion of and increase in peace operation missions are not
merely functions of the opportunities available to the international community,
but also its willingness and capacity to take action.15
There is now greater capacity for multiple organizations to meet any changes
in demand. As new peacekeeping operations have skyrocketed in the last 25–30
years, it is unrealistic for any single organization to assume responsibility for
them. At the same time, regional (e.g., EU) and subregional (e.g., Economic
Community of West African States, or ECOWAS) organizations have moved
beyond their founding economic purposes to include conflict management. As
a result, peace operations are now carried out by multiple actors.
In order to account for the rise in the number of missions and peace operations,
there have been substantial shifts in three related international norms:
sovereignty, democratization, and humanitarian intervention.16 During the
Cold War, before a peacekeeping operation could be deployed, the state upon
Even as armed conflict—the demand
for intervention in the form of peace
operations—has been reduced in the
last decade or more, peace operation
creation has maintained its high rate.
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whose territory the peacekeepers would be deployed had to agree to the operation.
The traditional notion held that sovereignty was nearly absolute: what
happened inside state borders was solely the domain of national governments.
More recently, exceptions to state sovereignty have been carved out, and the idea
that the international community has a vested interest in, and can play a role in,
internal matters has been increasingly accepted. Post-Iraq examples include the
continuing involvement in fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan and incursions
into Syria to destabilize the Assad regime.
Democratization has also clearly influenced intervention behavior and a
commitment to democratic principles, strengthened in the wake of the Cold
War. When disputants sign agreements to end conflicts—after 1989—that request
a peace operation, they often ask the operation to accept tasks associated
with democratization, such as monitoring elections (for example, in Angola,
Liberia, Mozambique, and Namibia) or facilitating changes in the rule of law
associated with the emergence of a new, democratic entity (for example, in
East Timor). In short, as the norm of democratization strengthened after the
Cold War, disputants have asked for assistance to build democratic states, and
organizations have offered to expand their mandates to include such associated
peacebuilding tasks.
Finally, there is the norm of humanitarian intervention.17 This norm establishes
a right for the international community to intervene in the event of
humanitarian disasters and widespread human rights violations. Still, there is
no legal obligation or “responsibility to protect” that assures an international
response to violations.18 Of course, no sovereign barriers to intervention exist in
the case of failed states, but there has not been an expectation of an affirmative
response by the global community until recently. Accordingly, peace operations
have been sent to areas without the full cooperation of the legally sovereign state
(for example, Kosovo Force—KFOR), or where no functioning government
existed (for example, United Nations Operation in Somalia—UNOSOM I).
Both illustrate a shift in international norms that include a more expansive role
for peace operations.
Policy Implications and the Future
The trends discussed in the previous sections indicate that peace operations
have become more complex in several ways. First, there are a larger number of
operations worldwide. Second, the kinds of functions performed by peacekeepers
have increased. Third, many other organizations have become involved in tasks
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traditionally performed by UN peacekeepers. Examples of NGOs are Mercy
Corps/Conflict Management Group, Save the Children, Genocide Intervention
Network, and Nonviolent Peaceforce.19 Finally, the context of peace operations
has changed from primarily interstate to intrastate conflict. Each of these developments
has substantial policy implications.
A larger number of missions invariably leads to increased demands for
resources from contributing nations. At present, the UN alone has deployed
over 100,000 personnel in 16 peace operations.20 Such operations cost approximately
$8 billion each year. Although this pales in comparison to U.S. military
spending, it is actually more than the regular budget for the organization as
a whole. Political issues arise when portions of the voting population express
reluctance at continuing to foot the bill for these foreign actions. Indeed, the
Trump administration in the United States has been particularly critical of UN
spending and foreign aid in general.
Resource demands from an increased number of operations could lead the
UN Security Council (where the United States has a veto) to limit the number of
new operations or not reauthorize extant operations; in effect, the international
community might exercise triage when deciding in which conflicts to intervene.
Some peace operations that should have been authorized will not be, given the
burden of existing operations. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the
most dangerous conflicts will be chosen for peace operations; more likely, the
Security Council will balance the interests of its major powers with the need for
conflict management. Furthermore, operation selection might be driven instead
by the scope of current commitments rather than exigency. In addition, newly
authorized missions may be suboptimal in terms of their mandates, starting
times, or resources (e.g., number of soldiers). Rather than individual instances
of missed opportunities, all peace operations may be affected as the burden of
over-commitment is shared across operations. Unless regional organizations—
which also face their own sets of resource and political constraints—fill the void,
some conflicts will be allowed to fester.
A larger portfolio of functions carried out by multiple actors and organizations
also raises several policy implications. One concern is that of coordination
and interagency conflict. Traditional peacekeeping operations were relatively
uncomplicated: the UN was largely responsible for securing commitments
from contributing states, and the actual conduct of an operation was left to a
commander and national military units. Within peacebuilding, however, the
military aspect must be coordinated with contemporaneous economic, social,
political, and humanitarian efforts. This may involve other units of the organizing
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agent (e.g., the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs), other international
organizations (e.g., the World Bank or regional development banks), or NGOs
(e.g., Doctors Without Borders). Coordination must also occur with local actors,
groups, militias, and government officials. Hybrid operations may add to the
complexity as different tasks are assigned or shared among other peace operation
agents (e.g., partnerships between the AU and the EU).21
Balas suggests that all participating organizations should have liaison officers
for peace operations at each other’s headquarters.22 Another suggestion
for increased cooperation
would be to have
yearly, multilateral summits
on peace operations
between the different
international organizations
active in this field,
allowing for better coordination and cooperation—both at the headquarters and
in the field. Finally, the UN, regional organizations, and NGOs could develop
some common standards for the conduct of such operations; some standards
exist for each of these sets of actors, but they are not always congruent with one
another. The net result would be greater efficiency in the delivery of vital supplies
so that duplication would be avoided and areas of the greatest humanitarian
need would not be missed.
Another implication of multiple missions in peace operations concerns
training. In addition to combat skills, military peacekeepers must develop
contact skills. For example, operations that attempt to restore civil societies
entail interpersonal and intergroup relational skills such as communication,
negotiation, and mediation. Similarly, those that focus on humanitarian assistance
also call for organizational skills. A core goal of all peace operations is
to prevent new outbreaks of violence. This is not achieved exclusively—or even
primarily—by military force or deterrence. Rather, compromises between hostile
parties are often necessary (for example, to ensure safe civilian passage through
areas controlled by different militias), and such agreements are most likely to
succeed when peacekeepers have some expertise in negotiation and mediation.
The challenges of training are considerable. They include learning to be
flexible as missions evolve, managing to shift between combat and contact roles,
and dealing with incompatible missions and culture shock.23 The variety of skills
that need to be developed has implications for agency supervision, once again
challenging military and civilian departments to coordinate their actions.
A core goal of all peace operations is to
prevent new outbreaks of violence. This
is not achieved exclusively—or even primarily—by
military force or deterrence.
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There has been an improvement in training regimens for peacekeepers,
in that most national militaries no longer insist that standard military training
is all that is needed for peace operation duty. Some states, such as the Nordic
countries, have conducted joint peacekeeping training for years, and private
organizations have sponsored workshops and seminars on peace operation
practices. One further option is to establish common training regimens for UN
and regional organizations; states would not be permitted to participate in peace
operations without meeting certain training standards, including those related
to contact skills and conflict management.24 The international community could
also adopt a peace operation specialty within national militaries, having their
soldiers trained for particular peacebuilding missions such as promoting societal
restoration and reconciliation. Specialized personnel outside conventional
military establishments could be called upon to perform specific duties.
The historical shift toward operations in the context of intrastate conflict
raises other policy implications. Civil conflicts have been characterized by a low
rate of success: over 40 percent of the 216 intrastate peace agreements included
in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) Peace Agreements Dataset
(1975-2011) saw a resumption of violence within five years.25 They often have
a greater number of relevant actors, a broader geographic area to cover, and a
difficult context for monitoring behavior. Peace operations in civil conflict are
dealing not only with multiple internal actors but sometimes also with contexts—including
failed states—that involve a breakdown or lack of government
structures on which to support their activities and promote long-term peace.
Indeed, peace operations are increasingly asked to fill those gaps and rebuild
the necessary institutions. As a result, the post–Cold War operations have taken
longer, averaging six years with a range of three months (Guatemala 1996) to
15 years (Kosovo 1999) following the peace agreement (a standard deviation of
4.65), according to one study.26 Further, results from that study show that shorter
peacekeeping operations occurred when the internal conflict environment was
less intense, and when peace negotiators adhered to principles of procedural
justice during the negotiation process.
Beyond the greater resource demands noted above, new peacebuilding
strategies might be needed to address the challenges of failed states or to sustain
missions in transformative societies. These could include more active participation
in providing advice for drafting constitutions, in sustaining grassroots
participation in constitutional assemblies, and in developing procedures that
encourage adherence to the statutes that provide a rule of law. Not all changes,
however, need to be reactive. Other actions may include greater use of preventive
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deployments of peacekeepers in order to head off state collapse or mitigate the
political and humanitarian disasters that result. Similarly, enhanced diplomatic
efforts might also produce plans with better cooperation from affected parties
and ones executed earlier in the reconstructive processes so that, even if peace
operations were deployed, their prospects for success and early withdrawal
would improve.
A novel approach that emerged in the middle of the twentienth century,
peacekeeping is now standard protocol for international—and intranational—
conflict management. It is unlikely that it will disappear in the coming decades,
although its evolution poses many difficult challenges. The strategy and the agents
responsible for authorizing and implementing these operations must adapt to
the changing circumstances in order for the successes that have been achieved
to be replicated and the failures not to be repeated. These operations occur in
increasingly uncertain global environments, requiring flexible adaptation from
both policymakers who craft missions and the peacekeepers who implement
those mandates. While we learn lessons about operations conducted in the past,
we are also aware that the new challenges to peace operations mean that they
will not be done in the same old way.
Notes
1. The labels used for each era and an extended discussion of each can be found in Paul F. Diehl and
Alexandru Balas, Peace Operations, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014): 43–60.
2. Most of the data, here and below, are based on the Appendix in Ibid., revised and updated (2012–2016)
by the authors.
3. Ibid.
4. See: SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2016).
5. United Nations Peacekeeping, UNTSO, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso/, and
UNMOGIP, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmogip/.
6. All the descriptive data here are taken from the Appendix in Diehl and Balas, Peace Operations, revised
and updated (2012-2016) by the authors.
7. Alexandru Balas, “It Takes Two (or More) to Keep the Peace: Multiple Simultaneous Peace Operations,”
Journal of International Peacekeeping, 15 (2011): 384–421.
8. Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman, “Multiple Peacekeeping Missions: Analyzing the Interdependence
of Peace Operation Missions,” International Peacekeeping (forthcoming).
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Alexandru Balas, Andrew Owsiak, and Paul F. Diehl, “Demanding Peace: The Impact of Prevailing
Conflict on the Shift from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding,” Peace and Change, 37 (2012): 195–226.
13. Therése Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2014” Journal of Peace Research,
52 (2015): 536–50.
14. Ibid.; also see: the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and Notre Dame’s Peace Accords Matrix
(PAM) for many examples of comprehensive agreements.
A
W
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15. Balas et al., “Demanding Peace.”
16. Ibid.
17. Thomas Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007): 88–118;
see also: Christopher Joyner, “The Responsibility to Protect: Humanitarian Concern and Lawfulness of
Armed Intervention,” Virginia Journal of International Law 47, no. 3 (2007): 693–724.
18. Alex Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 1–34.
19. These and other examples are discussed in chapter 5 of Andrea Bartoli, Negotiating Peace: The Role
of Non-Governmental Organizations (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters, 2013).
20. United Nations Peacekeeping Fact Sheet, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/
factsheet.shtml.
21. Some of these concerns have been addressed by UN reform efforts, but these have not necessarily
been successful. See: The United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi
Report), http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/brahimi_report.shtml. Reforms in 2000 were limited to
the United Nations and in any case not fully implemented. The Peacebuilding Commission reflects the
need for coordination, but that organization is only advisory, and it is supported by a relatively small staff
in the Peacebuilding Support Office. The HIPPO (High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations)
Report, http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.
pdf in 2015 and its recommendations are still too recent to assess whether there will be any impact on
UN planning and implementation.
22. Alexandru Balas, “Creating Global Synergies. Inter-Organizational Cooperation in Peace Operations,”
(PhD diss, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), 2011.
23. See: Paul F. Diehl, Daniel Druckman, and James Wall, “International Peacekeeping and Conflict
Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 1 (1998): 33–55.
24. For more on training contact skills, see: Daniel Druckman, Jerome E. Singer, and Harold Van Cott,
eds., Enhancing Organizational Performance (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997), chapter 7.
25. See Stina Högbladh, “Peace agreements 1975-2011 – Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset,”
in States in Armed Conflict 2011, ed. Therese Pettersson and Themner Lotta (Uppsala University:
Department of Peace and Conflict Research Report 99, 2012), 39–56.
26. See: Daniel Druckman and Lynn Wagner, “Negotiating Peace: The Role of Procedural and Distributive
Justice in Achieving Durable Peace,” in Group Decision and Negotiation: Theory, Empirical Evidence,
and Applications, ed. Deepinder Bajwa, Sabine T. Koeszegi, and Rudolf Vetschera (Cham, Switzerland:
Springer, 2017), 152–74.
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